


CZECH * DEMO GRAPHY

2010, Vol. 4



ARTICLES – *Terezie Štyglerová*: The Population Development of the Czech Republic in 2008 • *Jiřina Kocourková*: Family Policy in the Perspective of (Not Just) Demographers • A Speech by Vladimír Špidla, European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities • *Wendy Sigle-Rushton*: Fertility in England and Wales: A Policy Puzzle? • *Marta Korintus*: Challenges and Way Forward for Children's Services in Hungary • *Milan Kučera*: Pronatal Population Policy Is No Longer Enough – a Complex Family Policy Is Now Essential • *Kateřina Jirková*: The Concept of Family Policy and Measures Initiated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic

BOOK REVIEWS • DIGEST • DATA

Czech Demography, 2010, Vol. 4

The fourth issue of the electronic journal *Czech Demography* is being published for the last time in 2010. It was designed to present a selection of the best articles from the previous year's issues of *Demografie* in Czech in order to provide information about themes of interest in Czech demography. In 2011 the CSO is launching a new concept: one of the four annual issues of *Demografie* will be published in English. *Demography – Review of Population Development* thus now be open to scholars from abroad as well as from the Czech Republic. *Demografie* will continue to be published in print and the content of articles will be published with a quarter-year delay on the CSO's website.

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THE POPULATION DEVELOPMENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN 2008^{*)}

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Abstract: This article describes the demographic situation in the Czech Republic in 2008 and evaluates it in the context of recent development. The study analyses the causes and structures of population growth, the increase in fertility, divorce rate and abortion rate, and decrease in nuptiality and mortality. The issue of international migration data is also discussed. The analysis is based on data processed by the Czech Statistical Office.

Population development in 2008 recorded a further increase in the number of live-born children and total fertility. This resulted in a positive natural increase, and there was also a significant increase in the size of the population due to foreign migration. The total divorce rate surpassed the previous maximum in 2004, while conversely the marriage rate fell. In 2008 the trend of a halt to the previous decline in the induced abortion rate was confirmed.

The size of the population in the Czech Republic increased in 2008 by 86.4 thousand to reach 10 467.5 thousand people. The smaller population increase in 2008 than in 2007 (by 7.5 thousand) was the result of lower net migration. Conversely, the natural increase of 14.6 thousand was higher in 2008 than in the previous year by 4.6 thousand. The positive natural increases in the past three years (which followed a several-year period of decreases) were caused by the rise in the number of children born while the number of deaths stagnated. When the current wave of higher fertility ends (once the large cohorts of women born in the 1970s complete their fertility), the numbers of births will decrease.

The number of live-born children in 2008 was 4.9 thousand higher than in the previous year and reached 119.6 thousand. The last time the number of births was higher than this was in 1993 (121.0 thousand). But this was a smaller increase than that previously recorded between 2006 and 2007 (8.8 thousand). The rise in the number of live-born children recorded since 2002 has thus slowed. While between 2006 and 2007 first-order children accounted for one-quarter of the increase and second-order children one-half of the increase, between 2007 and 2008 first-order children made up almost sixty percent of the inter-year increase. There were also differences in the decomposition of the last two inter-year increases by child legitimacy: while between 2006 and 2007 there were almost equal shares of marital and extramarital

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Table 1 Population change, 2001–2008

Indicators	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	Numbers							
Live births	90 715	92 786	93 685	97 664	102 211	105 831	114 632	119 570
Deaths	107 755	108 243	111 288	107 177	107 938	104 441	104 636	104 948
Infant deaths	360	385	365	366	347	352	360	338
Marriages	52 374	52 732	48 943	51 447	51 829	52 860	57 157	52 457
Divorces	31 586	31 758	32 824	33 060	31 288	31 415	31 129	31 300
Abortions, total	45 057	43 743	42 304	41 324	40 023	39 959	40 917	41 446
induced abortions	32 528	31 142	29 298	27 574	26 453	25 352	25 414	25 760
Immigrants	12 918	44 679	60 015	53 453	60 294	68 183	104 445	77 817
Emigrants	21 469	32 389	34 226	34 818	24 065	33 463	20 500	6 027
Natural increase	-17 040	-15 457	-17 603	-9 513	-5 727	1 390	9 996	14 622
Net migration	-8 551	12 290	25 789	18 635	36 229	34 720	83 945	71 790
Total increase	-25 591	-3 167	8 186	9 122	30 502	36 110	93 941	86 412
Population (1 July)	10 287 482	10 189 423	10 201 651	10 206 923	10 234 092	10 266 646	10 322 689	10 429 692
	Per 1,000 population							
Live births	8.8	9.1	9.2	9.6	10.0	10.3	11.1	11.5
Deaths	10.5	10.6	10.9	10.5	10.5	10.2	10.1	10.1
Marriages	5.1	5.2	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.1	5.5	5.0
Divorces	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0
Abortions, total	4.4	4.3	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0
induced abortions	3.2	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5
Immigrants	1.3	4.4	5.9	5.2	5.9	6.6	10.1	7.5
Emigrants	2.1	3.2	3.4	3.4	2.4	3.3	2.0	0.6
Natural increase	-1.7	-1.5	-1.7	-0.9	-0.6	0.1	1.0	1.4
Net migration	-0.8	1.2	2.5	1.8	3.5	3.4	8.1	6.9
Total increase	-2.5	-0.3	0.8	0.9	3.0	3.5	9.1	8.3

births in the increases, between 2007 and 2008 eighty percent of the increase in live births was made up of children born to unmarried women.

In 2008, 104.9 thousand people died, which was almost the same number as in the previous two years. Even with the increase in the number of live-born children fewer infants died last year. This signified a further decrease in the already very low infant mortality rate – to 2.8 per mille.

The number of marriages that took place in 2008 (52.5 thousand) was 4.7 thousand lower than in the previous year, but it was basically comparable to the numbers recorded in other years in the new century (except for 2003). However, 2007 was an exceptional year for nuptiality, owing largely to the strong marriage appeal of the date 7. 7. 2007. The year 2008 also provided such a date that drew more people than usual to the altar – 8. 8. 2008. On this day a total of 2.2 thousand weddings took place (on 7. 7. 2007 though the figure was 4.4 thousand). Unlike the July data of the previous year, however, this did not lead to an increase in the total yearly number of marriages. In 2008, a total of 31.3 thousand marriages divorced, which is almost the same figure as in 2005–2007.

The number of abortions registered in 2008 (41.4 thousand) was slightly higher than in 2007. Both the number of induced abortions and spontaneous abortions increased. The rising trend in the number of spontaneous abortions has been apparent since 2003 and is mainly related to the increase in the number of pregnancies and the rise in the average age of pregnant women. However, the trend in abortions in 2008 confirms that there has been a halt to the long-term (eighteen-year) decrease in the number of abortions, which was already apparent from the trend in 2007.

Based on data from the Central Population Register Record of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (ISEO)¹⁾ registered foreign migration in the Czech Republic in 2008 added

Table 2 Foreigners by citizenship, 2001 and 2008

Citizenship	Number 31 Dec 2001	Number 31 Dec 2008	Difference between 2008 and 2001	Index 2008/2001
Ukraine	51 825	131 965	80 140	2.5
Vietnam	23 924	60 258	36 334	2.5
Slovakia	53 294	76 034	22 740	1.4
Russia	12 423	27 178	14 755	2.2
Germany	4 937	17 496	12 559	3.5
Moldova	2 477	10 644	8 167	4.3
Mongolia	1 153	8 569	7 416	7.4
Poland	16 489	21 710	5 221	1.3
Serbia and Montenegro	0	3 214	3 214	x
United Kingdom	1 628	4 512	2 884	2.8
Uzbekistan	87	2 327	2 240	26.7
United States	3 160	5 272	2 112	1.7
China	3 309	5 205	1 896	1.6
Netherlands	726	2 604	1 878	3.6
Bulgaria	4 101	5 922	1 821	1.4
Total	210 794	438 301	227 507	2.1

71.8 thousand people to the population. Compared to 2007, net migration in 2008 was lower (71.8 thousand, a decrease of 12.2 thousand from 2007), but much higher than in previous years (e.g. 35–36 thousand in 2005–2006). In 2008, 77.8 thousand new immigrants were registered, but the number of emigrants was much smaller than in previous years (6.0 thousand).

Population size and structure by age and marital status

According to the statistical balance, at the end of 2008 the Czech Republic had a population of 10 467 542 people. In 2008 the population size increased by 86.4 thousand; the previous year the figure was higher at an increase of 93.9 thousand. The increase in 2007 was the largest since the early 1950s. The increases in population size that have been occurring again in the past six years (after a period of population decreases in 1994–2002) are mainly the result of foreign migration, and in 1994–2005 this was wholly the case. In 2006–2008, in addition to positive net migration, there was also a positive natural increase in the population. However, the total natural increase in these three years was just 26.0 thousand people.

The expansion of demographic statistics to include foreigners with a long-term residence permit (since 2001) led to an acceleration of the increase in the number and share of foreigners recorded in the population of the Czech Republic. As of 31. 12. 2008 the Directorate of Alien Policy of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic recorded a total of 438.3 thousand foreigners with a residence permit in the Czech Republic, who make up 4.2% of the population. Between 2001 and 2008 their numbers more than doubled. The largest group of foreigners at present or in the past several years is made up of Ukrainians (132.0 thousand as of the end of 2008, 30.1% out of the total number of foreigners) and Slovaks (76.0 thousand, 17.3%), followed by Vietnamese citizens (60.3 thousand, 13.7%), Russians (27.2 thousand, 6.2%), and Poles (21.7 thousand, 5.0%).

The low fertility rate after 1993 intensified the decrease in the number and share of children in the population, which (following the rise in the 1970s) began roughly in the mid-1980s.

¹⁾ As of 2008 the source of data on the foreign migration of Czech citizens and foreign nationals is the Central Population Register Record of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. Until 2007 the source of data on foreign migrations was the Information System on Foreigners (Directorate of Alien Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic).

Table 3 Age distribution characteristics, 2001–2008 (as of 31 December 2008)

Age group/indicator	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	Population, thousands							
Total	10 206	10 203	10 211	10 221	10 251	10 287	10 381	10 468
0–14	1 622	1 590	1 554	1 527	1 501	1 480	1 477	1 480
15–64	7 170	7 196	7 234	7 259	7 293	7 325	7 391	7 431
65+	1 415	1 418	1 423	1 435	1 456	1 482	1 513	1 556
– 85+	106	98	90	94	102	113	125	137
	Structure (%)							
0–14	15.9	15.6	15.2	15.0	14.6	14.4	14.2	14.1
15–64	70.2	70.5	70.9	71.0	71.2	71.2	71.2	71.0
65+	13.9	13.9	13.9	14.0	14.2	14.4	14.6	14.9
– 85+	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.3
	Synthetic indicators							
Index of ageing ¹⁾	87.2	89.2	91.6	94.0	97.0	100.2	102.4	105.1
Total dependency ratio ²⁾	42.3	41.8	41.2	40.8	40.6	40.4	40.4	40.9
Mean age	39.0	39.3	39.5	39.8	40.0	40.2	40.3	40.5
Median age	37.9	38.2	38.5	38.7	38.9	39.1	39.1	39.2

Note: ¹⁾ Number of persons aged 65+ per 100 children aged 0–14.

²⁾ Number of children aged 0–14 and number of persons aged 65+ per 100 persons aged 15–64.

The slight increase in the number of births that has been occurring since 2002 was then in 2008 reflected in a halt in the decline in the absolute number of children under the age of 15 (an increase of 3.0 thousand between 2007 and 2008), but their relative share continued to decrease. The current share of children aged 0–14 in the population at 14.1% is 5.3 percentage points lower than in 1993 and in absolute figures 530 thousand lower.

The larger share of seniors over the age of 65 than children under the age of 15 in the population is influenced by the low fertility rate but also by the fact that the large cohorts born after the Second World War are entering the over-65 age group. The first large war-year cohorts (1940–1943) have crossed the 65-year mark, and this has led to rise in the share of this age group in the population. The index of ageing first surpassed the 100 mark in 2006 and in 2008 it was 105. In the following years the difference between the number of children and the number of elderly people in the population began to grow at an increased pace – people from the subsequent large wartime and post-war cohorts began to reach the age of 65. Soon the current wave of higher fertility will peak (if that did not already happen in 2008) and the intensity of demographic ageing will increase further.

In 2008 the number of people aged 15–64 grew (40.0 thousand), but after three years of stagnating at 71.2% their share of the population decreased (by two-tenths of a percentage point). The dependency ratio increased slightly. In the coming years the trend will reflect the irregularities in past development. In the category of people of productive age, crucial developments will be the continuing inflow of numerically small cohorts (born in the low fertility period of the 1990s) and, conversely, the outflow of people born during the period of rising fertility after the Second World War.

The declining marriage rate and continued postponement of marriage to a later age resulted in a further increase in the share of singles in the population in 2008, and not just in the younger age groups. The share of married women among women over the age of 15 fell below the fifty-percent mark, while among men, despite gradual decreases, it has managed to remain above that level (52.6% in 2008). The share of married men is highest in the 65–74 age group, where it is eighty percent, and among women it is highest in the 45–54 age group at around seventy percent. The number of widows rapidly increases with age, and in

Table 4 Distribution of the population over 15 by marital status (%), 2001–2008 (as of 31 December 2008)

Marital status	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	Males							
Single	30.9	31.3	31.9	32.3	32.8	33.3	33.7	34.3
Married	57.4	56.7	55.9	55.2	54.5	53.8	53.3	52.6
Divorced	8.8	9.1	9.3	9.7	9.9	10.1	10.2	10.4
Widowed	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7
Females								
Single	21.1	21.5	22.1	22.5	23.0	23.5	23.9	24.4
Married	53.5	52.9	52.2	51.6	51.0	50.4	50.0	49.5
Divorced	10.6	10.9	11.2	11.5	11.8	12.0	12.2	12.4
Widowed	14.8	14.7	14.5	14.4	14.2	14.1	13.9	13.7

Table 5 Proportion of married women in a given age group (%), 2001–2008 (as of 31 December 2008)

Age	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
15–19	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3
20–24	19.5	17.0	14.5	12.4	10.8	9.6	9.2	8.4
25–29	57.4	54.1	50.2	46.6	43.6	40.8	38.7	36.2
30–34	73.4	71.9	70.1	68.0	66.1	64.3	62.6	60.4
35–39	75.7	74.6	73.3	72.0	70.7	69.5	68.6	67.6
40–44	75.7	74.9	73.8	72.6	71.6	70.4	69.3	68.2
45–49	74.6	74.1	73.5	72.8	72.1	71.3	70.3	69.3
15–49	53.8	52.5	51.1	49.9	48.7	47.5	46.7	45.7

the oldest age group (85 and older) last year the share was 82.9%, while among men the figure was roughly half that – 40.0%. The maximum differences in the shares of widowers and widows are conversely observed in the youngest age group, but the number of such people in this age group is very low. Much smaller differences between men and women are observed among divorced people, both with regard to the total share of divorced people in the population and with regard to the shares in individual age groups. As in the case of widowed people, among divorced people the relative share is always higher among women. Divorced women somewhat less often remarry than divorced men. Given that the divorce rate has risen while the rate of repeat marriage has stagnated (following a decrease in the first half of the 1990s), the share of divorced people in the population over the age of 15 has gradually increased.

Nuptiality

The lowest number of marriages recorded in a calendar year was in 2003 (49 thousand marriages, when in the surrounding years there were 51–53 thousand marriages a year), and the total nuptiality of singles was lowest in 2008. The absolute number of marriages was only slightly different than, for example, the number in 2006. Were the 2008 marriage rate to remain constant, only 66.1% of single women and 59.6% of single men would marry before reaching the age of 50.

In 2008 the marriage rate continued to decline in the younger age groups. Compared to 2007, and to 2006, the probability of marriage (for men and women) was lower up to the age of 33. Compared just to 2007, marriage rates by age were also lower among people aged 34+ (with some exceptions). The year 2007 probably contained a slight accumulation of marriages, likely owing to the occurrence of the three lucky number 7s that year. The average age at first marriage increased slightly again and in 2008 reached 31.4 years for men and 28.7 years for women, which was an increase of 0.3 and 0.2 years, respectively, from 2007.

Figure 1a Distribution of the population by age groups and marital status (%) – males (as of 31 December 2008)




Figure 1b Distribution of the population by age groups and marital status (%) – females (as of 31 December 2008)





Table 6 Nuptiality indicators (from nuptiality tables), 2001–2008

Indicator	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Proportion of singles at age	Males							
25	82.7	84.9	87.8	88.9	90.1	91.0	91.3	92.5
30	55.8	57.9	62.8	63.3	64.7	66.2	66.2	70.0
35	42.5	43.3	47.5	47.1	48.1	48.8	48.0	52.8
40	37.2	37.4	41.4	40.4	41.6	41.4	40.2	45.1
45	35.1	35.0	38.7	37.8	38.5	38.6	37.0	41.9
50	34.0	33.8	37.5	36.4	37.2	37.1	35.5	40.4
Total first marriage rate (%)	66.0	66.2	62.5	63.6	62.8	62.9	64.5	59.6
Mean age at first marriage	29.2	29.7	30.2	30.5	30.7	31.0	31.1	31.4
Proportion of singles at age	Females							
25	66.6	69.4	73.9	75.3	76.7	78.2	78.3	80.9
30	41.2	42.7	47.2	47.3	48.7	49.3	48.6	53.4
35	32.7	33.3	37.4	36.4	37.1	37.3	36.3	41.2
40	29.6	29.8	33.9	32.9	33.1	33.1	31.9	36.8
45	28.3	28.3	32.2	31.1	31.8	31.3	30.0	34.8
50	27.5	27.6	31.3	30.2	30.9	30.3	28.9	33.9
Total first marriage rate (%)	72.5	72.4	68.7	69.8	69.1	69.7	71.1	66.1
Mean age at first marriage	26.9	27.2	27.7	28.0	28.1	28.4	28.5	28.7

Figure 2 Probability of getting married for single women by age, 2001–2008

In 2008 the number of protogamous marriages, where both partners are marrying for the first time, further decreased. In 2008 there were 32.8 thousand such marriages and they accounted for just 62.6% of all marriages. The year before that they accounted for 63.4% of all marriages, but at the start of the 1990s the figure was around 70%. The number of second or more marriages also increased, thus so did the share of remarriage rate out of the total marriage rate. Although the number and share of divorced people in the population has increased

in recent years (in the observed period since the second half of the 1990s), the absolute number of higher-order marriages does not exhibit the same trend. Except for some slight fluctuations in an increasing trend in 1997 and 2007, when the number of marriages of singles also increased, the number hovered around 13–14 thousand a year (for men and women).

In 2008 the marriage rate of divorced people returned to its 2006 level after showing a slight rise in between these two years. Were the situation in 2008 to remain constant, 44.5% of divorced men and 44.2% of divorced women would remarry; men on average 7.5 years after divorce, and women on average 7.9 years. While the marriage intensity of divorced people by time elapsed since their last divorce has basically remained at a constant at an average of 42–43 % since the second half of the 1990s (with small inter-year fluctuations; a bigger change was observed in 2007), the length of time from divorce to remarriage has grown longer and by no insignificant amount – the increase between 1995 and 2008 was 2.5 years. The reason is that there was a significant decrease in the remarriage rate occurring within one year of divorce, the category in which this time indicator is the highest (the marriage intensity of divorced men and women is falling generally as the time elapsed since the end of the last marriage has been growing). There has also been a slightly smaller, but still significant, decrease in the remarriage rate one to two years after divorce. Conversely, the remarriage rates several years (5 and more) after divorce are currently slightly higher than they were in the mid-1990s.

Table 7 Structure of marriages of divorces by the elapsed time since divorce (%), 2001–2008

Elapsed time from divorce (years)	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
0	18.2	17.1	16.9	16.3	14.9	13.2	13.0	12.9
1	12.2	12.3	11.9	12.0	11.4	10.6	10.6	10.5
2	8.7	10.2	10.4	10.1	10.0	9.7	9.2	9.1
3	10.1	7.1	8.3	9.0	8.1	8.7	8.8	8.1
4	8.1	8.3	5.9	7.0	7.7	7.4	7.6	7.4
0–4	57.2	54.9	53.3	54.3	52.0	49.6	49.2	47.8
5–9	24.0	25.2	25.4	23.7	23.8	24.6	24.8	24.3
10–14	10.2	10.7	11.4	11.4	12.7	13.5	13.6	14.3
15+	8.6	9.1	9.9	10.5	11.5	12.3	12.3	13.6

Among the demographic characteristics observed here, relatively strong marital homogamy is still typical of nuptiality in the Czech Republic. Marriages between men and women of the same marital status clearly prevail (78% in 2008, 80% in 1995), the average age difference between marrying partners has remained level at three years (3.1 in 2008 and in 1995), and more than half of all marriages are between men and women with the same level of education (58% in 2008 – out of those marriages in which the partners provided information about their highest completed level of education, and 57% in 1995), and the figure is 95% if the difference in education is just one degree. The places of residence of the bride and groom (before marriage) tend to be relatively close: around three-quarters (75% in 2008, 70% in 1995) of marriages are between men and women who live in the same district and the registered addresses of one-half of them are even in the same municipality (53% in 2008, 49% in 1995). This piece of data may be slightly overvalued given that some men and women will have changed their registered address before marriage to prepare for living together.

Divorce

The number of divorces in the past four years remained just above 31 thousand. The numbers recorded in recent years were also not far from this figure. The biggest exception was in 1999, when in connection with the new amendment to the Family Act there was a temporary decrease in the number of new divorces (23.7 thousand). Fluctuations in the opposite direc-

Table 8 Divorce rate indicators, 2001–2008

Indicators	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total divorce rate	0.45	0.46	0.48	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.50
Mean duration of marriage (years)	11.3	11.5	11.8	11.9	12.2	12.0	12.3	12.3
Proportion of multiple divorces (%) – males	19.4	19.5	19.1	19.5	19.9	20.0	20.0	19.3
– females	18.5	18.6	19.0	19.0	19.1	19.2	19.4	18.9
Divorced marriages without minors	11 037	11 346	12 119	12 255	12 078	12 412	12 721	13 104
Divorced marriages with minors	20 549	20 412	20 705	20 805	19 210	19 003	18 408	18 196
Proportion of divorces without minors (%)	65.1	64.3	63.1	62.9	61.4	60.5	59.1	58.1
Total number of minors of divorced marriages	30 385	30 260	30 927	31 008	28 732	28 117	27 546	27 034
Average number of minors of divorced marriages	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Proportion of divorces filed for by woman (%)	67.2	66.6	66.2	66.9	66.4	66.7	66.0	65.0
Proportion of divorces by cause "different characters, views and interests" (%)								
– on the part of male	46.5	49.1	50.6	51.3	52.1	54.6	66.0	70.4
– on the part of female	47.4	49.6	50.3	51.0	50.5	52.8	64.5	69.5

tion but smaller in scope occurred in 1996 and 2004 (33.1 thousand). Although the annual number of marriages significantly and rapidly decreased from the start of the 1990s, given the rise in the divorce rate and the fact that the divorce rate is highest in the first years after marriage this had almost no impact on the number of divorces in subsequent years.

The total divorce rate indicator rose to 49.6% last year. This is the highest divorce rate so far in the Czech Republic. The highest rate previously recorded was in 2004 (49.3%). Initial assumptions that the divorce rate had peaked in 2004 and that it would continue to hover around 48–49% were thus not fulfilled. The difference from the previous maximum in 2004 (and from 2007) is small, but the total divorce rate in 2008 suggested that there is a real possibility that the divorce rate could surpass the level where fifty percent of all marriages end in divorce, like in Belgium and Sweden, and that this could occur soon. Compared to 2007 in 2008²⁾ on average the divorce rate increased most in the first years after marriage and, at the opposite end, after a longer period of marriage – roughly after fifteen years. A more significant rise in the divorce rate after fifteen years of marriage is typical for the divorce rate trend in the Czech Republic during the past two decades. The maximum divorce rate even last year continued to occur two to six completed years after the marriage took place. The average duration of a marriage ending in divorce in 2008 was 12.3 years, similar to the figure in 2007, but almost two years longer than that observed in the mid-1990s.

Just as the basis curve of the divorce rate by marriage duration has remained essentially the same, so too the distribution of the divorce rate by age (the number of divorces to the number of married people) has remained similar, but the numbers have changed. In 2008 the maximum divorce rate continued to be in the 20–24 age group, as in 2008 an average of 35 men per 1000 married men and 38 women per 1000 married women divorced, while in 1995 the averages were 31 men and women per 1000 married men and women in the given age group. Age-specific divorce intensities rose during the observed period in almost every age group.

²⁾ Collecting data from the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic electronically in the form of a file of individual records on each divorce (from data for 2007) provided a methodologically tidier way of calculating the duration of marriage based on the date on which the divorce comes into effect (previously the mailing date had been used because no other date was available). However, the file on divorces for a given year also includes divorces that came into effect earlier. Consequently, the divorce rates according to the interval since marriage cannot be calculated most accurately by categorising divorces according to marriage duration and the year of marriage, and instead they are only calculated by categorising divorces based on the marriage duration.

Table 9 Fertility indicators, 2001–2008

Indicators	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total fertility rate	1.15	1.17	1.18	1.23	1.28	1.33	1.44	1.50
– first birth	0.54	0.56	0.57	0.60	0.63	0.66	0.69	0.73
– second birth	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.46	0.48	0.53	0.55
– third and higher-order birth	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.21
Probability of having 1st child	0.54	0.56	0.57	0.60	0.63	0.66	0.69	0.73
Probability of having 2nd child after the 1st child	0.80	0.77	0.76	0.73	0.74	0.72	0.76	0.75
Probability of having 3rd child after the 2nd child	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.30	0.29
Mean age of mothers	27.5	27.8	28.1	28.3	28.6	28.9	29.1	29.3
Mean age of mothers at 1st birth	25.3	25.6	25.9	26.3	26.6	26.9	27.1	27.3
Mean age of mothers at 2nd birth	28.4	28.7	29.0	29.3	29.6	29.9	30.1	30.5
Mean age of mothers at 3rd and higher-order birth	32.0	32.3	32.4	32.6	32.8	33.0	33.1	33.3
Premarital conception (%)	39.5	37.6	33.6	32.2	31.7	30.1	30.4	28.1
Net reproduction rate	0.55	0.56	0.57	0.59	0.62	0.64	0.70	0.72

The biggest changes were observed in the divorce rate in the 50–64 age group (between the years 1995 and 2008 the rate more than doubled), which reflects the rise in the average marrying age and in the intensity of divorce after a relatively long interval since the marriage date.

In 2008 exactly sixty percent of divorces were filed for by women. Seventeen percent of divorces were second divorces (for both men and women), and third- or higher-order divorces accounted for two percent of cases. Statistics on divorce by cause of break up increasingly identify the dominant cause of divorce as ‘different characters, views and interests’, which in 2008 was cited by 70% of men and 69% of women. The year 2008 saw the continued decrease in the share of divorces with minors: 42% of divorced couples did not have any minors at the time of divorce, 33% had one, 22% two, and 3% had 3 or more minors. A total of 27 thousand minors had parents who divorced in 2008. Generally this means that currently one-quarter of children of a minor age experience the divorce of their parents.

Fertility

In 2008 the rise in the number of births continued. This is a trend that began in 2002 after the sharp decrease in the first half of the 1990s. This increase initially stemmed mainly from the fact that women from the large cohorts born in the 1970s stopped putting off starting a family to a later age, and then this was combined with the fact that some of them expanded their families and that other women from subsequent relatively large birth cohorts, 1980–1982, reached the age of higher fertility. While in 2002 women in 1976–1977 most often had their first child, in 2008 these women most often had their second child, while it was women born in 1979 and 1980 who most often had first children. But even the number of first-order children born to women one to two years younger (the 1981 and 1982 cohorts) were higher than the number of first-order children born to women from the larger cohorts from the 1970s (1974–1977 cohorts). In terms of shares in the absolute inter-year increases in live-born children, in 2002–2004, 2006, and 2008 first-order children had the greatest weight. Second-order children accounted for the greatest share in the increase mainly in 2007, when the biggest increase in the number of children born was also recorded.

As in the case of the absolute number of live-born children, the increase in total fertility in 2008 was also lower than in 2007. However, the increase was still significant: rising to 1.50 from 1.44. The trend in order-specific fertility is responding to changes in birth timing. While at the start of the current revival of fertility it was first-order fertility that increased most, in 2007, by contrast, when the fertility of women in the large birth cohorts from the 1970s prob-

Table 10 Fertility rates by age and marital status of women, 2001 and 2008

Age	All females		Single females		Married females		Divorced females	
	2001	2008	2001	2008	2001	2008	2001	2008
20	40.1	34.2	19.9	27.4	310.2	278.3	113.2	303.8
21	49.9	39.1	21.9	28.9	250.3	244.3	66.9	128.1
22	58.4	45.3	22.4	30.8	211.3	216.0	73.1	119.3
23	70.6	52.8	22.3	32.9	197.3	199.4	68.8	103.3
24	82.8	66.8	24.4	37.2	180.6	208.7	62.1	92.2
25	95.7	79.9	27.7	42.2	170.4	199.9	62.2	100.9
26	99.1	94.0	32.2	47.4	151.2	198.9	56.9	91.0
27	97.3	107.9	37.6	52.3	131.8	197.3	54.7	87.5
28	89.4	119.2	37.3	60.5	113.6	191.4	46.3	87.6
29	78.1	123.4	39.5	66.1	93.1	178.8	45.6	89.8
30	68.2	124.6	43.4	73.3	77.0	166.1	43.7	80.8
31	58.4	111.9	38.1	75.8	65.3	137.2	38.5	72.7
32	45.3	99.0	38.7	72.4	48.0	115.8	35.1	68.6
33	37.6	80.3	31.0	65.9	39.1	89.1	33.5	60.3
34	29.4	66.8	28.2	62.4	30.4	71.0	24.8	54.6
35	23.3	54.4	24.6	54.4	23.2	56.9	22.4	45.4
36	19.3	41.5	23.8	46.6	18.8	41.9	18.9	36.4
37	14.6	32.3	19.0	39.5	13.9	30.6	16.4	34.0
38	9.9	21.9	11.1	28.2	9.3	20.7	12.3	23.3
39	8.5	17.4	12.7	22.7	7.8	16.2	9.9	19.1

ably peaked, second-order and high-order fertility increased most. In 2008 again the biggest increase was in first-order fertility, by 6% (second-order by 4%).

In 2008 the trend of postponing motherhood to a later age continued. The average age of women at the time of birth of the first child increased between 2007 and 2008 by 0.2 years to reach an average age of 27.3 years. The average age of all mothers also increased, by two-tenths of a year to reach an average age of 29.3 years. The average age of fathers at the time of birth of a child was 33.0 years in 2008 (this piece of data applies to 90% of live-born children, in the remaining cases the information about the father was not provided), and the average age of fathers at the birth of a first child to a woman was 31.3 years. The difference between the average age of the man and the woman at the birth of a first child was thus 4 years.

The highest fertility rate in 2008 was recorded among 30-year-old women, and the fertility of women a year younger was just very slightly lower. In 2007 the exact opposite was true, and just the difference in the age-specific fertility rates was slightly larger. In comparison with 2007, the fertility of women over the age of 30 increased, while the fertility of women under the age of 30 was almost the same.


The trend in the changes to the timing of childbirth towards a later age is apparent in the cohort-specific fertility rates. For example, while an average of 1.70 children were born per 30-year old woman born in 1965, for a woman of the same age born in 1970 the figure was 1.49 and for a woman born in 1977 it was lower lower at 1.09. The age of maximum fertility for the 1970 cohort was 20–21 years, and although it was still around 20 years for the 1973 cohort, the rate was lower, and a higher intensity was observed in subsequent age units. The age-specific fertility rates for the cohort born in 1974 followed an atypical course, as this cohort was around the age of 20 during the fall of fertility in 1990s, and fertility did not increase at older ages, so the highest fertility rate formed a wide interval (19–30 years). Among women of the next generations maximum fertility gradually shifted to a later age, but even in these younger cohorts faster rise in the fertility rate after age 19 is marked.

Table 11 Cumulated fertility rates by age and birth cohort of women

Cohort	Age					Total (by 2008)	Aged ^{*)}
	20	25	30	35	40		
1965	0.45	1.30	1.70	1.85	1.92	1.93	43
1966	0.45	1.28	1.67	1.84	1.91	1.92	42
1967	0.44	1.25	1.63	1.81	1.89	1.90	41
1968	0.44	1.22	1.59	1.78	1.88	1.88	40
1969	0.44	1.18	1.55	1.76		1.85	39
1970	0.43	1.11	1.49	1.73		1.80	38
1971	0.41	1.03	1.44	1.71		1.77	37
1972	0.39	0.95	1.38	1.68		1.70	36
1973	0.36	0.87	1.33	1.64		1.64	35
1974	0.30	0.78	1.26			1.54	34
1975	0.24	0.68	1.19			1.42	33
1976	0.19	0.61	1.14			1.30	32
1977	0.15	0.53	1.09			1.15	31
1978	0.13	0.48	0.98			0.98	30
1979	0.12	0.45				0.83	29
1980	0.11	0.43				0.69	28

Note: Cohort-age rates (from parallelograms with horizontal sides in Lexis diagram).
^{*)}Fertility rate for that age itself is roughly half (will be final with data for 2009).

Figure 3 Fertility rates by age and birth cohort of women



In 2008 there were 43.5 thousand extramarital births. The share of children born to unmarried women increased from 2007 by 1.8 percentage points to reach 36.3%. This figure is even higher in the cases of first-order births (46.2% in 2008), very young women (89.3% in the group up to the age of 19), and women with basic education (71.1%). Young single women

Table 12 Live births by legitimacy and birth order, 2001–2008

Birth order	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	Live births, total							
1.	43 337	44 745	45 363	48 066	49 930	51 823	54 050	56 941
2.	34 216	34 448	34 823	35 669	37 993	39 038	43 400	45 291
3.	9 244	9 531	9 561	9 862	10 271	10 712	12 529	12 758
4.+	3 918	4 062	3 938	4 067	4 017	4 258	4 653	4 580
Total	90 715	92 786	93 685	97 664	102 211	105 831	114 632	119 570
	Structure (%)							
1.	47.8	48.2	48.4	49.2	48.9	49.0	47.1	47.6
2.	37.7	37.1	37.2	36.5	37.2	36.9	37.9	37.9
3.	10.2	10.3	10.2	10.1	10.0	10.1	10.9	10.7
4.+	4.3	4.4	4.2	4.2	3.9	4.0	4.1	3.8
	Live births inside marriage							
1.	30 873	30 919	29 282	29 615	29 962	30 287	30 333	30 638
2.	29 026	28 621	28 262	28 672	30 079	30 237	32 999	33 883
3.	7 002	7 25	6 964	7 069	7 296	7 573	8 966	8 895
4.+	2 538	2 662	2 464	2 469	2 465	2 475	2 797	2 697
Total	69 439	69 327	66 972	67 825	69 802	70 572	75 095	76 113
	Structure (%)							
1.	44.4	44.6	43.7	43.7	42.9	42.9	40.4	40.3
2.	41.8	41.3	42.2	42.3	43.1	42.9	44.0	44.5
3.	10.1	10.3	10.4	10.4	10.5	10.7	11.9	11.7
4.+	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.5
Total of all children	76.5	74.7	71.5	69.4	68.3	66.7	65.5	63.7
	Live births outside marriage							
1.	12 464	13 826	16 081	18 451	19 968	21 536	23 717	26 303
2.	5 190	5 826	6 561	6 997	7 914	8 801	10 401	11 408
3.	2 242	2 406	2 597	2 793	2 975	3 139	3 563	3 863
4.+	1 380	1 401	1 474	1 598	1 552	1 783	1 856	1 883
Total	21 276	23 459	26 713	29 839	32 409	35 259	39 537	43 457
	Structure (%)							
1.	58.6	58.9	60.2	61.8	61.6	61.1	60.0	60.5
2.	24.4	24.8	24.6	23.4	24.4	25.0	26.3	26.3
3.	10.5	10.3	9.7	9.4	9.2	8.9	9.0	8.9
4.+	6.5	6.0	5.5	5.4	4.8	5.0	4.7	4.3
Total of all children	23.5	25.3	28.5	30.6	31.7	33.3	34.5	36.3

predominate among unmarried mothers, while the share of divorced women in extramarital fertility has decreased over time. However, it cannot be determined from ordinary demographic statistics what share of extramarital fertility involves single women and what share involves women living in unmarried cohabitation, i.e. what proportion of children born to unmarried mothers are born into two-parent, functional families, and what proportion of children are born to single women. By linking data on mothers who give birth while unmarried to data on brides getting married it becomes apparent that some women first have a child and then get married. For example, of the women who had their first child in 2004 and were unmarried when they gave birth, 30% had married within five years (by the end of 2008; this occurred somewhat more often among more educated women). Most of them married in the next calendar year after the child's birth – 8% of all unmarried mothers in 2004, and a year

Table 13 Live births outside marriage, 2001–2008

Indicators	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	Proportion of live births by marital status of woman (%)							
Single females	76.9	77.1	77.7	78.6	79.5	80.2	81.0	81.8
Divorced females	21.9	21.7	21.2	20.4	19.6	18.9	18.2	17.5
Proportion of live births by order (of the total number of children given order; %)								
1.	28.8	30.9	35.4	38.4	40.0	41.6	43.9	46.2
2.	15.2	16.9	18.8	19.6	20.8	22.5	24.0	25.2
3.	24.3	25.2	27.2	28.3	29.0	29.3	28.4	30.3
4.+	35.2	34.5	37.4	39.3	38.6	41.9	39.9	41.1
Proportion of live births by education of mother (of the total number of children of women given education; %)								
Basic	58.7	61.5	64.5	67.1	67.6	69.0	68.7	71.1
Secondary without GCSE	25.2	27.9	32.7	35.9	37.2	39.7	41.2	44.9
Secondary with GCSE	14.9	16.6	19.7	21.9	23.8	25.7	28.0	30.0
University	8.9	8.9	10.8	12.3	13.7	15.3	16.3	18.3
Proportion of live births by age of mother (of the total number of children of women given age; %)								
–19	71.6	76.8	81.8	85.2	86.7	87.7	88.2	89.3
20–29	21.4	23.6	27.3	30.2	32.3	34.9	37.5	40.5
30–39	21.0	21.4	23.8	24.8	25.4	26.7	27.1	28.7
40+	27.2	29.7	35.2	34.4	36.5	36.0	40.2	38.4

later slightly fewer at 7%. From this it can be inferred that probably a significant portion of the children born to unmarried women who later married were born into a family with two parents. Among those born in 2007 and later it is also possible to observe whether the woman married the father of the child if she listed him in the statistical report. Data on the father are provided in the statistical report on the birth for approximately ninety percent of children born (88% in 2008). It could be indirectly inferred from this that in these cases the father also cares for the child in some way. As with the share of extramarital births, the lower the level of education of the mother, the more often the information about the father is omitted.

Abortion

Starting in 2006, the decline in the abortion rate halted, and the total abortion rate actually increased very slightly (from 0.53 abortions per woman of reproductive age in 2005–2006 to 0.54 abortions in 2007–2008). The induced abortion rate has remained at the same level, at 0.34 abortions, for the past three years, while the rate of spontaneous abortions has risen slightly – from 0.16 in 2005 to 0.18 in 2008. The number of spontaneous abortions has been rising in parallel to the increase in the number of pregnancies; last year 14.3 thousand spontaneous abortions were recorded.

The substantial decrease in induced abortions in recent years tends to be linked to the spread of the use of modern contraceptives. The share of women who use prescription contraceptives has increased steadily since 1992 – from 17.2% of women of reproductive age to 54% in 2007 (ÚZIS, 2008). The share of women using ‘reliable’ contraceptives thus increased even during the years when the induced abortion rate had already stagnated. ÚZIS data on women using prescription contraceptives unfortunately do not distinguish them by age. The trend in age-specific induced abortion rates has shown in the current period of stagnation that the induced abortion rate among young and the youngest women (to the age of 28) has slightly increased, while among older women, on average, the decrease has continued. Thus it cannot be determined whether a similar or opposite trend has occurred in the individual age groups with regard to the use of modern contraceptives.

Table 14 Abortion rate indicators, 2001–2008

Indicators	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total abortion rate	0.60	0.58	0.56	0.55	0.53	0.53	0.54	0.54
Total induced abortion rate	0.44	0.42	0.39	0.37	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.34
Total spontaneous abortion rate	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18
Mean age – at abortion	29.6	29.6	29.7	29.8	29.8	30.0	29.9	29.9
– at induced abortion	29.7	29.7	29.7	29.8	29.6	29.7	29.6	29.5
– at spontaneous abortion	29.1	29.2	29.7	29.9	30.0	30.4	30.4	30.6
Therapeutic abortions – number	6 019	5 606	5 385	4 597	4 678	4 779	4 789	4 569
– per cent	18.5	18.0	18.4	16.7	17.7	18.9	18.8	17.7
Termination of ectopic pregnancy	1411	1321	1288	1339	1324	1278	1401	1413

From the perspective of the order of induced abortions, the halt in the long-term decrease in the induced abortion rate was caused by the slight increase in first-order abortions. The total rate of third- and fourth-order induced abortions decreased in 2006–2008, while in the case of second-order abortions the decrease already occurred between 2006 and 2007 and since then has just stagnated. This trend has resulted in a reduction in the share of women who have never had an abortion and conversely an increase in the share of women who have had one. Were the 2008 rates to remain constant in the coming period, the share of women who had one induced abortion would be 13.3% and the share of women who had at least one induced abortion would be 20.2%.

The fall in the number and share of repeat abortions continued in 2008: 61.5% of abortions were first-order, but even despite the decrease for a total of 14.6% of the women this was a third- or higher-order abortion. An analysis of the structure of abortion by the number of live-born children per woman shows that the highest share of abortions are had by women who already have two children – 32.5% in 2008. The share of this group has gradually declined over time, while the share of abortions had by childless women has increased. In 2008, 28.9% of all abortions were had by childless women.

Table 15 Total induced abortion rates by order, 2001–2008

Indicators	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	Total induced abortion rate							
1.	0.24	0.24	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.21
2.	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08
3.+	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05
Probability								
1st induced abortion	0.24	0.24	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.21	0.21
2nd induced abortion	0.48	0.46	0.45	0.44	0.42	0.42	0.38	0.37
3rd induced abortion	0.46	0.44	0.44	0.43	0.42	0.41	0.41	0.39
Proportion of women								
With no abortion	76.1	76.5	77.8	78.7	79.2	80.0	79.1	78.7
With 1 induced abortion	12.5	12.8	12.2	12.0	12.1	11.7	13.0	13.3
With 2 induced abortion	6.1	6.0	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.0	4.7	4.9
With 3 induced abortion	3.3	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.0

Mortality

The declining trend in total mortality continued in 2008. The speed at which mortality decreased in 2008 and in the previous two decades was not, unlike the decrease in fertility, unexpected, and it occurred relatively fluidly and without significant fluctuations. The maximum inter-year increase in life expectancy at birth was 0.75 years among men (in 1993) and

Table 16 Life expectancy, 2001–2008

Age	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	Males								
0	71.6	72.1	72.1	72.0	72.5	72.9	73.4	73.7	74.0
45	28.9	29.3	29.3	29.2	29.6	29.9	30.4	30.6	30.8
65	13.7	13.9	13.9	13.8	14.2	14.4	14.8	15.0	15.1
80	6.1	6.2	6.0	5.9	6.1	6.1	6.4	6.6	6.6
Females									
0	78.3	78.4	78.5	78.5	79.0	79.1	79.7	79.9	80.1
45	34.6	34.6	34.8	34.7	35.2	35.2	35.7	35.9	36.1
65	17.1	17.1	17.2	17.1	17.5	17.6	18.0	18.2	18.4
80	7.1	7.0	6.9	6.9	7.1	7.1	7.4	7.5	7.6
Difference females – males									
0	6.7	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.2	6.2	6.2	6.2
45	5.7	5.3	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3
65	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3
80	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.0

Table 17 Infant mortality rate structure and perinatal mortality, 2001–2008

Indicators	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Infant mortality rate	4.0	4.1	3.9	3.7	3.4	3.3	3.1	2.8
Neonatal mortality rate (0–27 days)	2.3	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.0	2.3	2.1	1.8
– early neonatal mortality rate (0–6 days)	1.5	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.0
– late neonatal mortality rate (7–27 days)	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8
Post-neonatal mortality rate (28–364 days)	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.0	1.1	1.0
Perinatal mortality rate ^{*)}	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.0	3.9	4.2	4.0	3.3

Note: *) Stillbirths and deaths at completed age 0–6 per 1000 live births.

0.57 years among women (in 1998 and 2006), with an average annual increase of just under four-tenths of a year for men and three-tenths for women. Owing to the somewhat faster improvement in mortality conditions among men, male excess mortality has decreased. In 2008 life expectancy at birth of men rose by 0.3 years to age 74.0 and of women by just under 0.25 years to age 80.1. The biggest contributor to this recent inter-year increase was the decrease in mortality intensity among men aged 70–79 (0.1 years) and 55–64 (0.07 years), and among women the biggest contributor was the decrease in mortality intensity over the age of 60 (0.23 years).

Infant mortality decreased in 2008 to 2.8 infant deaths per 1000 live-born children (from 3.1 in 2007). Both neonatal and post-neonatal mortality were lower than in the previous year.

In sum, in 2008 there was a decrease in the intensity of male and female mortality from all three of the main causes of death: diseases of the circulatory system, neoplasms, and injury and poisoning. Mortality from respiratory diseases and diseases of the digestive system were also lower in 2008 than the previous year. But the biggest change once again occurred in the rate of mortality from cardiovascular diseases. Among men the standardised mortality rate has been declining yearly by five percent and among women by as much as six percent. This category of causes of death in 2008 no longer accounted for more than half of all causes of death among women (49.8%), this however was not true for men (55.4%). The intensity of mortality from neoplasms decreased by three and two percent, respectively, and the decrease in the intensity of mortality from respiratory diseases and external causes of death was slightly larger. In the category of cardio- and cerebrovascular disease, there was a slight improvement in mortality from acute (myocardial infarction) and chronic forms of ischemic heart disease and cer-

Table 18 Standardised death rates by selected causes of death (per 100,000), 2001–2008

Causes of death	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
	Males							
Neoplasms	317.5	323.3	321.1	315.2	296.8	286.8	277.5	272.8
Malignant neoplasm of the lung (C34)	85.6	83.9	80.8	81.8	77.1	73.6	71.0	67.5
Malignant neoplasm of the rectum and colon (C18–C21)	50.8	51.8	51.6	50.7	46.6	45.4	40.6	40.4
Malignant neoplasm of the prostate (C61)	26.4	26.7	27.0	27.7	24.6	23.8	21.8	21.6
Diseases of the circulatory system	567.6	560.6	568.5	530.9	508.1	477.8	453.7	437.1
Hypertension (I10–I12)	10.9	10.7	10.4	14.0	12.3	10.5	17.9	13.7
Myocardial infarction (I21–I23)	126.0	113.1	106.1	91.3	81.3	72.7	69.3	68.7
Chronic ischemic heart disease (I25)	123.8	127.0	130.0	126.9	146.9	147.3	166.2	155.4
Heart failure (I50)	11.5	13.5	13.4	11.9	20.5	25.6	14.6	17.6
Cerebrovascular diseases (I60–I69)	148.6	144.7	148.0	127.2	123.0	113.4	91.6	86.5
Atherosclerosis (I70)	96.0	99.5	107.5	109.1	76.2	56.8	41.4	41.3
Diseases of the respiratory system	55.6	55.6	59.7	55.4	65.9	60.3	59.4	58.1
Diseases of the digestive system	50.7	50.3	50.8	50.4	52.4	50.2	49.5	48.2
Injury and poisoning	90.4	91.4	96.3	89.0	82.8	77.6	78.0	76.5
Transport accidents (V00–V99)	20.8	20.5	20.7	18.3	17.9	15.5	17.4	15.7
Suicides (X60–X89)	24.9	23.3	26.2	24.3	23.8	21.1	20.8	20.2
Other causes	61.7	65.1	68.5	65.7	70.7	71.5	73.1	73.9
Diabetes (E10–E14)	10.1	11.0	12.4	11.2	11.9	12.1	19.3	15.8
Total	1143.6	1146.3	1164.9	1106.6	1076.7	1024.1	991.2	966.5
	Females							
Neoplasms	179.3	175.3	177.5	173.0	166.2	164.9	157.0	155.2
Malignant neoplasm of the lung (C34)	19.1	18.1	18.8	18.6	18.7	19.7	19.1	19.2
Malignant neoplasm of the rectum and colon (C18–C21)	25.4	24.6	26.4	24.6	22.3	21.3	19.5	18.9
Malignant neoplasm of the breast (C50)	27.5	27.5	27.1	27.5	26.2	25.5	22.1	21.2
Diseases of the circulatory system	381.7	379.5	384.4	356.9	351.1	318.2	306.8	292.3
Hypertension (I10–I12)	8.1	8.3	9.3	10.5	10.2	8.2	14.5	11.4
Myocardial infarction (I21–I23)	56.9	52.4	48.1	41.6	37.2	34.4	32.1	31.5
Chronic ischemic heart disease (I25)	77.5	80.1	83.6	80.1	99.3	93.1	112.0	104.5
Heart failure (I50)	7.6	9.4	8.9	8.0	13.5	15.6	8.2	9.2
Cerebrovascular diseases (I60–I69)	122.5	119.5	120.6	100.7	99.2	90.8	73.1	70.8
Atherosclerosis (I70)	75.9	78.2	78.9	82.1	58.8	40.5	30.9	28.9
Diseases of the respiratory system	26.6	27.2	30.9	25.5	33.5	30.3	29.3	28.6
Diseases of the digestive system	25.8	26.0	27.5	25.7	26.8	26.0	25.5	25.2
Injury and poisoning	33.8	32.8	35.4	34.0	29.3	25.4	26.1	25.4
Transport accidents (V00–V99)	6.7	6.9	6.4	5.8	5.5	4.5	5.1	4.9
Suicides (X60–X89)	5.4	5.3	5.8	4.7	4.8	4.2	3.6	4.2
Other causes	44.9	45.1	48.0	46.7	50.3	48.5	50.6	49.9
Diabetes (E10–E14)	9.0	9.0	10.1	8.9	9.7	9.4	15.2	11.8
Total	692.2	685.9	703.6	661.9	657.2	613.2	595.4	576.7

ebrovascular diseases. In the category of neoplasms, in 2008 there was a continued decrease among men in mortality from neoplasms of the lung (among women it stagnated) and from neoplasms of the colon and rectum (among both men and women). In the latter case the decrease was smaller than the decrease between 2006 and 2007. In 2008 mortality from another common cause-of-death neoplasm was also lower than in 2007 – namely malignant neoplasm of the prostate among men and malignant neoplasm of the breast among women.

A more detailed breakdown of the structure of mortality by cause of death reveals that a successful change (at least to some) to coding practices was made: i.e. the incorrect identifi-

Table 19 Net migration of foreigners based on migration change and net migration of foreigners based on differences of stocks of foreigners, 2001–2008

Indicators	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Net migration of foreigners (CSO)	-9 243	12 557	24 235	17 020	36 780	34 737	84 087	72 330
Net migration based on differences of stocks of foreigners (DAPMI CR)	9 843	20 814	8 813	13 873	24 018	43 144	70 631	46 214
Difference	-19 086	-8 257	15 422	3 147	12 762	-8 407	13 456	26 116

Source:

DAPMI CR – Directorate of Alien Police of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic.

2008: CSO takes data on external migration from the Central Population Register Record (ISEO).

cation of atherosclerosis as a underlying cause of death when other (specified in the rules of WHO) causes of death are also present (e.g. ischemic heart disease). The share of deaths from atherosclerosis in both 2007 and 2008, upon completion of the research project dealing with this issue,³⁾ fell below 5%, whereas in previous years it had been around ten percent. However, compared with other countries with automated cause-of-death coding (and in some countries without it) this share is still very high. This disease is frequently cited by doctors when they fill in death certificates. In 2008 mortality from cerebrovascular diseases was lower (than in the period before the project term), which thanks to the project for improving cause-of-death mortality statistics was shown to be over-represented, while conversely ischemic heart disease was under-represented. It can be inferred that in these cases the use of incorrect methods has gradually been substantially reduced. Conversely, it seems that there are some concerns about selecting diabetes and hypertension as underlying causes of death. Mortality rate from these diseases decreased in 2008 following an increase in 2007 and returned to their previous levels. However, data on just one or two years are not sufficient to refute or confirm this hypothesis. Nevertheless, the trend in cause-of-death coding is moving in the direction of automated coding, where the (very extensive) rules for selecting cause of death are integrated into a program, and very likely sooner or later this method will also be applied in the Czech Republic.

Foreign migration

Based on data from the Central Population Register Record of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (ISEO), in 2008 there was registered foreign migration in the Czech Republic of 71.8 thousand people. Net migration in 2008 was 12.2 thousand lower than in 2007, wherein the number of immigrants was fewer (77.8 thousand compared to 104.4 thousand in 2007), but so too was the number of emigrants (6.0 thousand compared to 20.5 thousand in 2007). Net migration in the past two years has been double what it was in the previous two years (and that was even more so the case in 2007). In comparison with other years in this century the numbers of emigrants, especially in 2008, seem improbable. The problems with data on foreign migration are also illustrated by the different figure for net migration that is obtained from data on migration change of foreigners (immigrants and emigrants) compared to the figure for the net migration of foreigners obtained when the stocks of foreigners in the country at the end of two given years in a row are deducted.

In 2008 citizens of Ukraine added most to the foreign migration figure (18.6 thousand). In second place were Vietnamese citizens (13.3 thousand), followed by Slovaks in third place (7.0 thousand). The net foreign migration of Czech citizens in 2008, like in the previous year, was a negative figure (-540 people).

³⁾ A project of the European Commission titled 'Transition Facility Multi-Beneficiary Programme for Statistical Integration in 2004', which was conducted in 2006–2007, one outcome of which was the project 'Improving Cause-of-Death Statistics'.

Table 20 Structure of the volume of internal migration, 2001–2008

Volume of migration	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Total	204 622	223 103	211 487	216 831	213 688	225 241	255 690	250 071
Between regions	62 593	70 921	67 146	67 679	75 669	81 358	98 403	97 914
Between districts within the region	33 706	37 227	36 089	37 311	41 414	43 700	47 745	47 444
Between municipalities within the district	108 323	114 955	108 252	111 841	96 605	100 183	109 542	104 713
Between regions – per cent of total	30.6	31.8	31.7	31.2	35.4	36.1	38.5	39.2
Between districts within the region – per cent of total	16.5	16.7	17.1	17.2	19.4	19.4	18.7	19.0
Between municipalities within the district – per cent of total	52.9	51.5	51.2	51.6	45.2	44.5	42.8	41.9
People with Czech citizenship	198 635	213 220	201 187	205 106	195 755	202 268	212 934	207 328
People with foreign citizenship	5 987	9 883	10 300	11 725	17 933	22 973	42 756	42 743
People with Czech citizenship – per cent of total	97.1	95.6	95.1	94.6	91.6	89.8	83.3	82.9
People with foreign citizenship – per cent of total	2.9	4.4	4.9	5.4	8.4	10.2	16.7	17.1

Men make up more than half of the increase to the population size of the Czech Republic from foreign migration – 63% in 2008. In terms of age young people predominate, specifically people aged 20–29 accounted for more than forty percent of the net migration in 2008. The average age of people in the net migration in 2008 was 29.6 years, which is much younger than the average age of the Czech population as a whole (40.5 years).

Internal migration

In 2008, 250.1 thousand changes of address within the Czech Republic were registered. This was somewhat fewer than in 2007, but still higher than in the previous several years. The higher volume of internal migration in the past two to three years is connected with the increase in the share of migration of foreigners in the total volume of migration, and there are also more people at the age of the highest migration intensity. People however usually do not migrate far: 104.7 thousand migrations in 2008 were between municipalities within the same district (not including migrations within the City of Prague). However, the share of short-distance migration has been decreasing over time.

The share of foreigners in the volume of internal migration has gradually increased, though at a slower rate in 2008 than in the years previous to that. The number of cases of migrations involving foreign nationals was almost identical in 2007 and 2008, but in 2008 the number of changes of residences involving Czech citizens was lower. The biggest increase in the share of foreigners in the volume of internal migration was observed between 2006 and 2007, evidently in connection with the significant increase in the number of immigrants to the Czech Republic. Foreign nationals residing in the Czech Republic are much more mobile than Czech citizens.

The proportions of men and women in the volume of internal migration is relatively equal, unlike foreign migration, or more precisely women very slightly predominate (50.6% in 2008), and in terms of age internal migrants are only very slightly older than cross-border migrants (31.0 compared to 30.7 years).

The main migration flows in 2008 were: from Prague to certain districts of Central Bohemia (Prague-East, Prague-West, Mělník, Kladno, Beroun), from Brno-City to the district of Brno-Rural and vice versa, from the hinterland districts of Prague-East and Prague-West to the City of Prague, and from Pilsen-City to the district of Pilsen-North. These then are suburbanisation and urbanisation processes, and the former predominates over the latter.

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TEREZIE ŠTYGLEROVÁ studied demography at the Faculty of Sciences, Charles University. Upon completing her studies, in 1999 to 2006 she worked at the Czech Statistical Office where she specialised mainly in the analysis of demographic development, the issue of cause-of-death statistics, and work in the area of population forecasting. After parental leave she returned to the Czech Statistical Office and since May 2009 she has been in charge of the Department of Demographic Statistics.

FAMILY POLICY IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF (NOT JUST) DEMOGRAPHERS*

JIŘINA KOCOURKOVÁ**)

Family policy is not a theme that is new to the pages of the journal *Demografie*, which in recent years has published articles, for instance, by V. Kuchařová (2006: 229–240), L. Rabušic (2007: 262–272), and J. Kocourková (2008: 240–249) on, among other things, the significance of family policy in the Czech Republic. It has also printed discussions of the need for a pronatal policy in the Czech Republic, a position advocated mainly by V. Srb and M. Kučera, who published articles primarily relating to J. Rychtaříková's detailed analysis of trends in fertility. This is understandable, as demographers study state measures in support of families with children from the perspective of their impact on the reproductive behaviour of a given population. Since it is impossible to clearly separate family policy from pronatal population policy, in the 1990s the role of family policy in the Czech Republic was not given a proper assessment. Nevertheless, in the past decade a shift has occurred in both the political scene and in expert circles. The significance of family policy is no longer questioned and now the discussion instead centres on its content.

State support for families with children tends to grow in times of economic difficulty. With the adoption of the Janota package of austerity measures in September 2009, the question was raised in the Czech Republic, as it had been previously in the 1990s, of how tenable it is for families with children to be left to bear the burden of the costs of the economic crisis. The proposal to reduce the birth allowance from 13 000 to 10 000 Czk and cut the parental allowance by 10% fortunately failed to pass through the Chamber of Deputies, but MPs did not openly come out in opposition to the planned reduction of the maternity allowance, which would have the biggest impact on women with middle and higher incomes. Effective 1 January 2010, the monthly financial assistance in maternity for middle-income women is between eight and the thousand crowns, i.e. two to three thousand crowns less than in 2009. From the perspective of the long-term development of family policy in the Czech Republic this step must be viewed as lacking vision and as disruptive to the stability of financial support for families. Political representation in the Czech Republic has shown itself to be still inclined to underestimate the fact that both frequent changes and cuts in state family support negatively impact the population climate.

This series of papers on the issue of family policy opens with a speech by Vladimír Špidla, which he presented in Prague during the Czech Presidency of the EU at an international conference on 'Family Childcare and Employment Policy'. He touches on a very current issue –

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^{*}'Family Policy in the Perspective of (Not Just) Demographers' by J. Kocourková is the title of the Introductory article of the thematic issue of *Demografie*, 2009, 51 (4) devoted to the subject of family policy. In addition to original articles, the issue also contains the previously published articles of G. Neyer (Family Policies and Fertility in Europe: Fertility Policies at the Intersection of Gender Policies, Employment Policies and Care Policies. MPIDR Working Paper WP-2006-010 (2006), available at: <http://www.demogr.mpg.de/papers/working/wp-2006-010.pdf> and O. Thévenon (Les politiques familiales des pays développés: des modèles contrastés. In *Population et Sociétés*, N° 448, septembre 2008). The selection of articles published in *Czech Demography*, 2010, vol. 4, includes only original, previously unpublished articles.

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the expansion of childcare facilities as one of the Barcelona objectives. The Barcelona objectives need to be viewed as an attempt to modernise society across the EU, and improving the conditions of families with children has become an incontrovertible part of that process. Špidla emphasises that it is in the interest of every family and every child for EU Member States to invest in the development of good-quality, specialised services designed to advance the education and personal development of children.

This text is followed by a contribution from Gerdy Neyer, who analyses the ways in which measures in support of fertility, employment, childcare, and gender equality are interconnected. Lessons can currently be drawn from the 1990s, when Sweden and Finland were hit with an economic crisis. Neyer points out that, unlike Sweden, in Finland family policy arrangements prevented the fertility rate from falling.

In Olivier Thévenon's article data from a newly developed OECD database that collects information on family policy measures in different states are used to create an up-to-date typology of advanced states. The results confirm the unique position of France, where various forms of state support are directed at all families regardless of their income. The author shows that in France family policy in the 1970s did not depart from the long-term objective of supporting fertility. By contrast, Wendy Sigle-Rushton takes the example of England and Wales to show that a higher fertility rate does not have to be the result of a generous family policy. She argues that the generous family policy in Scandinavian countries stimulates not just higher fertility among women but also the postponement of fertility until women are older. The less developed, liberal family policy in Great Britain oriented towards supporting the traditional family does not create any motivation for women with lower education and lower income to postpone fertility and thus contributes to their higher fertility. However, an inauspicious consequence is that there are substantial differences in fertility rates by education or social status. Sigle-Rushton sums up by noting that in Great Britain the costs of reproduction are excessively born by those who have the fewest resources.

Marta Korintus' article analyses the development of childcare services in Hungary. She shows that the Czech Republic and Hungary shared a similar history in the area of family policy not just before 1989 but also after. Like in the Czech Republic, in Hungary after 1990 priority was given to developing a system of long paid leave to ensure parental care for small children. As a result the capacity of nurseries in Hungary has decreased by 60% over the past 25 years. Like in the Czech Republic, most children up to the age of 3 are at home with the mother. The issue of promoting gender equality and achieving a work-life balance has been largely ignored. The author attempts to elucidate in more detail the causes of the failure to date to implement the Barcelona objectives in Hungary. An interesting finding is that in 1993 a new form of childcare was introduced in Hungary, so-called family-based day care. This measure is strikingly similar to new measure put forth in the Czech Republic in the Topolánek Government's Pro-family Package in 2008 – care by a non-parental figure and the institution of mutual parental assistance.

Family policy in the Czech Republic is the subject of two articles. Milan Kučera reiterates the importance of population and family policy for the future of demographic development in the Czech Republic and identifies the problem areas in the life of families with children that a broadly conceived family policy ought to address. He expresses his disappointment over the opportunities that have been wasted, but is still confident that it is possible to mitigate the demographic-social debt faced by future generations. In the final article, Kateřina Jirková reflects on the character of contemporary family policy in the Czech Republic. She identifies the main shortcoming as the lack of continuity in family policy, which reflects the long-term political disagreement over the basic direction of family policy. She examines the most recent concept adopted by the Topolánek Government, the Pro-family Package, which, however, was dropped when the government fell, and she documents the difficulty involved in intro-

ducing even single measures in the field of family policy. In her view, this dire situation is the result of both the lack of authority invested in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry's lack of expert competence. She proposes a solution in the establishment of a Government Council for Family Policy made up of ministers from selected ministries.

As the articles by foreign authors show, the theme of family policy has come to occupy an important place in international demographic literature. At present it is no longer questioned that by adopting certain measures the state can significantly influence the living conditions of families with children and indirectly thus have an effect on the decisions people make about reproduction. Recent developments in the Czech Republic have shown that these issues warrant proper attention.

A SPEECH BY VLADIMÍR ŠPIDLA, EUROPEAN COMMISSIONER FOR EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES^{*)}

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak at this forum. I am very proud that my country has assumed leadership of the EU and I wish the Czech Presidency great success. I believe that in these difficult times a successful Czech Presidency will also be a success for the Union.

This conference addresses a fundamental issue for our society: how best to support families and create the best possible conditions for our children? All parents want their children to be as prepared as possible for the tasks that await them in adulthood. On several occasions in recent years the European Union and its Member States have expressly designated this as a priority.

One of the ways in which to benefit families and especially children the most is through support for the development of childcare facilities, so that every family can decide whether to care for their children personally or whether to share this task with accessible and high-quality specialised services. This is a responsibility directed at progress and the wellbeing of our children and there is no neglecting it.

Surveys conducted by the Commission¹⁾, by OECD organisations²⁾ and by UNICEF³⁾ have found that the expansion of childcare facilities significantly contributes to the education and personal development of children. I will return to this point below (chap. **Childcare facilities – the benefits for children and more**). In recent years the European Union and Member States have repeatedly expressed their willingness to work jointly in this direction. The adoption and implementation of the Barcelona objectives have given concrete form to this political commitment. I will return to this further on (**chap. The EU and Member States: the sustained effort to advance childcare**).

Today's conference represents an excellent opportunity to summarise the progress that has been made in implementing the Barcelona objectives and to determine where we can improve our endeavours (chap. **The Barcelona objectives call for the expansion of childcare and employment policies**) in order to:

- help families achieve a work-life balance;
- design more effective employment policies.

^{*)} This speech was given by Vladimír Špidla at the international conference 'Parental Childcare and Employment Policy', which was held on 5–6 February 2009 in Prague. The conference was organised by the Czech Presidency of the EU Council in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic with the support of the European Commission (for more on the conference see *Demografie*, 2009, 51, pp. 139–141; Kamila Svobodová, A Report: Rodičovská péče a politika zaměstnanosti. Available at: http://www.demografie.info/?cz_detail_clanku&artclID=606.

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Childcare facilities – the benefits for children and more

Allow me first to emphasise the benefits that every family and every child can derive from childcare facilities. This is not about ideology or economic performance. This is an issue that has to be viewed from the perspective of children and their development, and also of course from the perspective of parents, who want only the best for their children.

The first benefit of childcare facilities from the perspective of children is greater equality. Childcare services provide the same level of support to all families equally and represent a form of enormous assistance, especially for poor children and for the children of foreigners. They open the doors to a successful education and to better opportunities for obtaining a good job in the future. Expanding these services is one of the best investments that a society can make in its future.

Childcare services can also help minimise social inequalities. As Professor Esping-Andersen has noted, the educational ‘competition’ is already half over by the time children start school⁴⁾. Children whose parents cannot pay for qualified tutors and educators will be unable to surmount the gap that separates them from their peers from middle- and upper-class backgrounds. Affordable, universal childcare is therefore essential to maintaining solidarity in our society and to ensuring equal opportunities for all.

For the children of migrants, education is not just an instrument of social advancement, but also serves an opportunity to become successfully integrated into the host country, and this is a viewpoint of ever growing significance in Europe, as, according to data, we are going to have to rely on migration to ensure our demographic sustainability in the future.

Another benefit is the important role that childcare plays in the prevention of child poverty. This has been clearly reflected in the work of the Social Protection Committee:⁵⁾ all the Member States that have made progress in this area are ones that have improved the provision of childcare. Childcare gives parents more opportunities to work and increase their income. It is no secret that times are tough, and this is the only way in which parents can improve their and their children’s standard of living.

If we look past the child perspective of the benefits of childcare two facilities there are two more reasons for expanding these facilities:

- Childcare benefits individuals and society. An individual’s opportunities in life improve with the attainment of better education and the development of better social skills: both are acquired from the experience of being a member of a peer group in early childhood. And society as a whole benefits when its members are educated and well integrated.
- Childcare is essential for ensuring the equality of men and women. It gives both parents equal chances of finding and keeping a job and building a career. If we really want women to have the opportunity to choose whether to work or not, it is essential for them to be able to rely on good-quality and affordable childcare facilities.

The EU and Member States: the sustained effort to advance childcare

For a number of years the European Union has been committed to protecting the interests of children. The decision of the Czech Presidency to place childcare on the agenda of today’s conference is supportive of the work of the Commission and the efforts of all Member States in the past several years.

In 1992 the Council adopted a recommendation on childcare⁶⁾ in which it emphasised the

⁴⁾ Esping-Andersen, 2005: ‘If the educational competition is half over before children even start school then clearly we have to examine what goes on in the preceding years.’

⁵⁾ These studies, especially the report from 2008 on poverty and favourable living conditions for children, began in 2007 in connection with a meeting of the Council in March 2006, where Member States were called on to adopt measures to combat child poverty.

⁶⁾ Recommendation 92/241/EEC.

importance of expanding accessible, affordable, good-quality care facilities for children. The Council also adopted employment guidelines for 2005–2008 and 2008–to 2010, in which it again called for the expansion of such services⁷⁾.

The Renewed Social Agenda is the most current example of the commitment shared by all Member States. Last year, the Renewed Social Agenda was enthusiastically adopted at a meeting of the Council in Chantilly and established investment into children and youth as a priority.

The Barcelona objectives call for the expansion of childcare and employment policies

Almost seven years ago, the Member States reached an agreement in Barcelona on the importance of childcare and established ambitious objectives for themselves. They agreed by 2010 to secure the provision of formal care for at least 90% of children between the age of 3 and mandatory school age and for at least 33% of all children under the age of 3.

This deadline expires in a year and most of the Member States have already made significant progress, especially for the benefit of children. Although for many Member States achieving the objectives established in 2002 will be difficult, the number, quality, and accessibility of childcare facilities has increased substantially across the entire EU⁸⁾. It is already clear that the Barcelona objectives have led Member States to develop more intense strategies to provide parents with better childcare services.

- The Barcelona objectives are clearly conducive to improving access to employment for both parents, and they do so in conformity with the Lisbon strategy objectives, which include increasing the employment rate in general and the employment of women in particular. It must be clarified that these two strategic objectives are not in conflict. We can attain a higher employment rate, greater equality between men and women, and at the same time have children who are able to fully develop their potential. Some Member States have achieved this: two of them, France and Sweden, are part of a trio that includes the Czech Republic.
- The Barcelona objectives enhance women's opportunities for participating in the labour market and thus they help narrow the gap between men and women in this area. The European Council drew attention to this in March 2006 in the European Pact for Gender Equality⁹⁾.
- They help solve demographic problems by enabling Europeans to raise their children while still going to work, which provides them with earnings and leads to a better-functioning society¹⁰⁾.

⁷⁾ With regard to the commitments stemming from the Barcelona objectives, the Council's employment guidelines for 2005–2008 and 2008–2010 request Member States to work towards a '*better reconciliation of work and private life and the provision of accessible and affordable childcare facilities and care for dependants*.' (Guideline No. 18). The Council also calls on Member States: '*To enhance a lifecycle approach to work and to promote reconciliation between work and family life, policies regarding childcare provision are necessary. Securing coverage of at least 90% of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33% of children under 3 years of age by 2010 is a useful benchmark at national level...*' (Council Decision of 15 July 2008 on Guidelines for the employment policies of Member States (2008/618/EC)).

⁸⁾ On average, 26% of children under the age of 3 receive a formal care. In the older age group the figure is 84% of children. If we look at the data for individual Member States only five have achieved both targets. Three provide care for more than 90% of children between the age of 3 and mandatory school age, but not for children younger than that. Two Member States meet the target for care for younger children but not for children over the age of 3. Seventeen countries – including all the new Member States – have met neither of the targets. In the Czech Republic only 2% of the younger age group receive care and 67% of the older age group.

⁹⁾ Presidency Conclusion, 7775/1/06/ REV 1.

¹⁰⁾ European objectives in the area of improving work-life balance were reconfirmed in a statement on 12 October 2006 about the demographic future of Europe. This statement in particular highlights the need to create more favourable conditions for the demographic recovery of Europe.

- These objectives were elaborated and ratified by all Member States and are now being implemented. The European Union does not have direct authority in this area, but it has responded to the demands of Member States and has provided support through:
- The European Social Fund,
- joint monitoring of the progress of Member States in fulfilling the Barcelona objectives,
- active support for the exchange of best practices between Member States.

Beyond the Barcelona objectives

The Barcelona objectives are one aspect of the modernisation of society across the EU, but we need to back them up with a comprehensive strategy. Allow me to briefly sum up whether the strategies put forward by the Commission are headed in the right direction.

- In the first years of life children need the greatest amount of care from their parents. The Commission proposed prolonging maternity leave to enable mothers to freely choose how much free time they want to have before the birth of a child and how long they want to remain at home with the child afterwards. Also, the issue of the allowance paid over the course of maternity leave will be addressed for the first time at the EU level, which could reinforce the effectiveness of these laws.
- The enactment of paternity leave is not being considered for now, but it may be dealt with during the discussions about parental leave that were initiated with social partners recently. Paternity leave is extremely important: any conflict that may arise between a woman's freedom and her participation in the labour force on the one hand and the interests of children on the other occur not because the woman is abandoning her children but because the man refuses to assume a fair share of the responsibility for caring for children.

Conclusion

This conference is a welcome initiative. It contributes to the debate that was opened many years ago and that is so necessary. Our policies will continue to focus on the interests of children. We will continue to attend to the welfare of children and think about how these services can be best set up to serve all families in the EU.

All Member States have already articulated this shared objective. I am glad that we share this common goal of giving every family a chance to work and SIMULTANEOUSLY raise children. I am also pleased that the Barcelona objectives have already helped us make some progress in this area.

Today's conference is an opportunity to look for new ways of fulfilling the Barcelona objectives and advancing complementary strategies to establish the best possible conditions for children and parents. It would be a tragedy if the conference just re-opened old disputes between women's rights advocates and the champions of traditional family models instead of helping us to move forward.

We live in a different world today, and in this new world, where men and women can attain the same level of education and have the same longings for fulfilment in life, we have to find the appropriate strategies.

But it is also a world in which the transmission of inequalities from one generation to the next can still divide society, deny many people the opportunities that our modern economy has to offer, impoverish us in the long term, and underpin social instability.

Let's turn this conference into an opportunity for reflection on making a better society for all.

FERTILITY IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A POLICY PUZZLE?*)

WENDY SIGLE-RUSHTON**)

Abstract: Relative to many other European countries, fertility in England and Wales has been maintained at moderately high levels. Other countries with similar TFRs have far more generous and universal family policies. This paper explores why that might be the case. The main argument which is sketched out in this brief note is that moderately high fertility can be sustained in different settings, but the resulting fertility profile will likely differ in predictable ways which can be linked to the family policy regime and the labour market.


In the 1970s and 1980s, fertility in the majority of European countries, as measured by the total fertility rate (TFR), fell from above- to below-replacement level (Sigle-Rushton and Kenney, 2003; Sobotka, 2004). Although today all EU-27 countries have TFRs below replacement level, the gap between replacement level and the TFR varies considerably across countries. In many of the Southern and Eastern European countries, the TFR fell below 1.3, a phenomenon that has been termed “lowest-low fertility” (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega, 2002). Others have experienced more moderate declines and have maintained higher levels of fertility which, although still below replacement, leave them far better placed to deal with the challenges of population ageing. England and Wales is one such country. As Figure 1 shows, for the period from 1973 (when the TFR fell below replacement after the 1960s baby boom) until 2008, the TFR averaged about 1.78, falling below 1.70 in only four years (Sigle-Rushton, 2008). Indeed Sobotka (2004) describes England and Wales, along with the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), France and Ireland, as forming a “high fertility belt” within Europe.

This high fertility belt comprises countries which, from a policy perspective, form a rather heterogeneous group. It contains countries representative of each of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) “Three Worlds of Welfare” and each of Lewis’ (1992) male breadwinning regimes. France, Denmark and Sweden were forerunners in the provision of generous child benefits and family policies, such as job protected leaves and subsidized child-care, that made it easier to combine paid employment and motherhood. The remaining Nordic countries have implemented similar family policies as well. Although it is important to consider the wider social and economic context in which policies are embedded (MacDonald, 2002; Neyer, 2006), economic theory suggests that the Nordic countries and France have policy packages which support fertility (Björklund, 2007). In contrast, at least historically, neither Ireland nor England and Wales have provided very much government support for families and children. In both countries there has been strong institutional support for the male breadwinning family and relatively weak labour market regulations establishing the rights and entitlements of working mothers. Indeed, compared to much of Europe, the economies of both countries have been relatively unregulated. The British labour market, in particular, is characterized by high employment rates but also high rates of (low paid) part-time work, high turnover and

*) This article was published in *Demografie*, 2009, 51 (4), pp. 258–265. The contents of the journal are published on the website of the Czech Statistical Office at: <http://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/demografie>.

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Figure 1 Post-World War II trend in the total fertility rate in England and Wales



Source: Birth Statistics for England and Wales FM.1, Table 1.4

low firm specific investments in individual workers (Sigle-Rushton, 2008). Focusing on England and Wales, this paper examines how fertility has been sustained despite a lack of explicit concern or, at least until recent years, family policy effort. Drawing on economic models of the timing of fertility, I begin with a discussion of how generous family policies like those we see in the Nordic countries create incentives for higher fertility but at the same time for delayed fertility, especially for lower paid women. By the same logic, a dearth of such policies should make it less costly for lower paid women to begin childbearing early and to have larger completed family sizes. The strength of these incentives will, of course, depend to some extent on the labour market setting and the extent to which the government is willing to intervene in the labour market. Taking into account both family policies and the labour market, I argue that, as theory predicts, British fertility, while moderately high, is educationally and socially polarized¹⁾. As a consequence, the costs of reproducing the next generation fall disproportionately on those with the fewest resources. I also discuss the role that migration and changes in policy have likely played since 2001 when the TFR increased sharply.

Economic theory suggests that higher earning women have a strong incentive to delay their fertility (Gustafsson, 2001). Moreover economic theories of the optimal timing of motherhood predict that a coherent set of family policies that support the combination of employment and motherhood – in particular policy provisions which are both generous and linked to previous labour market attachment – provides incentives for women to postpone childbearing until after they have completed education and secured paid employment. Job protected maternity and parental leave with wage replacement (which lowers the opportunity costs of temporary withdrawal from the labour market) and subsidized childcare for mothers who are employed should reduce the costs of childbearing but discourage fertility at younger ages, at least until after securing a permanent job (Björklund, 2007; Gustafsson, 2001). This kind of policy package should create incentives for moderate and lower earning women to delay

¹⁾ I borrow this term from a study by Ekert-Jaffé and colleagues (2002).


childbearing as well. For women with low earnings, the incentive is stronger the wider the gap between maternity benefit levels and income support levels.

In addition, if all mothers are awarded generous entitlements, there may be a tendency to avoid hiring or promoting women in the private sector because they are viewed as potential mothers and, therefore, expected to be more costly to employ in the longer term. Indeed some have suggested this kind of statistical discrimination explains patterns of occupational segregation in Nordic countries with high percentages of women working in the public rather than the private sector (Hakim, 2008; Shalev, 2008). In part because of high levels of occupational segregation (but also because of more narrow wage distributions in general), women's earnings distributions are more narrow in the Nordic than the Anglo-Saxon countries. A narrow wage distribution with relatively strong minimum wage protection should create incentives for women of lower occupational classes as well to delay fertility in order to qualify for generous work-related maternity benefits. Low levels of earnings inequality also means that the benefits of delaying childbearing for higher earners are not as great as they would be when their earnings trajectories are steep (Gustafsson, 2001). This should encourage slightly earlier and perhaps higher completed fertility amongst higher earners than would be expected in settings with greater levels of inequality and fewer universal, employment linked family policies.

In countries where government support for families with children is limited and offered as a safety net to the poorest families only, incentives to postpone or even forego childbearing are strongest for women with the highest likelihood of labour market success²⁾ (which is usually characterized by steep earnings trajectories but male work patterns) and weakest for women with lower occupational status. In this more residual family policy setting, career interruptions for childbearing can carry substantial economic costs for moderate to higher earning women. When minimal family policies are embedded in economies with high levels of earnings inequality, low levels of labour market regulation and low levels of firm-specific investment in workers (so that firing or demoting workers is relatively easy and inexpensive for firms), the incentive to delay amongst the highest earners is likely to be intensified because early motherhood might result in relegation to the "mommy track" (especially if she wants to reduce her working hours) and substantially reduced lifetime earnings. For this reason, a minimal family policy regime creates incentives for these women to postpone and then closely space the births of additional children in order to minimize their human capital depreciation (Cigno and Ermisch, 1988). That said, with late school leaving and steep earnings trajectories well into their thirties, postponement might become "perpetual" (Berrington, 2004) and the ultimate result is likely to be higher levels of childlessness (and smaller completed family size) amongst the most qualified and highest earners. This, of course, can be expected to vary considerably by the characteristics of different jobs (see, for example, Blackwell and Glover (2007) and Crompton and Harris (1998)), but, on average, *laissez faire* policy settings should create strong incentives for delay (and possibly for childlessness) amongst those with stronger labour market positions. For more disadvantaged women, movement into and out of employment in this sort of setting is not very costly since they are unlikely to obtain positions with great opportunities for advancement and their earnings trajectories tend to be flat. Moreover when the labour market is poorly regulated and the earnings at the bottom of the distribution are near the benefit level, the existence of low-level means tested benefits might pro-

²⁾ For the highest earners, this may be offset to some extent in contexts where there is a large supply of low paid (women) who can be hired to provide care privately allowing high earning women to purchase market substitutes for their child care requirements (Shalev, 2008). This can be due to an unregulated labour market characterized by high levels of wage inequality (Donath, 2000) and/or an large black market (often comprising illegal migrant workers). Even then, concerns that motherhood may still be treated as a signal of less commitment may reinforce incentives to delay.

Figure 2 Age specific fertility rates in England and Wales from 1965 until 2005



Source: Birth Statistics for England and Wales FM.1, Table 10.1

vide insurance against early childbearing, but only for the lowest earners. In countries like the UK where means tested benefits for lone mothers were originally intended to allow them to opt out of the labour market (Sigle-Rushton, 2009), the social acceptance of using income support to fund periods out of the labour market may be well entrenched.

Taken together this brief sketch suggests that even with the same TFR, underlying fertility patterns might differ by family policy regime. Compared to countries with more generous levels of provision and financial support for families with children, those countries with low levels of targeted, often means test-tested, support for families should have higher rates of fertility at younger ages concentrated amongst the more disadvantaged and lower completed fertility, with higher rates of childlessness, amongst the more advantaged. Socio-economic differentials in motherhood and completed family size should be wider in these countries, but the disadvantaged should carry a greater share of the costs of reproducing the next generation.

Empirical evidence is consistent with these predictions. In most other moderately high fertility countries, as fertility declined and was postponed, graphs of age-specific fertility curves shifted rightward but remained steep and highly peaked. In contrast, in England and Wales, the age-specific fertility schedule flattened in the early twenties but less so at younger ages (Figure 2). These differences mean that rates of teenage childbearing remain higher, peak age-specific fertility rates tend to be lower, and the fertility profile overall more dispersed in Anglo-Saxon, residual family regimes than in other moderately high fertility countries (Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns, 2002). Indeed, total fertility rates have remained stable since the 1980s because decreases in fertility at ages 20 to 29 were substantially offset by increases at ages 30 to 40 suggesting fairly substantial recuperation after earlier postponement. At the same time, fertility rates at the youngest ages changed very little. Since 2000 fertility rates for those aged 20-29 stopped declining, while for women in their thirties they continued to rise contributing, in part, to the steady increase in the TFR since 2001 (Sigle-Rushton, 2008). In terms of completed family size, fertility in England and Wales is characterized by high “concentration ratios” which suggests that, compared to most other European countries, fertility

is less evenly distributed across the population resulting in both greater levels of childlessness and higher percentages of large families (Shkolnikov, Andreev, Houle and Vaupel, 2007).

Although these patterns confirm that younger and older women are having children at higher rates in England and Wales (and other Anglo-Saxon countries like Ireland) and that fertility is not evenly distributed across the population, they do not tell us much about the average socio-economics characteristics (often proxied using measures of educational attainment) of women who are giving birth at different ages or about the women who never give birth at all. Consistent with the predictions outlined above, evidence suggests that teenage childbearing in England and Wales (and childbearing in the early 20s as well) is heavily concentrated amongst the poorly educated and the disadvantaged (Social Exclusion Unit, 1999).

Social polarization in patterns of delayed fertility is also consistent with theoretical predications. Rendall and colleagues (2005) show that in England and Wales, highly educated women born in the 1960s were far less likely than women born in the 1950s (for whom female labour market participation was lower) to have given birth by age 33 – a fall of more than 10 percentage points to just under 54 percent. For the low educated, there was little evidence of change in the timing or likelihood of a first birth, and over 80 percent of women had given birth by age 33. In contrast, more than 70 percent of highly educated women born in the 1960s gave birth by the age of 33 in Norway and France, and there is evidence of substantial postponement at age 21 and 25 amongst the lower educated. Despite evidence of on-going recuperation (see also Kneale and Joshi, 2008) followed subsequently by increased tempo (Rendall and Smallwood, 2003) which, as outlined above, would be expected by women who want to limit their time spent out of the labour market, highly qualified women in England and Wales are nonetheless more likely than less educated women to remain childless and their completed fertility is lower. Berrington (2004) demonstrates a strong educational gradient in completed fertility in Great Britain using the General Household Survey in 2000 and 2001. She finds that 28 percent of highly educated and only 16 percent of unqualified women in their early forties were childless. Women with high levels of education were also more likely than less educated women to report having had only one child. In contrast, amongst unqualified women, larger families were most common. About 20 percent reported having four or more children. These figures, when examined alongside those of other countries, confirm that the fertility profile in England and Wales is more socially polarized than in other moderately high fertility countries with more generous and universal family policies (Sigle-Rushon, 2008; Toulemon, Pailhé & Rossier, 2008; Eckert-Jaffé et al, 2002; Rendall et al, 2005).

Although the evidence outlined above suggests that the economic and policy context in England and Wales has contributed to moderately high but socially polarized patterns of fertility, the rapid increase in the TFR since 2001 requires further examination. Recuperation following earlier delays is surely part of the explanation. Increased rates of immigration and changes to family policy in recent years might play a role as well. Researchers have noted that countries with low levels of labour market regulation tend also to have high levels of migration, and countries with high levels of protection tend to have fewer migrants. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the UK has received large numbers of migrants in recent years, higher even than in countries like Sweden which have been similarly open to the movement of new EU members (Ruhs and Martin, 2008). Given their young age distribution, foreign born mothers³⁾ make a small but not unimportant contribution to the TFR, one that has been increasing in recent years. However, the TFR for women born in England and Wales has increased as well (Tromans Natamba and Jefferies, 2009). So although migration cannot be singled out as the sole reason for recent increases in fertility, it is nonetheless true that in-

³⁾ It is important to keep in mind that there is substantial overlap between international migrants and foreign born mothers, but they are not the same. Unfortunately, we only have data on the latter.

creasing rates of migration (which mean an increasing share of new immigrants) have contributed to the increase in the TFR since 2001. In 2001, the TFR in England and Wales would have fallen from 1.63 to 1.56 if births to foreign born mothers (17 percent of all births) were not included (Office for National Statistics, 2007). By 2007, when births to foreign women totalled 21.9 percent of all births, the TFR of 1.92 would have fallen to 1.79 (Tromans et al, 2009). There are, however, reasons to question whether their contribution to average levels of completed fertility is likely to be as high as the foreign born TFR might, at first glance, suggest⁴. Because migrants tend to give birth soon after migrating, there will be strong tempo effects on the TFR during periods of high migration, and as Toulemon (2006) demonstrates the TFR for migrants tends to exceed their expected level of completed fertility. This incongruity will be most marked when recent migrants comprise a large share of the total migrant population as was the case in England and Wales since the turn of the century. On the other hand, to the extent that migrant women are incorporated into the lower echelons of the occupational and earnings hierarchy and to the extent they are entitled to state benefits, migrant women might be expected to have higher than average fertility if they remain in England and Wales over the long-term and if their fertility resembles that of other, similarly situated, native born women.

Recent changes to family policy, while more generous than what was offered previously, remain distinct from those programmes in place in the Nordic countries and France. Compared to the Nordic model, UK family policies have been more gendered in their implementation. For example, the length and generosity of maternity leave but not paternity or parental leave has been extended (Lewis and Campbell, 2007) and free preschool is provided but only for a few hours a week (Sigle-Rushton, 2009). Moreover, policy reform has not included major shifts towards greater government intervention in the labour market. Taken together, recent policy changes provide the most support to mothers who work part-time in low-paid and low status occupations, some additional support to moderate earning women (many of whom work longer hours than preschool can cover), but they do not really offer gender equitable solutions for families with higher earning women who work longer hours. Nor do they offer attractive solutions for those families where the woman is the primary earner (Sigle-Rushton, 2008). As a consequence, changes to family policy may have been responsible for some of the increase in TFR since the turn of the century, and the more generous maternity leave policies may work to reduce social polarization slightly, but the profile in England and Wales will, I expect, continue to follow an Anglo-Saxon pattern for the foreseeable future.

To summarize, persistently high rates of fertility amongst teenage women and those who are poorly qualified or with poorer labour market prospects have contributed to patterns of stable total fertility rates in the last three decades of the 20th century. The concentration of fertility amongst the least advantaged, as measured by education level and occupational class, has been (and remains) higher than in other countries with similar levels of fertility such as France (Ekert-Jaffé et al, 2002). These outcomes are not inconsistent with economic theories of fertility timing and suggest that the TFR masks important variations in fertility patterns that may well be linked to family policy regimes and their interaction with the labour market. When we examine increases in fertility since the turn of the century, high levels of net migration and the increased generosity of family policy may well have contributed to the steady rise in the TFR since 2001. However, it is not entirely clear whether recent increases are short-lived tempo effects or whether they reflect actual changes in the size of families women will go on to have.

⁴ There are also data quality issues. Data on the number of migrants entering the country is very limited. Mothers are well counted because they are captured in vital statistics. However many women who have migrated but remain childless are unlikely to be precisely counted. The denominator in fertility rates is therefore likely to be underestimated and, as a consequence, the migrant TFR biased upward.

In England and Wales, the *laissez faire* family policy regime and economy have historically created incentives for a moderately high but relatively disadvantaged fertility profile. In this context, high fertility depends on high levels of inequality. As a consequence, the costs of producing the next generation are unevenly and regressively distributed. High fertility is also likely to be accompanied by relatively high rates of child poverty and all of its related social problems. Theory suggests that reduced social exclusion, reduced inequality, and increased employability (all consistent with EU policy and indeed, until the recent change of Government, UK policy aims (Sigle-Rushton, 2008; 2009)) will, *ceteris paribus*, come at the cost of reduced fertility by making early motherhood less attractive for disadvantaged groups. For countries of the EU and those wanting more equal and socially just societies, the Nordic model may be the only feasible option in the longer run.

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CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES IN HUNGARY¹⁾

MARTA KORINTUS²⁾

Abstract: The paper describes the present system of childcare leaves and childcare services – as means of support for families with young children – then, gives an overview of challenges and possible future scenarios. A discussion of family day care services highlights the country's experience of introducing and trying to scale up these services, which are thought to be especially suitable for rural areas where it is not cost-effective to maintain childcare centers.

In Hungary, the system to support parents with young children includes leaves for insured and uninsured parents, paid at different levels; financial support in the form of family allowance and tax credit; and childcare services. These services include nurseries, called “*bölcsőde*” in Hungarian, for children under the age of three; kindergartens, called “*óvoda*” for those between the ages of 3 and 6; and family day care “*családi napközi*” for children between 20 months and 14 years of age.

The different elements of the leaves available for parents to care for their child cover the period up to the child's third birthday. Parents who did not have a specific number of days spent in employment – therefore, are not insured – receive a flat sum. Those who are insured, – that is, had the required number of days – are paid at 70% of their previous earnings, up to a ceiling, until their child becomes two years old. Then, they receive the flat sum until the child become three years old. There is also a third element, for which those parents are eligible who have three or more children and the youngest child is between three and eight years of age. The payment for this is the same flat sum. Fathers can have five days of fully paid leave during the first two months after the birth of the child.

Nurseries and kindergartens are both public centers providing full time care and education. Families pay only the cost of meals, but those in need have free or reduced priced meals. The ratio of the age group in nurseries is only about 11%³⁾, whereas the ratio in kindergartens is 85%. So, during the period covered by leaves, the majority of children are at home with a parent – mostly the mother. However, this cannot be taken for granted as a parental choice, since there are no nurseries in many parts of the country, and there are areas where there are no job opportunities either.

None of the democratic governments since 1990 developed childcare services as much as they could have. Demographic goals seemed to override other considerations, and one of the measures thought to address declining birth rates was the development of an extended system of long, paid childcare leaves. Until recently, gender equality has not entered the debates about leave policy and achieving a balance between work and family life. Organizations calling for equal rights for women in the 1990s and the early 2000s focused on reducing domestic abuse, ‘equal pay for equal work’, and women's representation among decision makers.

¹⁾ This article is based on the presentation made at the Czech Presidential conference *Parental Childcare and Employment Policy: "Collision or Complementarity?"*, Prague, 5–6 February 2009.

²⁾ This article was published in *Demografie*, 2009, 51 (4), pp. 266–273. The contents of the journal are published on the website of the Czech Statistical Office at: <http://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/demografie>.

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³⁾ Source for all data throughout the article: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.

Nonetheless, there is an uneven division of labor between men and women in the home. In order to raise the labor force participation of women it has become important to provide more affordable and more diverse services for children.

The reasons for changes in childcare policy and services were numerous. Some of these were related to ideology, some to financing issues, and some to new or unmet needs. The overwhelming majority of nursery and kindergarten places are still in public centers. Whereas earlier, a substantial share of them were maintained by companies, today their involvement dropped to a fraction only.

The system of children's services in Hungary is split. Policy responsibility for children under the age of 3 come under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour⁴⁾. The Ministry of Education and Culture has responsibility for the services for children 3–6 years, which are now seen as the first stage of public education (kindergarten). Schooling age in Hungary is 6, and kindergarten is compulsory for 5 year-olds as preparation for school.

The 1997 Act on the protection of children, and the 1993 Education Act are the relevant pieces of legislation for nurseries and kindergartens. Regulations govern the system of administration and inspection, define minimum criteria, educational content, quality standards and access to childcare, respite care and long term care services, and kindergarten and after school care respectively. Both pieces of legislation focus on children's rights, equality, and the involvement of parents in the programs. Licensed family day care and home childcare were also included in the 1997 legislation as basic services to be provided for families with young children. A family day care provider can look after maximum five children between the ages of 0–14. The laws define the duties of local governments also, and state what (so called "basic") services they are required to ensure for the population in their area of authority. These duties can be fulfilled by setting up and operating programs directly, or in partnerships, as well as by means of contracting out the services. Nurseries and/or family day care and kindergartens are, for example, such basic services. Licensing regimes vary according to the type of service, and are based on the criteria set in legislation for the different services. Local authorities are the issuing agents.

The inspection is done by the county guardianship offices (part of the public administration system) once in every 4 years, and by the licensing local authority once a year for nurseries and family day care. The inspection of kindergartens is the duty of the maintainer, mostly local authorities. The maintainer also evaluates the professional work in the kindergarten on the basis of the pedagogical measures and evaluations of pedagogical service, the expert-opinion of persons in the national register, the report written by the institutions of public education, and the opinion of supervisory body of kindergartens. Registered professionals have to be asked to comment on plans for setting up, or closing down services and provisions.

There are several challenges that have to be met. Perhaps, the biggest ones are the difficulties in implementing policies arising from the decentralized nature of Hungarian administration. There are more than 3100 local authorities. Many of them are small with a population of less than 2000 people, with the same duties as the bigger ones, but with small budgets, which are not enough to finance services. Another challenge is the divergence of interests between central and local governments, which have consequences for the implementation. Whereas access issues are important for the central government due to plans to increase women's labor force participation, and to meet the Barcelona targets, local authorities often have other priorities. Consequently, access to places in nurseries is uneven, rural areas usually lack services. The division between early education and care provisions (nurseries and kin-

⁴⁾ At times, this task was the responsibility for the primary healthcare for children. Later, since the beginning of the 1990's childcare was considered to relate more to social welfare. Law 31 of 1997 currently places responsibility for the 0–3 year old children under social welfare.

dergartens coming under the authority of different ministries) makes the provision for children's services even more difficult. Improving access for children in under-served rural settlements, for children with disabilities, and for Roma children to childcare and kindergarten were recommended by the OECD (2004).

Most of the children under the age of 3 are cared for at home by the mother, due to the availability of extended maternal and parental leaves. Non-parental childcare for children between the ages of 20 weeks to 3 years is provided almost entirely in nurseries. Those children whose development is assessed to be lagging behind can stay until they are 4 years old, and those with disabilities, up to age 6. Since 1984, however, both the number of centers and their places have dropped by about 60 percent. Today, only about 15–20% of the settlements have nurseries, and most of these are bigger towns. In 2007, there were 24934 nursery places, providing for 32010 children, for about 10-11% of the age group. As the data indicate, the number of children admitted was higher, than the places nurseries are licensed for, thus the utilization rate was high. Most children attending were in the 24–35 month age range, and about a third was older than 36 months. Special needs children can be integrated into mainstream childcare settings.

Family day care, as a new form of childcare was introduced in 1993. It is the form of childcare when someone cares for other people's children in her own home. The legislation and criteria for licensing family day care homes were developed in the early 1990's, with the idea of substituting nurseries and kindergartens in those settlements where centers cannot be maintained. Today, family day care means licensed homes, with maximum 5 children per adult between the ages of 0–14. However, in 2007, there were only 205 family day care providers in the whole country. Why? The main problem is the difficulties of financing, since most families do not have enough income to cover the full cost of care, and there is limited public financing. Out of the 205 providers, 51 were public, and 154 were private or non-profit.

In the course of developing the family day care model during the 1990's, some concerns were addressed, which are still problematic today:

- What level of quality can be ensured in these homes?
- What kinds of support family day care providers could receive to get started and to operate?
- How it is possible to ensure a good balance between center-based care and family day care when the latter is cheaper for local authorities?

The debated issues covered setting standards, training and support, and the importance of finding the right balance between providing center-based and family-based childcare. The model was intended to be widely available so the requirements had to be suitable for “average homes” and ensuring the safety, and healthy development of children at the same time.

Good quality requires training. But what kind of training was to be requested? Professional training? If yes, was it to be that of a nursery worker who cares for children under the age of three, or that of a kindergarten teacher, or that of an elementary school teacher?

But perhaps the toughest issue was to make sure everyone understands the aim and functions of family day care, and how these differ from traditional center-based services.

Today, we have legislation that regulates the minimum criteria and licensing for family day care. These include the definition of fit person, the requirement for prospective providers to attend a 60 hours training course, and the criteria for the environment and the working with children. However, upscaling is slow, due mainly to financing difficulties.

Kindergarten coverage is much better, since childcare leave and assistance are available for parents only until the child's third birthday, and therefore, the demand for places providing for children older than 3 years have always been much higher. Kindergartens were developed

⁶⁾ I: Interviewer, R: Respondent.

extensively during the 1960's and 1970's, and survived the transition years with only some closures. As a result, most of the settlements in the country have a kindergarten. In the 2007/2008 school year, there were 349514 kindergarten places, providing for 323958 children for about 85% of the 3–6 year-old age group.

The ratio of private (non-profit and for profit) providers is about 5% only both for kindergartens and nurseries, the rest are public services.

Both nurseries and kindergartens provide full time care and education. Opening hours are usually from 6 in the morning to 6 in the evening, with some local variations. Children get four meals a day: breakfast, mid-morning fruit, hot lunch, and afternoon snack. Centers usually close altogether for six weeks during the summer and Christmas holidays. However, closing times during the summer vary among centers in a given area, so those children whose parents cannot take leave for those specific days (and whose grandparents cannot look after them either) can attend another nearby center during this time. Both are comprehensive programs, addressing children's total needs by providing an integrated package of services in healthcare, nutrition, and psychosocial stimulation. There are regular visits by health visitors, and according to need, both nurseries and kindergartens can use the services of other professionals, such as psychologists, special education teachers, speech therapists, etc.

Since the political changes from state socialism to democracy in 1989/1990, diversification of the relatively uniform services has been taking place. Ways of breaking the uniformity included the introduction of flexible opening hours, offering additional services (such as mother-toddler groups, parent groups, take home meals, special events for children and families), opening up to parents and the community, involvement of parents and reformation of the curriculum. Many nurseries offer services, which are available for all parents living in the area. The most common ones are:

Creche-service: occasional care for children whose mother needs some time during the day or week for some reasons, such as distance working, study, every day chores, etc.

Mother-toddler group: where parents and children can spend some time together, play, and meet others on the premises of the nursery.

Organized events for parents: events usually tied to mother-toddler group meetings, experts are invited to talk about topics the parents are interested in, or ask for.

Toy library: where parents can take out a choice of toys, books and equipment.

Take-away meals: usually the kitchen of the nursery cooks pre-ordered meals for take away by parents living in the neighborhood.

Home childcare: Families can request a careworker to go to the child's home for a period of time when the parents need help in looking after the child.

Advisory service for parents: Regular parent group meetings, where topics of their choice or problems are discussed. In addition, any parent can seek personal advice in matters concerning his/her child.

Hungary has national standards both for nurseries and for kindergartens, which cover basic principles of care and education, minimum criteria for the environment, staffing, health and safety requirements and necessary documentation. These regulations aim to have a core standard, while providing enough flexibility for institutions to shape their service to meet local needs. The approach to work with children, that is, pedagogy, is practice-oriented, dealing with issues of supporting the process of becoming autonomous and independent, the tasks and role of practitioners related to children's play and other activities, relationship with families, introducing/inducing children to the centre, communication between workers and children, nursery tales and poems, etc. Nursery worker, as well as kindergarten pedagogues believe that the "most possible time should be left for playing". Nevertheless, there is some difference in approach that reflects the characteristics of the two age groups. While nursery workers give priority to "teaching the children how to do everyday tasks and become self-re-

liant and autonomous”, kindergarten pedagogues also emphasize “passing on cultural values and preparation for school”. Careworker/child ratios are 1/6 in groups of 12 children in nurseries, and 1/11 in groups of 22 children in kindergartens. The ratio is better for groups with special needs children. Professional support for nurseries is provided by appointed nurseries, whose staff monitor other services in a given geographical area; organize training and ongoing training, conferences, exchange visits etc.; provide consultation and guidance; and circulate information.

The main challenge today is related to growing admission rates to the same number of places. Group sizes have become bigger, and the ratio of children per adult have become worse in nurseries, as there has been a growing demand for places, and no other solution is easily available to local authorities. Consequently, flexibility cannot be ensured in many places, and additional services might no longer be provided because of the high utilization rates putting greater demand on staff. Part-time care for children has been cancelled in favor of full-time care, for the same reasons. Work with special needs and disadvantaged children has been gaining more attention. Their numbers in services have been growing ever since the transition years due to set policy priorities and this poses quite many challenges both for nurseries and kindergartens, related to further education of staff about working with such children, securing the services of specialists, necessary alterations in the environments, acquisition of toys and equipments, etc.

The name of workers in nurseries is “childcare worker”, meaning a person looking after / taking care of children. There were 5576 childcare workers in 2007. The name of workers in kindergartens is “kindergarten pedagogue”. There were 29919 kindergarten pedagogues in 2007. More than 90% of the practitioners in both centers are qualified. In addition, there are assistants in both types of centers, helping qualified staff responsible for the work with children. The different names of the workers in the two types of service for young children imply different understandings and approach to work. However, the difference in practice is not that great anymore. Pedagogy is the overarching link, and supporting children’s overall development is the main aim of both professions.

Education for nursery workers and kindergarten pedagogues is not only at different levels, but are offered in different institutions. Both include a substantial amount of practice. The professional qualification is on upper medium level for childcare workers, and tertiary level for kindergarten pedagogues. The orientation of the two types of education is somewhat different. Nursery workers were traditionally taught many health and medicine-related subjects and only a few dealing with the psychology and pedagogy of children/childhood. This ratio has been changing over the years, but practical subjects still dominate. Theoretical aspects have been stronger in the training for kindergarten pedagogues. No qualification is required for family day care providers but they have to attend an introductory course and have to meet certain criteria required for obtaining a license. Qualified workers both in nurseries and kindergartens have to participate in accredited further training and to collect a certain number of credit points within 5 years in order to be kept registered, that is, to be able to keep their job. Legislation describes the system of accreditation and registration.

Children’s services and elementary education are dominated by women. There are no men at all in nurseries, and their number is negligible in kindergartens. Those few men who work with young children report facing quite many difficulties but believe they can bring something new and unique to the lives of children and to traditional female dominated services.

The average age of the workers is 41 years in both in nurseries and kindergartens, which forecasts problems. The aging of the childcare workforce is clearly not a recent development,

⁷⁾ Unlike induced abortion, where, if the woman seeking the induced abortion is under the age of 16, parental consent is required.

though. Maybe the popularity of the profession declined, maybe working with children is not seen as a “profession”, maybe more young people choose to study for higher education degrees, maybe the prestige of the work is not high enough. There are no clear answers. Career opportunities are usually linked to the structuring of the workforce and its training. In Hungary, advancement is limited to being the director or deputy director of a nursery or kindergarten even if workers complete further training courses. Moving to other services is quite limited, due to the specialized nature of knowledge and skills.

Labor shortage is a big problem for the whole ECEC sector and the main cause is the extraordinary low wages. All these workers are public employees and their salaries are based on a unified wage table. Radical steps have to be taken in order to make the profession inviting for young people. The prestige of the work in society should be raised, and the conditions (including pay, education, and work conditions) should be improved for ensuring the recruitment of new professionals

Financing limitations allow only supply-driven services. As a result, there are not enough places for children younger than three years of age, although it is a legal duty for local authorities to ensure a place and to assess needs locally. Financing services is mainly the responsibility of the central government in the form of earmarked funding, and the local governments by complementary funding. Between 30 and 40 per cent of funding for nurseries and kindergartens is from central government, 10 per cent from parents' fees, which is lowered or cancelled completely for those with low incomes, and the rest is covered by local government. For families receiving supplemental child protection allowance, meals are free. Since 1996, kindergartens are eligible to receive a double normative grant for each child with a speech-based need or light mental disability, and a triple grant for each child with a physical or sensory disability, autism, or medium severity disabilities.

The decentralized system has disadvantages over full state-funding because, local governments have many duties to fulfill, and the financing available for these tasks is often not enough. Especially, smaller local authorities tend to have financial difficulties. Although it is possible for them to contract private and voluntary sector providers, services are almost entirely public. The reason is the discrepancy between the cost of delivering services and the combined sum of earmarked funding and parental payments. Average income level is low in Hungary, which makes it impossible for most families to cover the full cost of care.

On a national level, payments related to leaves, cost less than to set up and maintain nurseries.

According to several surveys, the dominant attitude of the population is that the best place for the young child is at home with the mother. Leaves seem more popular than childcare services. Are they really? We do not know the answer, because the responses to surveys are biased by the fact that most families do not really have a choice. Because:

There are no other options than leaves in many places; strong traditional belief exists that it is best for children under 3, to be at home with the mother; the take up of leaves comes with payment, whereas parents have to pay – however little it is – for nurseries and kindergartens; there are difficulties returning to work after the leave period; and generally, the knowledge about leaves is better than about children's services

In line with European developments, today, demographic goals have less importance than in the earlier decades, and there has been a growing interest in leave policies closely related to the attention paid to increasing female labor force participation and balancing work and family life. This change in focus has raised questions about the length and payment level of available childcare leaves and about the right mix of paid leaves and ECEC services. Economists have been warning that extended leaves are counter-effective to the return to paid work. The longer the period the mother stays home with the child, the smaller the chance that she will be able to return to and re-integrate into the developing labor market. The OECD (2007)

recommendations for Hungary suggest that extended leaves ought to be cut back from 3 years to maximum 12 month, and the savings should be used to fund increased support for childcare services. Sociologists, on the other hand, demonstrate the poverty alleviating effect of the benefits tied to leaves in poor families, and argue that long paid leaves are sometimes their main (or only) source of income.

The present structure of the Hungarian leave system has been shaped through changes influenced by the very different approaches during successive government cycles. Probably due to the lack of overall consensus about the function of childcare leave (whether to support childbirth, children's development, women's labor market participation, women's equality, etc), there is now one strand (GYES) that is available universally for those who have not had the necessary number of insured days (work) before giving birth, and another one (GYED) for those who had been insured. GYES is paid at a flat-rate, equal to the amount of the minimum old-age pension. Payment for GYED is 70% of earnings up to a ceiling. Overall, the prevalence of financial support for families has not changed.

Structures have changed quite often and quite a lot during the transition years, but the perceptions of women's role in society and within the family have been changing only to a lesser extent. A study (Pongracz, 2008) looking at expectations concerning paid work and family responsibilities internationally indicate that the transformations in Hungarian society had no influence on the nostalgia felt for the traditional gender values and the traditional division of family commitments. Nevertheless, there was agreement also that the family cannot afford to forgo the woman's salary. Others (Brayfield and Korintus, 2008) found that both men and women increased their support for women's employment over time, but full-time employment was clearly not desirable for women with children under 3. These are in line with the argument (Blaskó, 2005) that the acceptance of the male-breadwinner model after 1989 was mostly due to massive unemployment in the early nineties. The overall picture emerging from a survey (Korintus, 2008)⁵⁾ indicate that the respondents favored the mother staying home with a young child; think that nurseries are used mainly because the mother needs to have a job in order to have enough income for the family; and are of the view that a wife would rather work part time, or not work at all, if the husband earned enough for the family to live on. But the responses have to be interpreted carefully, given the widespread lack of nursery and/or family day care places, and the difficulties to return to the labor market because of a general job shortage and prevailing working-time rigidities, in particular the low availability of part-time jobs.

There are arguments (Ignits és Kapitány, 2006) that during the transition years, the emergence of unemployment and the growing social inequality forced the support system of family policy to take over more and more the tasks of social policy. Therefore, the effects of the family support system (including childcare leaves and allowances) on alleviating poverty are sizable. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office data show that social transfers can effectively decrease child poverty, from 48% to 20%. Even though supporting parents' labor market participation and developing services for children – including developing and better organizing childcare – have been identified as the main means of reducing poverty in a recent government program, the effects of cutting back on leave periods (and therefore, the benefits tied to them), especially on the universal one, might worsen the situation of the great portion of those families whose income very much relies on this form of support. According to the data of the 2006 TÁRKI Household monitor, about 12% of the population in Hungary can be considered poor. Children and youth are the two age-groups with the highest risk of poverty. Compared to the average 12%, the poverty rate among 0-15 year olds is 15%. In view of these data, affordable childcare services available at times consistent with working patterns and of

⁵⁾ The study used data from the omnibus survey collected by TARKI in 2005.

a high quality are also of high importance, besides parental leave entitlements, both to address poverty and to help bring more mothers into the labor force.

The framework of Hungary's strategy is given by the EU Barcelona targets, the "Legyen Jobb a Gyermekeknek" (Making Things Better for our Children) National Strategy (2007–2032) and Action Plan, and the New Hungary Development Plan (2007–2013). These set the goals of supporting parents' labor market participation and developing services for children – including developing and better organizing childcare – as the main means of reducing poverty. The strategy considers supporting parents' labor market participation and developing services for children, including developing and better organizing childcare as the main means of reducing poverty. However, issues about implementation and scaling up emerge. Legislation is in place, but questions of financing, sufficient number of qualified workers, training needs and capacities have to be solved. Otherwise, the legislation will not be implemented on the local level.

One way forward is the integration of nursery and kindergarten services. The issue arose within the scope of the discussion about shortening the leave periods and increasing the number of available places for children under 3. Local authorities, especially the small ones, do not have funds to build new nurseries. Family day care could be a solution with some funding from local authorities, or with higher parental payments. Neither of these seems to be realistic on a wide scale. Therefore, other options are explored, such as making space available for a nursery group in kindergartens, and changing the legislation to admit 2 year-olds in kindergartens. These options might be a solution to greater access, but who will work with these children? Presently, there is an aging workforce and no one knows who will replace them. The job is not prestigious and it is low paid. Young people are not likely to find it a good career option.

Today, Hungary, as a member of the European Union, is expected to meet the Lisbon and the Barcelona targets (whereby childcare places should be available for 33% of children under 3), related to women's employment, and services for children respectively. However, there are many challenges and problems that are rooted in the inherited system, financial constraints and policy making (the perceptions and attitudes of decision makers). Birth rates have been falling for a long time, the society is aging, and these trends are coupled with low activity rates, especially with low women's employment rates.

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PRONATAL POPULATION POLICY IS NO LONGER ENOUGH – A COMPLEX FAMILY POLICY IS NOW ESSENTIAL ^{*)}

MILAN KUČERA ^{**)}

Abstract: The current – and according to demographic forecasts the future – population situation in the Czech Republic should lead to a wider discussion about how to interpret the changes in reproductive behaviour in the past twenty years, what their consequences will be, and how to respond to them. However, discussions without looking for solutions cannot be the agenda of a complex science like demography.

The current and, according to demographic forecasts, future population situation in the Czech Republic requires, in my view, that a wider discussion take place on how to interpret the changes in reproductive behaviour that have occurred in the past two decades, what their consequences will be, and how to respond to them. Unlike two to three decades ago, there is now an increasingly stronger link between two basic demographic processes: fertility, in the sense of the reproduction rate (and possible influential factors on it), and mortality, in the sense of rising life expectancy (and in relation to the pension system). These are two ends of the same stick, and in the long-term outlook they can no longer be assessed separately in this country. Population growth (decreases) by natural change will be relatively insignificant compared to the changes in age structure and the subsequent changes in the gross social capital of the total population.

In this deliberately sharpened treatment of the problem, which is aimed at generating debate, and not just among demographers, I will present my own ideas about how to approach and where lie the solutions necessary approaches to and proposals for solutions. However, such a complex science as demography cannot rest at discussion and not look for a way out of this situation.

Population policy, according to the *Multilingual Dictionary of Demography* (2005), by various measures attempts to influence population change, or within the framework of such policy the effectiveness of these measures is studied (entry 105–2), and does so either in the form of pronatalist policies, aimed at increasing fertility, or antinatalist policies, aimed at reducing the number of births (entry 930–4, 5). There is no definition, or even mention, of family policy in this dictionary. The concept of family policy entered the Czech demographic landscape through the activities of the National Centre for the Family (Národní centrum pro rodinu) in Brno (*Rodina v ohnisku zájmu* – Brno, 2002, director J. Zeman). I consider **family policy** to be the attempt through various social measures to create favourable conditions for the formation of legal marital unions and their existence (duration) as the place for reproduction within the family (having children) and simultaneously for the creation of human (social) capital by raising and educating children in the family. Thus, family policy is always about families with children and about caring for and raising children in the family. In this re-

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gard, children are at the centre of family policy, and parents are the intermediary in the relationship between society and children. Yet, the quantity of children and generated social capital cannot be set in opposition or distinguished or be viewed as offsetting or compensating for each other; the two must form an integral whole. I regard a crucial aspect of family policy to be prioritising the fulfilment of the needs and interests of children in terms of childcare and child-raising, even above the interests of the parents (their self-fulfilment, success, careers; see also maternity and parental leave).

No pronatalist population policy, and even less so any family policy, can of course be limited just to the provision of financial benefits with a view to increasing the material living standards of parents and by extension their children or just to creating opportunities for obtaining particular childcare privileges. Family policy has an especially wide scope, stretching from the marriage of potential parents right up to their death (or divorce).

The precondition I proceed from is that family policy forms a significant part of the state social policy, that it is rooted in a social framework, and that on the whole it is covered financially by tax revenue, specifically, by means of a redistribution between people living as families with children and those living outside a family, without children, and as singles. I define people living in legal families to mean married parents caring for dependent children without their own income to a maximum age of 30, i.e. until completion of their professional qualifications (so not singles in the care of their mothers). When a child begins to earn his/her own living or leaves the parental household the family undergoes a modification, a change in its position. A specific situation is that of lone-parent family households with a dependent child (children): a single or divorced mother, a divorcee with a child, or even unmarried cohabiting partners with a child (children). While the latter also constitute a family, it is a much less stable form of family, usually without children or with fewer children than in a legal family, and in such families the interests of children are very often not thoroughly respected (in particular there is a greater likelihood of alternating fathers, a higher risk of abuse of assistance). If partners are unable to publicly acknowledge responsibility for each other, will they be able to demonstrate their responsibility for bringing up children? This understanding of family policy also relates to the issue of the position and life of elderly parents (i.e. parents formerly in the above-defined legal family unit), including how their pension is calculated, the amount calculated at the end of their economic activity, and the form of life they live thereafter – permanently independent or as part of the wider family, or in some kind of institution, whether private or public, in a retirement, seniors', or nursing home.

The need to adopt a wide concept of family policy

In my view, family policy should not be viewed as a form of social engineering, as a kind of manipulation and restriction of people's freedom to exercise their own judgement in the important decisions they make in life. The decision to have children and give them a piece of one's 'self' is a sign of acknowledgement of parental responsibility and not an expression of the desire to obtain and live off some kind of 'state assistance'. The population situation will force countries with rapidly ageing populations – declining reproduction and rising life expectancy – to establish a positive asymmetry through a family policy that benefits families that have children, and thus create demographic and social capital, and at the expense of those who by their own choice do not take part in this reproduction.

There is a misleading theory that every responsible person should do what they can afford to do with their income (activities, education, intellect, etc.), and that children should be had by those people who will be able to look after them mainly with their own resources and with a minimum of social assistance. Parents who care for and raise children limit the income available to them for personal consumption, lose some of the conditions for achieving personal fulfilment or success, and give up a substantial amount of free time that they could oth-

erwise use for themselves. The value of their 'lost' opportunity costs is high. By caring for and raising their children, they are 'creating' the workforce of the future and investing them with human capital that will one day also serve those who did not participate in this process. Even today's singles and partners who opt not to have children will one day claim entitlement to a share of the social resources to which they contributed less than those who 'shared' a certain part of their life with their children. This relates especially to the senior years and especially the latter part of those years in a person's life, once a person is no longer fully or at all able to take care of him/herself.

In the days when more than 90% of young people got married and the rate of childlessness among young families was low, as was the rate of extramarital births, the family was the only, uniform lifestyle model for the vast majority of young people, almost without competition, and with only some debilitating factors. When this was the situation – and in this country that was almost right up until the Velvet Revolution – there was no need to create any family policy. There was little variability of living conditions, and people's lives differed little by education levels.

However, after 1990 the situation began to change quickly. The opportunities for higher education and qualifications and to compete for success or directly for career (jobs and salaries) grew, and **the family with children wound up in a tough competitive environment**. Marrying and having children at the very least entails restrictions on the conditions for achieving personal fulfilment and constitute a significant change to a person's previous way of life of complete personal freedom and no responsibility for a partner or children. For a substantial share of young people, remaining free of such commitments has become the ideal, either in a permanent or temporary outlook, even beyond the age of 30: as a result more than one-third of young people do not marry, and if they do then more often than ever before they remain childless or have just one or at the very most two children. This puts parents with children at a significant and long-term disadvantage in every respect.

According to research, young people place a high value on marriage and having children. The reality, however, is different, either because their expectations are unrealistic and consequently their life plans unattainable, or simply because in studies young people tend to say what they are expected to say. Marriage with children has become a future of little appeal for many young people, and especially for increasingly more educated young women more strongly pursuing their own interests. A negative role in this is also certainly played by a system of social assistance that is unstable and inadequate because the forms and levels of assistance it provides are relatively undifferentiated (e.g. the child allowance, which is sometimes more like a social benefit for the poor), and by the difficulty of obtaining housing, and recently also by the rise in unemployment among young people, which forces them into more cautious demographic behaviour. The living conditions of young people have been completely transformed within a short span of time, and this has been reflected in a decrease in nuptiality intensity and especially a fall in total fertility from 1.3 to 1.4 children born per woman.

Demographic forecasts predict not only that future generations will have fewer children but also that there will be a gradual decrease in the number of families and the number of families with children especially. A narrowing of the reproductive base will necessarily lead to a shortage in the production of social capital, and the amount of such capital in the population will stagnate or probably decline, which in the long term will lead to the 'impoverishment' of society. This societal decline will be a heavy price to pay in the future for what the current population is saving today by having fewer children. The resulting demographic debt will grow, and it will be impossible to stop even by importing labour or 'brains'.

Although the current economic situation will undoubtedly impede the adoption of an effective family policy, I believe it is essential above all to formulate and debate a comprehensive policy concept and search for possible ways of implementing it. This of course does not mean

adopting populist measures at several-year intervals just before the elections, but rather entails that all the political parties adopt a long-term course of action that is widely acceptable to families with children (even if it encroaches on others, without children) and arises out of an understanding of how seriousness this situation is. The concept needs to encompass various optimal solutions tailored to different types of young families with children and especially mothers according to how many children they have, the parents' education and qualifications, wage level, position in the labour market – including women who choose to remain at home with the children (permanently or temporarily when the children are young) – and whether they live in a city with a comprehensive infrastructure or in a smaller community or in particular a rural area, with poorer transportation conditions, and so on. Instruments should be developed that limit abuse (control mechanisms) and prevent people from placing their children in institutions or in the permanent care of grandmothers or 'luxuriously' paid nannies; in short, a concept that in every respect establishes responsibility for children even over some interests of the parents. Children, and especially small children under the age of 2, have a right to parental care.

The concept would have to engender **maximum stability**, envisioning further positive development and only rarely any curtailment. It would have to have an accompanying psychological effect, so that those young people who want children can have as many as they want with the level of care they want, and so that those who do not are in no way pressured or forcibly motivated to have them. People can adapt their way of life and practices to the changing external conditions in society (e.g. the big changes in consumption, prices, etc.), but families who in specific social conditions decide to have, care for, and raise children, with everything that that entails, cannot later relieve themselves of their responsibility for those children.

Family policy areas

In my view, the following problem areas in the lives of families with children are critical components of any family policy concept:

1. Housing for young families

- start-up rental flats, perhaps smaller and less expensive, leased for a limited term of, for instance, 8–10 years;
- favourable interest rates on building savings (to purchase housing) for families with children;
- re-introduction of the construction of cooperative housing managed by municipal authorities with the option of a long mortgage repayment schedule (if there is a real interest in and the right conditions for such an option).

Activities in this area should be the domain of the municipal authorities.

2. Birth allowance

- to be increased only after there has been a verified rise in the objective costs that follow the birth of a child (ensure it contains no motivational element for having children).

3. Care for preschool-age children

In this area, it is necessary above all to be guided by the interests of small children (a child's right to parental care), and the return of mothers to work should give way to this interest. That means:

- formulating **maternity leave** options of different duration and an allowance set according to the duration of leave, with a **minimum** leave period (or the corresponding paid paternity leave) during which a uniform allowance is paid regardless of a person's prior work income. That leave period should not be less than one year, and should not ever be substituted by care from a paid nanny and only in extreme cases by care from a grandmother or nursery care;

- the change to the duration of **parental leave** should also allow for different length and thus also different financial options, with the possibility to make a change (with a financial ‘adjustment’) and should reflect whether there is an interest in or possibility to place the child in a nursery or preschool (thus taking into account the different conditions for the existence and capacity of childcare facilities in urban and rural communities);
- the specification of terms should take into account the number of children in the family, their ages, and of course devote special attention to the care conditions for disabled children, and under this complex rearrangement of terms children under the age of 1 would only in exceptional instances be placed in a nursery and with a loss of benefits to the mother, and children under the age of 2 should not be sent to preschool;
- to tie the length of maternity and the maternity allowance to a fee for placing a child in a facility (including compensation for cases when use of such a facility is impossible, i.e. when there is no such facility in the area or limited capacity – reflecting the difference between urban and rural communities), and to create comparable conditions for the coinciding parental and working roles of mothers, and of fathers, so that the standard of childcare overrides the interest of the mother in returning to work quickly, in order to ensure that the conditions mothers, or fathers, have for combining their parental and professional roles are as comparable as possible – with the proviso that the standard of the child’s care takes precedence over the mother’s interest in returning to work quickly;
- implement similar arrangements for families with children where the parents are in a consensual union and for lone parents, accompanied by the creation of a monitoring system (e.g. to ensure the child is not permanently left in the care of other persons);
- In response to the non-existence or inadequate capacity of preschools organise neighbourhood ‘mini-schools’ for children of a similar age (for a maximum of 5–6 children) in suitable housing conditions in the home of the mother of one of the children, with verification that the premises conform to health and care standards and that the fees for the service are financially manageable, potentially granted some subsidy proportionate to the level of costs per child in a preschool, and attend to ensuring that the service sees to the child’s physical and mental development as well as providing supervision;
- for urban centres and their hinterland areas within reach by transportation calculate at least a rough projection of the necessary preschool capacity approximately 3–5 years in advance, or even longer in the case of larger regional units, and thus substantiate the need or lack thereof to construct more facilities. This is the only way to respond effectively and in advance to possible fluctuations in the number of children in different age groups.

4. Child benefits

- determine the potential amount of these benefits and increase them based on the objective family expenditures on children, differentiate them based on the age of the children and if possible the number of children in the family (e.g. with a provision that in the future these objective expenditures on a third or fourth child should be covered out of social resources – but not those of higher-order children);
- establish and monitor as a condition of receiving child benefits that the child be in regular school attendance with adequate results and requisite health care, both of which can be monitored by school administration and paediatricians; e.g. mandatory vaccinations, regular checkups two to three times a year, etc.;
- do not pay benefits for any period during which a child is placed in a hospital or children’s home, do not pay benefits retroactively for any period during which the family and children were living abroad, for instance, if they do so to apply for asylum in another country, and ensuring material care from the ‘recipient’ country.

5. Other material and associated psychological measures

To help emphasise the work parents do in caring for and raising children arrangements like

'third and fourth children go free' could be set up – e.g. in public transit, in cultural institutions, at zoos, water parks, pools, etc. Such arrangements could be implemented at little financial cost, but would have enormous psychological impact and would encourage a sense of pride in parents that the work they do raising their children is valued by the public. This relates to the provision of various social services – free of charge, subsidised, and fully paid for.

6. A potential concept for the retirement security of elderly parents and of elderly who did not contribute to the formation of demographic-social capital

In this country and other countries the old-age pension system long in effect for people upon completion of their economic activity has been based on the length of time a person has made retirement insurance contributions in the form of (tax) deductions from their wages and the level of income in previous years. A generation of social insurance payers essentially pays the old-age and other pensions of the preceding generation of parents. This well-functioning system was made possible by the fact that the vast majority of the population participated, total fertility remained at a level of 2.1 births per woman, and life expectancy grew only gradually: the age structure deteriorated only slowly, and with the low level of education and qualifications the creation of the necessary social capital at that time was not at risk. However, as soon as this situation changed, when the share of people participating in reproduction was no longer large enough, the total rate of reproduction remained low, and the life expectancy quickly began to rise, then after 1990 an accelerated pace of population ageing took off in this country, with demographic forecasts predicting an ominous rise in the share of seniors in the population (to as much as 22–24% and 30–33% by 2050) and a decrease in the creation of human capital in the numerically decreasing population of children and young people. This can only be partially offset by further increasing the retirement age to 70.

While some people – parents with children – invest a substantial portion of their work income and life opportunities into caring for and raising children, others can take the 'savings' they make by not having children and spend them on various forms of retirement insurance and investments, etc. This generates a pronounced imbalance between these two groups of people that is buoyed up by pressure from liberal economists that each person's future retirement pension should be determined by the long-term amount of the financial resources set aside over the course of the entire period of their economic activity (while maintaining the 'state' retirement pension at just a minimum level).

Some economists and demographers looking beyond the horizon of the next electoral term have increasingly drawn attention to these two different population groups and their participation in the formation of demographic-social capital in the future. Therefore I propose that the fact of this differing participation be taken into account when establishing the conditions for paying and calculating the amount of the old-age (and derived) pensions. In practice that would mean that to the pensions of parents be added their previous contribution to the creation of demographic-social capital, while from the pensions of people who did not have children their non-contribution would be deducted to a corresponding extent, because they had the opportunity to save much more for their retirement than parents did. This of course would require a long-term process of creating a new system over a long period of intergenerational equilibration – but some day it will be necessary to conceptually design and bring about this process. Naturally it will run up against a lack of understanding and resistance from those 'hurt' by the system, of which there will be an ever larger number in the population (according to forecasts the number of two-parent families with children will especially decline). In my view, not only will it be necessary to cover the negative effects of population ageing by making the necessary differentiation of prior participation in the creation of demographic-social capital. A reduction in the formation of demographic-social capital, i.e. the decreasing number of children and young people, will have an impact on all of society.

I believe that a long-term concept for and gradual implementation of a reformed pension system should take these perspectives into account, even if the circumstances at present are not auspicious for making such changes.

Conclusion

Family policy needs to establish conditions that will make the change in the age structure of the population and the capacity of social capital in society bearable. I write ‘bearable’ because auspicious would be to venture too far: the right time to successfully implement and achieve such a change already occurred in this country in at least the past ten years. However, if with its population the Czech Republic is to remain viable in the group of smaller European countries it has no other option. Our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will one day find it difficult to understand the current inaction of their parents and grandparents once, without any possibility of rectifying the situation, they will have to reap the bitter, seedless fruit sown during the lives of generations in the 20th century that ignored the increasing demographic-social debt that led to the impoverishment of society as a whole and consequently to the stagnation of the living standard.

In a democratic society it is possible to prevent the situation where some children are born without parents who assume the requisite responsibility for their care and for raising them and without being invested with social capital. That is all the more why it is necessary to establish conditions that help parents for whom children represent an important and joyful life value and are an important part of their personal fulfilment and of the intergenerational transmission of traditions of a good education, a cultural way of life, or even religious faith. The old proposition that ‘the nation lies eternal in its children’ is acquiring entirely new significance in the 21st century.

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THE CONCEPT OF FAMILY POLICY AND MEASURES INITIATED BY THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC*

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Abstract: The author informs readers about the substance, objectives, and reasons for the emergence of the government's most recent family policy document, 'Pro-Family Package', which contains a series of measures aimed at supporting families with children. The author also examines some problematic areas that are currently hampering the formation and adoption of a comprehensive and effective concept of family policy for the Czech Republic.

The most recent documents outlining the government's objectives and proposals pertaining to support for families with children was adopted by the cabinet of Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek on 19 November 2008 in **Government Resolution No. 1451 on family policy – the Pro-Family Package**. Despite the title of this document, in which seven proposed measures for improving work/life balance, supporting active fatherhood, and supporting family-type substitute care are formulated as a framework law, the cited resolution was adopted by the government as a schedule appended to the documents that were part of the National Concept of Support for Families with Children (hereinafter the 'Concept').

Both the Pro-Family Package and the Concept are very different in form from previous conceptual documents with a similar focus¹⁾. They were drawn up by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic, which laid special emphasis on formulating the objectives in as much detail as possible and explicitly identifying the steps²⁾ necessary to ensure the feasibility of their implementation and fulfilment within an established time frame, identified as the electoral term of the Government³⁾. Compared to the National Concept for Family Policy adopted in Government Resolution No. 1305 on 12 October 2005, the result of this effort was a more narrowly profiled⁴⁾ 36-page Concept focusing on the issue of supporting families with dependent children.

The Concept concentrated on four key areas of support for families with children from the perspective of their needs: creating adequate socio-economic conditions that families can function in; improving the quality of family relations and strengthening parental responsibilities; supporting families with special needs; and engaging the regions and municipalities in family policy. It charts the situation of families in the designated areas and focuses on identi-

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¹⁾The Action Plan in Support of Families with Children for 2006–2009, adopted in Government Resolution No. 854 of 12 July 2006, and especially the National Concept of Family Policy, adopted in Government Resolution No. 1305 of 12 October 2005.

²⁾The Concept does not make do with just establishing rough general objectives, such as 'improving people's ability to combine work, family, and personal life', but also identifies specific problems, where a fixed-term assignment is then formulated in such a way that its outcome would be the adoption of a specific legislative or non-legislative measure that would directly respond to the given problem.

³⁾ I.e. the Topolánek Government.

⁴⁾ That is, in terms of its subject focus.

fyng the key problems therein. The core part of the Concept is a chapter that discusses basic areas of support as they relate to the needs of families with children and the current objectives and direction of family policy. It also outlines and explains the reasons for the steps that the family policy will strive to take. The closing, and to some degree key, chapter in the Concept contains a set of explicitly defined proposals for legislative and non-legislative measures laid out in response to the objectives presented in the introduction to the Concept. The legislative measures were taken up in the Pro-Family Package.

The Pro-Family Package, which received considerable media attention, proposes the following measures to help improve work/life balance: a) the introduction of the institution of mutual parental assistance; b) support for commercial childcare services through a revision of the hygienic, spatial, and qualification requirements for running this type of business; c) the introduction of non-commercial childcare services – the institution of the mini-school; d) the introduction of tax advantages for employers that provide or facilitate childcare for their employees; e) the introduction of deductions on social security premiums and the state employment policy contributions. The Package also proposed introducing a paternity allowance to promote active fatherhood, and with the objective of directing the financial resources allotted to substitute childcare into the sphere of family-type substitute care, it proposed granting foster guardians caring for children in foster-care facilities entitlement to remuneration in the form of a foster-care allowance, to be provided according to the terms laid out in Act No. 117/1995 Coll., on State Social Support, as amended.

The Package’s proposed measures to support childcare services make no provisions for an increase in the capacity of preschools.⁵⁾ The reason is that preschools usually fall under the authority of the municipalities, and the government has no way of ordering the municipalities to increase preschool capacity, and the municipalities themselves tend to be reluctant to do so.⁶⁾ Another reason this option was not pursued is that increasing the capacity of preschools would constitute an escalation of public expenditures and an additional burden on the state budget. Consequently, the proposals relating to childcare services are directed at finding alternative, non-institutional solutions that primarily involve the use of private resources and minimise the burden on public budgets. According to the Pro-Family Package, such alternative solutions include involving parents in caring for other people’s children, engaging the private and non-profit sector to expand the supply of childcare services and doing so by formulating clear rules governing the provision of such care, establishing minimum hygiene and qualification requirements for the operation of care services, and finally, with regard to activating employers, introducing tax allowances.

Probably the most widely discussed measure designed to support care for preschool-age children is the proposal to establish the institution of registered providers of mutual parental assistance. The goal of this measure is to come up with a clearly defined operational framework within which, in conformity with the legal code, a registered physical person with at least one child up to the age of 7 can provide care full time, on a regular basis, from their own home and for a limited fee for at most four children up to the age of 7 (including the care-provider’s child/ren). Provision of the service (care for pre-school age children) is not subject to the terms of the Trade Licensing Act (No. 455/1991 Coll.), as amended. Instead, the proposal would authorise a registered provider to receive a maximum fee of 5000 CzK per child monthly in return for the service of providing childcare and the provider of the service is not required to pay income tax as a physical person on that income. A registered provider is also not required to pay social security premiums, state employment policy contributions, or even health insurance premiums. The total net monthly income of a physical person engaged in the

⁵⁾ A large part of the criticism of the Pro-Family Policy was actually levelled at the absence of this measure.

⁶⁾ IV, Rapid Survey 3/2008.

provision of this service could thus be as much as 15 000 CzK. It is also proposed that the parents of children placed in the care of a registered provider could use the parental allowance to pay for this care.

This proposed measure derives from the practice of mutual assistance that some parents already use to deal with the problem of the shortage of care services for preschool-age children, so that for various periods of time and under agreed conditions they care informally for each other's children. Implementation of this proposal required the introduction of new legislation, but it is intended to establish the foundations for the legal provision of remunerated care for children other than one's own for a fee; that is, to activate potential providers of this informal form of childcare, who could provide the given service without fear of being penalised for running an unauthorised business in the 'grey economy'. The assumption is that the actual conditions of the care provided will be agreed by the contracting parties in the arrangement and parents are expected to be the ones to check into and inspect the service they are leaving their child in⁷⁾.

The Pro-Family Package also proposes expanding the supply of childcare services by simplifying the hygienic and spatial requirements for operating a childcare business for just a small number of children. It also proposes amending the qualifications requirements for running a regulated trade in the category of 'Day-care for Children up to the Age of Three'⁸⁾. Under this measure, the premises used to provide the service of care, as a regulated or unregulated trade, defined as activity no. 72 'Out of School Provision of Care and Education, Courses, Training, and Teaching Activities', for a maximum of 4 children at one time (including the provider's own child up to the age of 7) would not be subject to the same hygiene requirements as those set out generally in By-law No. 410/2005 Coll. on Hygiene Standards for the Premises and Services of Facilities Providing Care and Education for Children and Youth, as amended (hereinafter the 'By-law on Hygiene Standards for Care Premises'), but rather would be subject 'just' to requirements proportionate to the smaller number of children. While these requirements should ensure that the needs of children are met, they should at the same time facilitate the development of this type of business. The professional qualifications required to perform this regulated trade should be broadened to allow individuals wishing to provide this service to demonstrate their qualifications with a requalification certificate or another document testifying to their professional qualifications⁹⁾.

The adoption of new legislation is also assumed in the third proposal to support childcare services for preschool-age children provided on a non-commercial basis with the introduction of the 'mini-school'. According to this proposal, mini-schools could be set up for a maximum of 4 children between the ages of 6 months and 7 years (again the number of children includes the childcare provider's own children). The hygienic and spatial requirements for mini-schools would be adapted to reflect the smaller number of children and essentially be similar to ordinary household facilities. The proposal envisions this as a service that would usually be provided by the employer of a parent at the parent's workplace or some other appropriate and accessible location, or provided by non-profit subjects, the municipalities, or

⁷⁾In this regard the bill envisaged that parents considering use of such a service would be provided with an information brochure (manual) at the registered location informing them of the nature of the service provided, of their rights and obligations, of the responsibilities arising from the provision of the service, and drawing attention to other factors that should be taken into account when making the decision of whether or not to place one's child in the provider's care.

⁸⁾According to Schedule No. 2 in the Trade Licensing Act No. 455/1991 Coll., as amended.

⁹⁾The bill envisioned the introduction of a course of adequate duration that would focus specially on caring for children in substitute care. In preparing the bill, consideration was also given to the possible positive effect of the new qualification legislation on helping to address the situation of women over the age of ⁵⁰ who are at bigger risk of unemployment. By obtaining this qualification these women would have an opportunity to do business in this field, as the proposed amendment to the hygienic requirements would pose an obstacle to setting up such a service.

the regions, which, according to reg. no.  35 par. 2 Act No. 128/2000 Coll. on the Municipalities, as amended, and reg. no.  1 par. 4 Act No. 129/2000 Coll. on the Regions, as amended, are required under their independent powers to cater to the needs of their citizens and to do so using the organisational components of the state. In the case where the employer covers the costs of setting up and running the mini-school for its employees' children the costs would be tax deductible.

Further to the measures supporting childcare services, the Pro-Family Package also proposes amending the Income Tax Act so that the expenses an employer incurs in arranging childcare for its employees also be categorised among tax deductible costs. These include expenditures incurred from operating a separate health-care facility – nurseries, services providing care and education¹⁰⁾ in conformity with the By-law on Hygiene Standards for Care Premises, mini-schools – and the employer's contribution to the provision of childcare for the child of an employee by another subject or employer¹¹⁾.

Another measure in the Pro-Family Package is directed at supporting part-time employment for parents with children up to the age of 10 and other people defined as hard-to-employ in the labour market¹²⁾. The proposal is that employers that offer part-time employment, i.e. employment in which the employee's work hours amount at most to 80% of the established number of hours in the working week, can claim a deduction of up to 1500 CK in the calendar month in which for the whole month the given conditions are met. It should be noted that in order to assess the effects of the measure after a certain trial period the Pro-Family Package proposes limiting the effective duration of this measure to a period of three years and then, based on the results, either terminating or extending the effective duration of the measure.

The measure to introduce a new health-insurance benefit, the paternity allowance¹³⁾, is aimed at encouraging active fatherhood by granting financial support to fathers who opt to temporarily interrupt their employment in order to care for a newborn child either alone or (usually) together with the mother¹⁴⁾. The paternity allowance would be provided for a period of one week on the condition that the insured person take this leave within the first six weeks of the child's life or within the first six weeks from the time the child in care that replaces the care of parents.^{15, 16)} The parental allowance is conceived as a health-insurance benefit and

¹⁰⁾ Typically, a private facility established as an unregulated trade, no. 72, 'Out of School Care and Education, Organising Courses, Training, Teaching Activity', and as a regulated trade, 'Day Care for Children up to the Age of 3', often somewhat inaccurately designated as private nurseries and private preschools.

¹¹⁾ Current regulations conform to the Income Tax Act No. 586/1992 Coll., as amended, wherein expenditures incurred by employers in the provision of care for the preschool-age children of their employees are only deductible if the employers incur them from operating their own preschools in conformity with Act No. 561/2004 Coll. on Preschool, Basic, Secondary, and Higher Education (the Education Act), as amended. If the expenditures go to covering the cost of placing an employee's child in preschool or some other childcare facility for preschool-age children run by a subject other than the employer are not tax deductible. If the employer provides the employee with a (monetary) contribution on top of wages or salary to cover the costs connected with placing the employee's children in preschools or facilities for preschool-age children run by subjects other than the employer, this contribution is only tax deductible if this employee entitlement is entrenched in a collective agreement, internal regulation, or work or other contract.

¹²⁾ Alongside employees caring for children up to the age of 10 this also applies to employees who are disabled or over the age of 55, or who is caring personally for another person dependent on Level I-IV assistance, and for this reason is registered with the municipal authority with extended powers or who is a student enrolled full time in secondary or higher education

¹³⁾ This is sometimes referred to in the media erroneously as the introduction of paternity leave.

¹⁴⁾ Given the fact that men are already able to take parental leave after the birth of a child together with the mother's maternity leave, the introduction of a new benefit would de facto assign it a status that corresponds to the way so-called paternity leave functions in a number of EU countries.

¹⁵⁾ In such a case only if the child is placed in care substituting parental care by the age of 7.

¹⁶⁾ Determined with a view to the purpose of the paternity allowance, which is to support paternal care of a newborn child, and in conformity with the enactment of terms in  32 par. 1e) of the Health Insurance Act No. 187/2006 Coll., as amended, which stipulates that after the six-week period following the birth of a child the father of the child or the husband of the mother of the child can alternate with the child's mother in collecting the maternity allowance.

consequently is calculated the same way as the financial allowance paid to men on maternity leave. The amount of the paternity allowance per calendar day is proposed as 70% of the daily assessment base.

The last measure in the Pro-Family Package is aimed at regulating the financing of foster care in facilities designed to provide foster care, which represents a specific type of substitute family care¹⁷⁾. In conformity with Act No. 359/1999 Coll. on the Social and Legal Protection of Children, as amended, the financing of the operation of these facilities and the costs connected with the provision of foster care is to a large extent left to the institutors of the facility. The Act also places relatively high demands on the professionalism of foster guardians and on the professional and material arrangements for the provision of care. The proposal to grant foster guardians in facilities entitlement to remuneration in the form of a foster-care benefit under the terms set out in Act No. 117/1995 Coll. on State Social Support, as amended, is intended to reduce the incongruity between the demands in the act and the real means of the institutors and finally is intended to establish a level of stability for facilities engaged in the provision of foster care.

The Pro-Family Package was intended to be the fulfilment of the Topolánek Government's policy agenda, particularly its declared objective of supporting the development of childcare services for families with children aged 4 and under, including care provided by a non-parental person, strengthening the role of fathers in caring for children, promoting more opportunities for flexible working hours, and motivating employers to employ parents raising children. The fate of the Pro-Family Package thus to some extent reflects the fate of the last Government. Despite the effort to come up with measures in the Pro-Family Package that would support the kind of childcare services that would not add to the burden on the state budget, costs were the reason why the draft wording of the bill composed by the ministries were not submitted to the current Government for debate as envisaged in the above-cited Government Resolution No. 1451¹⁸⁾. Thus, the Fischer Government dealt with the documents 'only' in relation to its adoption of an opinion on a private member's bill put forth by Petr Nečas and Michaela Šojdrová to publish a law supporting families with children and amending some acts¹⁹⁾. The Government adopted a negative opinion on that bill, which it expressed in an addendum to Government Resolution No. 834 of 29 June 2009²⁰⁾.

From the Pro-Family Package's design and the character of its proposed measures it follows that although it focuses intensively, for instance, on the area of work/life balance, it does not contain a comprehensive, compendious conceptual solution to any individual family pol-

¹⁷⁾ As of the end of 2007 a total of 55 such facilities, including SOS Children's Villages, were operating in the Czech Republic

¹⁸⁾ The resolution tasked the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and Social Affairs to draw up a bill on registered providers of mutual parental assistance and on mini-schools, a bill to amend Act No. 589/1992 Coll. on Social Security Premiums and State Employment Policy Contributions, a bill to amend Act No. 187/2006 Coll. on Health Insurance, a bill to amend Act No. 359/1999 Coll. on the Social and Legal Protection of Children, and a bill to amend Act No. 117/1995 Coll. on State Social Support, and together with the bill to amend the Trade Licensing Act No. 455/1991 Coll. drawn up by the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the bill to amend the Income Tax Act No. 586/1992 Coll. drawn up by the Ministry of Finance, to submit them with the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Finance to the Government for debate by 19 April 2009.

¹⁹⁾ Parliamentary Statute no. 863, which contains the draft wording of the proposals for the Pro-Family Package, was submitted on 28 May 2009 to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and is now in its first reading.

²⁰⁾ The reason for the negative position taken is 'the increase in mandatory expenditures and especially the substantial decrease in state budget revenue following the adoption of the act as a whole, whilst the Government considers the impact of the submitted bill on the state budget stated in the explanatory report is considerably underestimated'. (The estimate of the total impact of the proposed legislation on the state budget is estimated in the document as a maximum of 2.5 milliard CzK annually, of which 0.5 milliard annually would go to paternity leave, 1.9 milliard CzK to the insurance deductions, and 0.1 milliard CzK to the measures supporting foster guardians and other measures.) The Government also issued comments on the proposed legislation for introducing mutual parental assistance and mini-schools.

icy issues. Despite this fact and the criticism of the orientation of the material as a whole and at its individual legislative proposals or parts thereof, as voiced by part of the professional, political, and lay public when the contents of the Pro-Family Package were made public, the Package nonetheless represents the most complexly conceived undertaking by the government to date that explicitly deals with support for families with children²¹⁾.

The form²²⁾ of the document and the difficult process involved in its preparation²³⁾ reflect two problematic factors that complicate the formulation of effective family policy measures. First, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is not endowed with the necessary authority for it to be able to coordinate the formulation of a concept and/or other measures of family policy. Second, the expert competence of this central organ of state administration is insufficient for it to formulate a concept and/or family policy measures on its own, as, given the nature of the family policy agenda, the requisite areas of expertise fall under many other ministries²⁴⁾.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs derives its authority to coordinate the creation of family policy from clause § 9 of Act No. 2/1969 Coll. on the Establishment of Ministries and Other Central Bodies of the State Administration of the Czech Republic, as amended (hereinafter the 'Competences Act'), which stipulates that: '... [it] is the central body of state administration [responsible] for care of the family and children'. The relative vagueness of this clause has in the past already led to disagreements over the exact scope of competence of individual ministries and it does not give the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs much room to consistently assert its authority at the level of state administration as the coordinator of the concept of family policy. The National Concept of Support for Families with Children responds to this defect with a measure to amend the Competences Act so that it explicitly establishes the role of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs as coordinator in the formation and implementation of family policy, wherein it would also change its name to the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and the Family.

A solution to this lack of competence in a way that would also establish a clear political mandate to formulate a family policy concept and/or measures across the government would then be to establish a Government Council for Family Policy (or the Family), which would be made up of ministers from selected departments and would be chaired by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs or, to emphasise the inter-ministerial character, the Prime Minister. This would create a body with the remit to delegate analytical and conceptual assignments to individual ministries according to their competencies. An unquestionable advantage of a body set up in this way is that it would represent an explicit expression at the central level of state administration of its will to tackle a specific task and prevent fundamental splits of opinion between individual departments over solutions to the given family policy tasks. This would significantly reduce the risk of material prepared by the government subsequently failing to pass or being substantially amended owing to the incompatible views of individual ministries. The body's expertise would be supported by the opportunity to invite groups of external experts set up ad hoc to work on specific tasks.²⁵⁾ It can be assumed that the role of

²¹⁾ Just as information I should add that converting the legislative intents into draft legislation required a new set of rules be drawn up on the institution of mutual parental assistance and mini-schools, and the introduction of amendments of varying scope to other legislation.

²²⁾ It was de facto a combination of the non-legislative text of the concept and the legislative intent of the proposed legislative amendments *sui generis*.

²³⁾ Given the nature of the measures it was necessary to establish close cooperation between the submitter - the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs - a number of other ministries, in particular the ministries of health, finance, and industry and trade.

²⁴⁾ At the very least the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry for Regional Development, and some of the agendas over which the Office of the Government exercises responsibility

²⁵⁾ This refers to experts from outside the central bodies of state administration.

the Technical Department of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs²⁶⁾ would in such a case shift and become more organisational, including the task of securing source materials, in relation to the Council and its working groups. With respect to previous experiences with formulating concepts and their oftentimes confused implementation in practice, I believe that without establishing the type of body described above it will be difficult in the future to formulate a good-quality and comprehensive concept of state family policy in the Czech Republic.

However, it should be added that even the adoption of both of the steps outlined above would not solve another crucial problem in the Czech family policy concept, namely, the absence of continuity. At least a basic political agreement on the focus of family policy and the direction that should be taken in support of families is the primary precondition for the success of even the very best formulated and adopted measures. In the above light it is almost impossible to give a specific account of the particulars of Czech family policy, a fact that became apparent more than ever before after the fall of the Government. While here and there it is possible to identify individual measures of greater or lesser importance in the area of benefits or tax support for families, it is hardly possible to speak of any system of conceptually adopted measures with a uniform objective.

Despite this gloomy concluding comment on the 'haziness' of Czech family policy, allow me to close this article on a more positive note. Over at least the past five years it has been possible to observe a shift at the level of political parties and state administration towards accepting the view that it is necessary to support so-called functioning families²⁷⁾. It is perhaps not too optimistic to believe that the Czech Republic has now taken a couple of small steps on a long path, at the end of which lies a clearly defined and relatively continuous family policy.

The article expresses solely the personal opinion of the author.

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²⁶⁾ At present this function is held by the Family Policy Section in the Department of Family Policy and Social Systems.

²⁷⁾ This not very correct term refers to families that are not in difficult social circumstances. This shift in perception is important also given the reduction in social support for families that occurred in the Czech Republic in the 1990s.

POPULATION DEVELOPMENT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 2001–2006¹⁾

This publication analyses demographic development in the Czech Republic in the new millennium. It was prepared by members of the Department of Demography and Geodemography at the Faculty of Science, Charles University, and it ties in with (in content and presentation) similar analyses that the department published in the years between 1994 and 2002 (Population Development in the Czech Republic 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 1990–2002). Like the previous publications, this one is also structured according to individual demographic processes, and at the close of the first section there is also a chapter on families and households. In response to the significance of the changes in fertility an article on this subject and the related issue of population policy is included in the second part of the publication. The individual chapters are titled: **Population Structure** (Dagmar Bartoňová), **Nuptiality** (Ludmila Fialová), **Divorce** (Květa Kalibová), **Abortion** (Jiřina Kocourková), **Mortality** (Boris Burcin), **Migration** (Dagmar Bartoňová), **Families and Households** (Dagmar Bartoňová), **Fertility in the Czech Republic: Current State and Recent Trends** (Jitka Rychtaříková), **Population Climate and Family Policy** (Jiřina Kocourková). Following the introduction, there are tables presenting an overview of natural population changes since 1960 and analytical indicators of population development in the Czech Republic from 1981 to 2006. A list of definitions for the basic demographic indicators used in the analysis and English summaries of the chapters are printed at the end of the publication.

The chapters are based mainly on data from the annual processing of population change by the Czech Statistical Office. In the first chapter, information on the structure of the population by sex, age, and marital status (based on data for individual calendar years) is accompanied by some additional information on the population structure ascertained in the 2001 Population and Housing Census (the population by education and nationality). Selected data on foreigners from this comprehensive survey are also presented in the chapter on Migration. Also the last chapter in the first part of the publication, Families and Households, is based on the results of the censuses conducted in 1991 and 2001. To complete the picture of the demographic situation in the Czech Republic the authors also occasionally draw on other data sources on this subject.

Although the publication under review is titled *Population Development in the Czech Republic 2001–2006*, in the individual chapters, with the exception of Migration, the authors also assess development over the longer term, roughly since the start of the 1990s, but in the case of fertility since as far back as 1986 (data presented in tables and figures; understandably the authors often go further in the discussions in the texts). In this respect the chapters are not entirely uniform, and this also reflects the very individual approach taken by each of the authors, and this is also apparent, for instance, in other details, such as the inclusion or exclusion of information on the international position of the Czech Republic with respect to the issue under examination, or data on the vital events of foreigners living in the Czech Republic. However, these differences are not very substantial and certainly in no way alter the fact that this is a complex, good-quality, and exhaustive analysis of recent and current population development in the Czech Republic.

For the most part, the chapters follow a traditional approach to this type of analyses, based on almost all available and meaningful classification of demographic data. Given that this is an omnibus publication with wider possible applications, it is understandable that greater attention is not devoted to more 'marginal issues', but in the chapter on Migration, for instance, no basic data are presented on the development of foreign migration of Czech citizens, which, despite its problematic nature, ought to be included in it. Valuable information, especially relating to the education of women, is presented in the chapter on fertility by Jitka Rychtaříková. Although the data are not always perfect (in a not small percentage of cases the data are not provided and are automatically filled in during the processing of the

¹⁾ Praha: Katedra demografie a geodemografie Přírodovědecké fakulty UK v Praze (Department of Demography and Geodemography, Faculty of Science, Charles University in Prague), 2007, 114 p.

This review was published in *Demografie*, 2009, 51 (1), pp. 52–53. The contents of journal are published on the website of the Czech Statistical Office at: <http://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/demografie>.

birth report; moreover, in what is probably just a small number of cases, the highest completed level of education that applied at the time of the observed event will change within a relatively short period of time), the education of women is one of the most important differentiating factors of (not just) fertility. The author also discusses the current issue of whether there exists a new alternative to marriage with children. Based on the different structure of married and unmarried mothers by average age at the time of first birth, birth-order, and education, she refutes the hypothesis that unmarried cohabitation with children exists as an alternative to marital union. By combining data on mothers who had their children while not married with data on brides getting married it turns out that some women first give birth to a child and only then get married (in the case of births in 2007 and later, in most cases it is possible to observe whether it is the father of the child that she married). For example, among women who had their first child in 2004 and were not married, one-quarter of them married within four years (and this occurred slightly more often among more educated women). This means that for some women unmarried cohabitation with children is an alternative to marriage, but only in the early stages of family life. Although it would appear then that the unmarried cohabitation of parents is no substitute for marriage with children, a positive development is that data on the father in the statistical reports on births are provided for ninety percent of children born (in 2007). It could be indirectly inferred from this that in these cases the father is in some way involved in caring for the child. However, as in the case of extramarital births, the share of omitted information increases the lower the level of completed education of the mother.

In addition to the high-quality content of the publication, it also has a very nice design and layout. Boris Burcin, who alongside working on selected demographic subjects also specialises in designing and preparing publications for print, has maintained a consistent style in this regard for several years. Thus, even less regular users of the publication can immediately orientate themselves in the content and find links to the publication outcomes of members of the Department of Demography and Geodemography at the Faculty of Science. The concise synopses inside each chapter containing key information on individual issues in population development are among other things an excellent idea for helping readers to easily navigate the publication's content.

Terezie Štyglerová

FAMILY AND EMPLOYMENT

This rich and valuable publication¹⁾ is made up of four interconnected sections that provide a complex analysis of the situation of parenthood today from the perspective of the demands of work and family and the conditions and strategies affecting these two spheres. The goals of the analysis and the evaluation are made clear in the abstract and in the introduction by A. Křížková. The focus is mainly on the issue of combining work and a family, the biggest obstacle to which is care for children, especially children aged 6 and under. The studies are based on research conducted in 2005 on a representative sample of 1998 parents (men and women) sharing a household with children up to the age of 18.

The publication's evaluative aim is apparent in the very titles of the individual sections: 'Parents in the Labour Market – Real Opportunities and Hypothetical Choices' (H. Maříková), 'How Contemporary Parents Organise and Manage Work and Family Life' (A. Křížková), 'Reproductive Plans and the Reality of Early Childcare' (H. Hašková) and 'The Division of Household Work and Childcare in the Family' (J. Bierzová). It is difficult to describe the concise content and the findings of the analyses of data presented in the tables and figures, but they provide a very realistic description of the situation in which families are living and to which they are forced (rather than want) to react, while their educational conditions, preferences, and the position of the women themselves (single mothers) are different. The authors question the Czech term for maternity and parental 'leave' ('*dovolená*'); they want a more accurate term for the period spent caring for children, for which the parent is relieved from work with partial financial compensation in order to perform this specific role.

The analyses essentially confirm realities of family with dependent children, which we are already familiar with from demographic research in the 1950s, but here in the newly differentiated conditions

¹⁾ Křížková, A. (ed.) - Maříková, H. - Mašková, H. - Bierzová, J. *Pracovní a rodinné role a jejich kombinace v životě českých rodičů: plány versus realita*. Praha: Sociologický ústav AV ČR, edice Sociologické studie 06:14, 2006.

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arising from the wider opportunities for choosing family strategies. In the 1950s, however – especially owing to the low level of education of women in particular – women were not in as strong a position as they are in today (in the 25–39 age group there is only a slightly smaller share of women than men with higher education, but a higher share of women with secondary education at 40%, while the figure for men is around 30%). However, what has changed little is the fact that the differences in men's and women's employment income are still considerable. And that, in my view, is the source of the reality reconfirmed in this research that women are still responsible for most childcare and household work (and most often are the ones who take 'leave'), because the absence of men from the labour market causes a bigger decrease in income than the absence of women. I believe that this is the key issue. The second fact overlooked here, in my view, is that even after fifty years of women's employment women as mothers have not managed (or wanted?) to raise their sons in such a way that preclude the reproduction of past approaches to parenthood and household activities in future generations. If this chain cannot be broken by the current, more emancipated generation of mothers, then similar research in twenty years will again reconfirm everything that is being observed today. The third thing that I believe the authors missed is the defence more commonly used now to avoid being forced into traditional roles: marriage at a later age (more often after obtaining a certain position at work), the rejection of marriage (singles: at the age of 35 more than one-third of women would remain single!), and deliberate childlessness or life with just one child.

Our labour market and consequently also our society are still set up in a way that accommodates men and the assumption that they will be less burdened by family activities, and even women with higher education are only slightly less affected by this. Demands in general have grown, and this particularly impacts women. Women's work successfully raising children and running the household is not nearly as valued as a career would be or as the earnings of men are. The assumption that the legislative extension of 'leave' will give both women and men wider choices in their family strategies has not been fully proved. Mothers, especially mothers of small children living in small rural communities, albeit perhaps closer to grandparents, are in a very particular position.

I value that the analyses of single motherhood in the publication particularly drew attention to the fact that single mothers are much more often women with basic education and more often live in parts of the country where there is currently the highest unemployment rates. How this is connected also to the larger share of young Roma women among single mothers could only be revealed by a deeper study of this reality, the long-term consequence of which are hard to speculate on.

These studies should also be read by people – men – in executive positions; perhaps the situation in the future could improve. The authors should be praised for their sound methods and their conclusions.

Milan Kučera

ILLEGAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF MIGRANTS (THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT)¹⁾

On 29 February of 2008, a book launching was held at the Faculty of Science, Charles University in Prague. The new book, *The Illegal Economic Activities of Migrants (the Czech Republic in a European Context)*, published by Karolinum publishers, is devoted to the topic of illegal economic activities of migrants in the Czech Republic and selected European countries and it was prepared by a group of authors under the editorship of *Dušan Drbohlav*. The publication is one of the main outcomes of the project 'International Migration and the Illegal Economic Activities of Migrants in the Czech Republic in a Wider European Context' (no. IJO57/05-DP1 – supported by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic) and it is based on the key research areas defined in the National Research Programme TP5 'Modern Society and Its Transformation'.

Illegal migration and the unauthorised economic activities of foreigners constitute a subject that is currently on the tongues of politicians and experts not just in the Czech Republic but also in other advanced countries. It is clear that, despite some benefits, this phenomenon is accompanied by a number

¹⁾ Drbohlav, D. a kol. *Nelegální ekonomické aktivity migrantů (Česko v evropském kontextu)*. Praha: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Karolinum, 2008, 311s.

This review was published in *Demografie*, 2009, 51 (2), pp. 130–131. The contents of journal are published on the website of the Czech Statistical Office at: <http://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/demografie>.

of significant risks. These risks affect not just migrants but also the environment of the host countries and even that of transition and source countries.

One of the book's main assets is the authors' effort to provide a complex picture of this issue, and this is achieved not just through the diverse selection of themes studied, but above all through the methodological approach applied to them. The book is written in a highly readable, easy to understand style of language, accessible not just to experts on international migration, but to anyone in the lay public with an interest in this subject.

The first and **introductory section of the book** is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, the author, *Dušan Drbohlav*, lays out the terminological, conceptual, and methodological conception of the studied problem. He explains the terms used in the book, such as 'illegal migration', 'illegal employment', and 'illegal business', and how these terms are interpreted in relation to legislation currently in effect in the Czech Republic. He also presents the definitions and meanings of some other regularly used terms relevant to the given issue, such as 'illegal' and 'quasi-legal' economic activities, the 'Švarc system' (the practice of hiring labour on the basis of individual trade licenses instead of employment contracts, so that people perform their economic activities on the basis of trade licence even though their real activities should be performed on the basis of labour-law regulations) and the 'klientský' or 'client' system (an organised system in which 'clients' (migrant workers) are provided to employers by mediators who profit from the migrants.). He also notes that at a theoretical level very little attention has thus far been devoted to illegal migration and the unauthorised economic activities of migrants, and he cites examples of some more comprehensive concepts that deal with illegal migration. The closing section of the first chapter focuses on the methods used to study illegal migration and the unauthorised economic activities of migrants. In this case the chosen method of research is the Delphi method.

The second chapter, also written by *Dušan Drbohlav*, is mainly devoted to the development and the wider conditions behind illegal migration in Europe, its impact on destination countries, and the policies applied within the framework of EU countries to combat illegal migration.

The theme of developing joint EU policies to regulate economic migration is dealt with in the third chapter by *Andrea Baršová*. In this chapter, the author devotes attention to the constitutional framework of forming EC/EU policy to regulate economic migration, policies aimed at combating illegal economic activities of foreigners, and EU policies regulating legal economic migration.

The next section of the publication is titled **The Wider Framework of Unauthorised Economic Activities of Migrants in the Czech Republic**. The chapters in this section focused mainly on the problem of legal labour migration in the Czech Republic (Chapter 4 by *Dušan Drbohlav*) describe the development of the Czech labour market since 1990 (Chapter 5 by *Zdeněk Čermák*) and the black labour market as it relates to the situation in the Czech Republic (Chapter 6 by *Martin Fassmann*), and outline the legal and political framework behind the effort to combat unauthorised economic activities of migrants in the Czech Republic (Chapter 7 by *Andrea Baršová*), and examine the results of efforts by the relevant authorities to crack down on this problem (Chapter 8, by *Dita Čermánková* and *Lenka Lachmanová*).

The third and core section of the publication presents the **results of the project 'International Migration and the Illegal Work Activities of Migrants in the Czech Republic in a Wider European Context'**. The introductory chapter, by *Dušan Drbohlav* and *Lenka Lachmanová*, outlines the objectives and questions of the research and its design. As mentioned above, the Delphi method of research was used, which involves conducting a repeat and systematically organised survey of opinions and attitudes among experts on the chosen issue. Experts were invited to comment on the most common forms of unauthorised economic activity that migrants to the Czech Republic engage in, the reasons for these activities, the basic characteristics of migrants involved in illegal economic activities, the estimated number of such migrants, the future course of illegal economic activities of migrants in the Czech Republic, the impact of these activities, and measures that could restrict such activities.

On the one hand, the results of the research confirmed some generally known facts and earlier findings (e.g. the persistent existence of the 'Švarc system' and the 'client' system) as the most common forms of illegal and quasi-legal economic activities of migrants in the Czech Republic, the significant role of the 'mediator' lobby, the strong demand for illegal foreign labour on the part of domestic employers, and the position of Ukraine as the dominant source country for migrants engaged in illegal economic activities in the Czech Republic). On the other hand, some of the research's findings were not entirely unambiguous (e.g. the estimated number of migrants engaged in illegal economic activity in the Czech labour market significantly varied, and similarly ambiguous was the estimated scale of this phenomenon for the years 2006–2010).

The next chapter in this section, by *Lenka Lachmanová*, draws on the experiences of the relevant au-

thorities in this area, i.e. labour offices and trade licensing offices, where employees were given a survey on this issue. It is worth noting that the results of the survey more or less confirmed the opinions of respondents and findings from the Delphi research.

The next chapter, by *Zdeněk Čermák* and *Dagmar Džúrová*, focuses on the work and living conditions of illegal migrants in the Czech Republic. The chapter presents the results of a questionnaire survey carried out among two groups of migrants: migrants to the Czech Republic from post-Soviet countries and migrants from Vietnam.

'Economic and Transit Migration to the Czech Republic – the Life Stories of Illegal Migrants' is the title of the next chapter in the third section. In this chapter, the authors, *Dušan Drbohlav* and *Eva Janšká*, inform readers about the results of interviews conducted with illegal migrants in the Czech Republic. Based on an evaluation of the life stories of these respondents the migrants are divided into groups according to migration types. An important finding produced by this research is that in terms of illegal transit migration and unauthorised economic activities the Czech Republic in many respects now resembles traditionally advanced immigration countries.

The chapter by *Dita Čermáková* looks at the widespread 'client' system in the Czech Republic and its specific features. The author looks at the start of the client system in the Czech Republic and describes its basic operating principles and the main actors in the system. She also points out how the entire system functions in an environment that is very strongly influenced by restrictive state legislation pertaining to third-country migrants and the inadequate enforcement of rights. The final chapter in the third section, by *Dušan Drbohlav* and *Lenka Lachmanová*, outlines some possible approaches to estimating the number of illegal migrants in the Czech Republic and especially Prague. Particularly interesting is a proposal for estimating the number of migrants living illegally in Prague using a field survey of the number of foreigners living in selected localities that represent certain types of residential areas.

The fourth section of the book is devoted to **other particular aspects of illegal migration and unauthorised economic activities of migrants in the Czech Republic**. In the first chapter, the authors, *Pavla Rozumková* and *Martin Rozumek*, look at the illegal economic activities of persons applying for international protection. Many readers may be surprised to learn how diverse a range of illegal economic activities these migrants are engaged in within this country. In the next chapter, *Vlastimil Vintř* reflects on the role of the non-profit sector in the area of illegal migration and illegal economic activities of migrants.

The book's fifth section deals with the **situation of source countries and their view of labour migration to the Czech Republic**. The introductory chapter in this section, by *Valerij Mošňjag* [*Moshnyag*] and *Milan Lupták*, describes the position of the Czech Republic in the plans and strategies of Moldavian labour migrants. The next chapter, by *Olena Malynovská* [*Malinowska*], deals with labour migration from Ukraine to the Czech Republic. This is followed by a chapter in which *Milan Lupták* focuses on the contemporary 'push' factors in Ukraine that drive labour migration abroad. The conditioned nature of the contemporary migration of Vietnamese citizens to the Czech Republic is the subject of the next chapter by *Jiří Kocourek*.

The sixth and equally interesting section of the book is devoted to the results of studies on illegal migration and unauthorised economic activities of migrants conducted in other Central European countries, namely **Austria and Hungary**. It is worth noting that the results of the studies in these countries in many respects concur with findings in the Czech Republic.

The seventh section of the publication is the conclusion, in which the authors, *Dušan Drbohlav* and *Lenka Lachmanová*, summarise the main findings.

The entire publication is written in a very pleasant to read and comprehensible style. Despite the fact that the book has contributions from numerous authors, it comes across as consistent and coherent. Using the Czech Republic and some other European countries as its examples, the book offers the inquisitive reader insight into the nature and mechanisms behind illegal migration and illegal economic activities of foreigners in their host country and the impact of these activities on society, and finally, it proposes measures for effectively combating these phenomena. I strongly recommend it be read.

Jarmila Marešová

DIVORCES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1991–2006: WHAT DIVORCE REPORTS CAN TELL US (PART 2)*

Divorce rate statistics are based on the Divorce Reports, which contain various types of information on top of the most essential information for evaluating a demographic process – divorce rate. We have already discussed data from the Reports that relate to the course of the divorce proceeding itself in *Demografie* (2008, 50: 213–218) or *Czech Demography* (2009, 3: 119–124), now we will focus on the demographic aspects.

Divorcees according to the information in the Divorce Reports

The information on people who were divorced in a Czech court includes their date of birth, state citizenship, highest completed level of education, and order of the divorce. All these data, along with the cause of the divorce, are recorded only in those divorce proceedings that end with a divorce being granted. In this text then we are only talking about effectuated divorces, not divorce proceedings otherwise terminated.

Like other demographic processes, the divorce rate has a strong correlation with a person's age. However, the Divorce Reports do not explicitly state the age of the divorced male or female; rather in the statistical processing of information a person's age is calculated from his/her **date of birth** (before 1995 the person's entire personal identification number was listed) and the date of divorce, which is the date on which the divorce report was despatched, as indicated in the form¹⁾.

Age-specific divorce rates are most easily calculated as reduced rates, where the number of divorces among people of a given age is related to the mid-year population of that age. The distribution of these rates is significantly related to the character of nuptiality, to when men/women tend to marry, and thus at what age they are then able to get divorced. In the observed period between 1991 and 2006 nuptiality underwent substantial changes and in conformity with the changes in nuptiality the reduced rates of divorce shifted their axis and intensity to an altogether different point than where it was fifteen years previously.

Table 1 Reduced rates of divorce by sex and age

Age group	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006
	Males						Females					
15–19	0.17	0.10	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	1.10	0.67	0.24	0.14	0.09	0.07
20–24	8.95	8.10	5.53	3.01	1.92	1.19	17.77	15.88	11.58	6.97	5.28	3.56
25–29	17.47	18.19	17.20	12.60	10.37	6.98	19.04	20.29	20.67	17.28	15.08	11.95
30–34	15.71	16.92	18.05	16.98	17.10	14.42	14.30	16.15	17.85	17.02	19.38	17.20
35–39	13.25	13.88	15.65	14.93	18.17	17.18	12.42	13.08	14.87	14.08	17.45	17.66
40–44	10.83	11.49	12.67	12.15	15.06	15.88	8.87	9.83	10.91	10.60	13.78	14.39
45–49	7.14	8.23	9.17	9.11	11.83	11.91	5.12	5.90	6.99	7.37	9.18	9.63
50–54	4.17	4.86	5.60	5.73	7.20	8.03	2.56	2.90	3.52	4.03	4.90	5.45
55–59	2.36	2.37	2.98	3.42	3.97	4.26	1.26	1.16	1.56	1.63	2.29	2.51

In 1991 the highest reduced rate of divorce among women occurred at the age of 25, while in 2007, according to nuptiality life tables, only 22% of females are even married by that age. Given the postponement of first marriage to a later age, the highest reduced rates of divorce among females now occurs in the age interval from 33 to 39 years and among men between 35 and 43 years, reaching a value of around 18%. Changes in nuptiality began to be more palpably reflected in the age-specific divorce rate from the 2nd half of the 1990s, when there was a significant decrease in the number of younger

¹⁾ This article was published in *Demografie*, 2009, 51 (2), pp. 143–151. The contents of the journal are published on the website of the Czech Statistical Office at: <http://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.nsf/i/demografie>.

¹⁾ Starting in 2007 a new piece of information in the report is used to calculate age: the date on which the decision legally came into effect, combined with the date of birth.

Figure 1 Share of divorced people in five-year age groups as of 31 December, males





Figure 2 Share of divorced people in five-year age groups as of 31 December, females



people divorcing. Conversely, from the start of the 21st century there has been a clear trend of an increasingly significant rise in the divorce rate around the age of 35 and more.

Another criterion for evaluating the divorce rate (from the perspective of age) is the share of divorced people in a certain age group (as of 31 December of a given year, when balanced figures on the population composition by marital status are available). Like the reduced rates, this piece of data reflects not just the change in the divorce rate but also the change in the nuptiality rate. Along with the rise in the divorce rate and the postponement of first marriages another key process here is the decreasing rate of remarriage. The second-named process leads to a decline in the share of divorcees in the younger age groups, while the first- and third-named processes result in an increase in the share of older divorced people. The 'borderline' age in this regard appears to be 35.

The share of divorced people in the individual age groups shows a similar trend for both males and females, while at any given age there is always a higher share of divorced females than divorced men. Relatively the largest number of divorced people is found among 45–49 year old males (the percentage in this category has gradually risen from 11% to 19%) and among 40–44 year old females (13% at the

start of the 1990s, 22% at the end of 2006). Between 1991 and 2006 the most stable percentage of divorced people was in the 30–34 age group, with an average of 9.4% among males and 12.4% among females. The youngest age group, 15–19 year olds, is not represented in Figures 1 and 2, because there is just a very small number of divorces in this group (less than 1%), but it should still be noted that the share of divorced people in this age group changed dramatically, by more than 90%: among males it fell from 0.12 to 0.01‰, among females from 0.59 to 0.03‰.

Age-specific divorce intensity is best described with so-called net rates, wherein the number of divorces is related only to people actually in a position to divorce, i.e. married people. These intensity indicators in a certain respect have remained unchanged since the early 1990s: the maximum figures continued to be in the youngest age groups (Figures 3 and 4). However, the numbers changed substantially.

Figure 3 Divorce intensity by age (number of divorces per one thousand married persons), males





Figure 4 Divorce intensity by age (number of divorces per one thousand married persons), females



While in 1991 an average of 30 per one thousand married females between the ages of 20 and 24 divorced, in 2006 the figure was 42 per thousand married females. Among married males the trend was similar: in the 20–24 age group the divorce intensity rose from 33 to 51%.

Every age group saw an increase in age-specific divorce intensity. The biggest changes were witnessed in divorce among males over the age of 45 and females over the age of 40, the figures for which more than doubled from what they were in 1991. Conversely, the most stable trend in divorce intensities was recorded in the 25–29 age group. Divorce intensity's rising trend was interrupted only at the turn of the century, when it was affected by an amendment to the Family Act (effective 1 August 1998). Consequently, age-specific divorce intensities returned to the level they were at in 1991, and in younger age groups they were even lower (Table 2).

Table 2 Divorce intensity by sex and age (cohort-period specific events)

Age	Males							Females						
	1991	1994	1997	1999	2000	2003	2006	1991	1994	1997	1999	2000	2003	2006
15–19	17.2	8.3	9.0	8.0	9.0	16.8	23.4	14.4	12.6	12.8	8.6	11.1	30.1	29.3
20–24	33.2	33.4	37.0	30.6	37.2	44.6	50.9	30.4	32.0	34.6	26.8	34.4	40.0	42.2
25–29	25.3	28.8	31.7	23.2	29.4	32.7	32.2	22.2	25.4	28.6	21.1	27.3	29.7	30.5
30–34	19.6	21.7	24.8	18.8	25.0	28.5	27.7	16.5	19.2	22.0	16.5	22.1	27.1	26.2
35–39	16.2	17.6	20.6	15.0	20.0	25.9	26.3	14.8	15.6	18.1	13.3	17.7	22.9	24.7
40–44	12.8	14.3	15.9	12.2	16.0	20.7	22.5	10.3	11.6	13.4	10.5	13.3	17.8	19.5
45–49	8.2	9.5	11.1	9.0	11.5	15.3	16.5	6.0	7.1	8.5	7.3	9.2	11.6	12.7
50–54	4.7	5.5	6.4	5.8	6.8	8.8	10.4	3.2	3.4	4.4	4.1	5.0	6.2	7.0
55–59	2.6	2.6	3.4	2.8	3.9	4.6	5.1	1.6	1.4	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.9	3.3
DRM ^{a)}	11.5	12.2	13.1	9.6	12.2	14.0	13.6	11.4	12.2	13.1	9.7	12.2	14.0	13.7

Note: ^{a)} Divorce rate of marriage = number of divorces to total number of marriages (married males/married females).

Statistical records traditionally include data on the petitioners' highest completed level of **education**, but since 2005 this information is provided on a voluntary basis²⁾. In more than half of all cases the spouses filing for divorce have the same level of education, which corresponds to the educational homogeneity of marriages. Generally, the level of education listed most often is secondary education without GCSE (roughly 50% of males and 40% of females), followed by secondary with GCSE (20–30% of males and 30–40% of females). The third-largest group is made up of people with basic education, but over the years their share decreased from more than twenty to roughly ten percent. The fewest divorcees state the highest educational category, with complete university education. However, their share has been growing gradually and since 2003 men with university education have even outnumbered men with basic education among divorced people.

Since 1991 data on divorces by the spouses' education have also been available in combination with the duration of the marriage and the year of the marriage. Therefore, when comparing the educational structure of the initial marriages, assuming that the spouses had completed their education at the time of marriage, we can calculate the total divorce rate separately for individual spousal educational combinations. Were the divorce intensities in 2006 to remain constant, in 15 years 33% of marriages would end in divorce. Relatively the fewest divorces would occur among marriages between a male with university education and a female with secondary education with GCSE and between two spouses with university education (19% and 23%, respectively), while the most divorces would occur among marriages between two people with secondary school without GCSE, between partners with basic education, and in marriages between a man with basic education and a woman with university education (40–50%). Divorces between people with university education tend on average to occur after a longer period of marriage than is the case of people in lower educational categories.

The structure of divorce **by order** has long remained unchanged. Repeat divorces make up approximately one-fifth of all divorces in the Czech Republic, among both males and females. However, the proportion of higher-order divorces understandably differ by the age of the divorcees, and there are also regional differences in the values of this indicator.

Another differentiating factor in the structure of divorce by order is education. Relatively the most second- and higher-order divorces are recorded among people with basic education, both for males and

²⁾ For two years autocorrects was applied in the statistical processing, and after it was abandoned in 2007 education was not determined for 18% of females and 18% of males.

females. In 2006, 28% of divorced females with basic education went through a repeat divorce, while among females with university education the figure was just 14%. In the case of females, the higher the education the lower the share of repeat divorces. The situation with males is different in that the percentage of repeat divorces is approximately the same at 17% to 20% in every educational group except basic education, where it is higher (24–25% in recent years) (Table 3).

Table 3 Percentage of repeat divorces by sex and education

Education	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006
	Males						Females					
Basic	21.9	21.3	22.8	24.7	24.0	25.2	26.7	25.4	26.7	28.3	27.7	28.1
Secondary without GCSE	17.4	16.7	18.4	19.4	19.0	19.7	17.3	16.9	18.5	18.7	19.6	19.9
Secondary with GCSE	17.2	16.0	17.6	18.1	17.3	19.1	15.3	14.5	15.3	15.8	16.4	16.5
University	16.0	16.6	17.9	19.3	19.5	19.3	13.4	11.0	13.3	14.0	13.7	14.2
Total	18.2	17.4	18.8	19.7	19.1	20.0	19.1	17.7	18.7	18.8	19.0	19.2

In 1991–1994 the Divorce Reports also included an item on **nationality**. In total, 93–95% of people divorcing indicated that they had Czech (Moravian, Silesian) nationality, while the most common other nationality was Slovak (which in 1991 accounted for 68% and in subsequent years 56–61% of all the nationalities indicated other than Czech).

In 1995 the item on nationality was replaced with **citizenship**. In the following years the number of divorced couples in which at least one partner had a citizenship other than Czech grew continuously, and in recent years the tempo of the increase has accelerated. However, the percentage remains small: in 2006 the figure was 6.0% of the total; 3.7% of divorced males had foreign citizenship and 2.6% of divorced females did. The number of divorces in which both partners have foreign citizenship has also been rising, most of them involve marriages between two Slovak citizens.

The range of different citizenships recorded has always been wider among male foreigners than female, but it has widened for both in recent years: in 1995, the first year in which citizenship was recorded, there were 51 different citizenships recorded among males and 32 among females (including the Czech Republic, but excluding the category of other and unknown), by 2006 the number of different

Table 4 Divorces by citizenship

Indicators	1995		1997		2000		2003		2006	
Total divorces	31 135		32 465		29 704		32 824		31 415	
– two citizens of the CR	30 419		31 605		28 700		31 459		29 543	
– one foreigner	677		817		958		1 316		1 786	
– both foreigners	39		43		46		49		86	
Proportion of divorces with at least one foreigner (%)	2.3		2.6		3.4		4.2		6.0	
Divorced foreigners	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Total divorces	479	276	595	308	689	361	850	564	1155	803
by country of citizenship:										
Germany	35	15	36	17	55	7	68	15	64	10
Poland	32	47	28	53	22	49	41	48	31	29
Russia	8	20	25	20	35	39	60	80	58	96
Slovakia	221	139	213	118	159	92	150	98	198	155
Ukraine	7	14	19	28	45	96	79	164	114	271
Vietnam	32	8	47	10	83	23	123	48	250	110
by divorce order:										
1st	386	193	460	215	526	232	593	339	853	455
2nd or higher	93	83	135	93	163	129	257	225	302	348
Proportion of repeat divorces (%)										
– by foreigners	19.4	30.1	22.7	30.2	23.7	35.7	30.2	39.9	26.1	43.3
– by citizens of the CR	18.3	17.9	18.8	18.6	19.6	18.6	18.8	18.6	19.8	18.6

citizenships had grown to 81 and 47, respectively. Although the variety of different citizenships recorded has widened, certain citizenship groups have tended to dominate. Only six citizenships have alternated among the four-largest groups in the observed period: Slovak, German, Polish, Vietnamese, Russian, and Ukrainian. Among women the largest groups contain relative more events than is the case among males.

Between 1995 and 1998 the largest number of divorces with foreign citizens involved citizens of the Slovak Republic, a large number of whom were people who had married when both spouses were members of a single Czechoslovak state. In 1995 every second divorced female of foreign citizenship was a Slovak citizen. In the years that followed the share of Slovaks fell sharply and in 1999 they were slipped out of first place. At that time the largest number of foreign divorced females were Ukrainians, and they are still the foreigners who most often appear in divorce court. The situation of foreign divorced males is different. Slovak citizens were still the most common foreign participants in divorce proceedings in 2003, and it is only since 2004 that males of Vietnamese citizenship have outnumbered them.

Compared to Czech citizens, foreigners are less often recorded among first divorces (Table 4). While among Czech citizens the share of second- and higher-order divorces is between 18% and 20% for males and females, among foreign divorced males the figure ranges between 20% and 30%. The highest figure is among foreign divorced females and is often greater than 30%, which is more than double the figure for Czech females.

Divorced marriages according to the information in the Divorce Reports

The last circle of items in the Divorce Reports that was selected for the purpose of this article related to the divorced marriage. Generally the selected items can be described as characteristics common to both spouses: the date of the marriage, the number of minor children, and finally the shared residence of both spouses had to be filled in, even for divorce proceedings that did not end in divorce, but here we will leave those events aside.

From a demographic perspective the most important piece of information for studying divorce rate is the **date of the marriage** (since 2001 the full date has been recorded, while before it was just the month and the year), from which the length of the duration of the marriage is calculated in reference to the date of the divorce³⁾. Although the number of divorces has not changed much in recent years, there have been significant changes in the structure of divorce by marriage duration.

Over the years there has been a decrease in the number of divorces that occur shortly after the wedding. This is partly the result of new legislation (in 1998 a legal amendment tightened the restrictions on obtaining a divorce shortly after marriage), but it is more owing to the fact that the number of new marriages decreased and people are marrying at a more mature age, often after having lived together for a period. Conversely, a long-term rising trend in the intensity of divorce among older marriages emerged, most markedly among unions longer than ten years in duration. Today these account for almost 60% of all recorded divorces.

Divorce intensity differs primarily according to the duration of marriage. This indicator has in recent years begun to peak in the fifth and sixth year of marriage, compared to the early 1990s when it peaked

Table 5 Divorces by the duration of marriage

Duration of marriage (years)	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006
0-1	2 668	1 724	1 366	1 263	1 331	1 280
2	2 471	2 268	1 639	1 624	1 526	1 400
3	2 422	2 624	2 026	1 790	1 705	1 441
4-5	3 957	4 474	4 477	3 145	3 317	3 225
6-7	3 077	3 470	4 292	3 123	3 008	2 984
8-9	2 446	2 813	3 364	3 179	2 582	2 594
10-14	4 749	4 935	5 871	6 180	7 148	5 681
15-19	3 843	4 029	4 003	3 797	5 188	5 479
20 and more	3 733	4 602	5 427	5 603	7 019	7 331
Total	29 366	30 939	32 465	29 704	32 824	31 415

³⁾ Since 2007 the date of the marriage and the date on which the divorce legally comes into effect are the decisive dates for determining the duration of a marriage.

Table 6 Intensity of divorce by the duration of marriage

Duration of marriage (years)	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
0	0.65	0.60	0.39	0.41	0.37	0.42	0.47	0.57	0.41	0.00	0.28	0.31	0.36	0.38	0.36	0.30
1	2.46	2.23	2.16	2.07	1.88	2.00	2.04	2.27	1.89	2.32	2.11	2.05	2.17	2.15	1.94	2.17
2	3.04	2.87	3.09	3.11	2.97	3.03	2.89	3.01	2.48	2.88	2.89	2.74	2.83	2.81	2.63	2.79
3	2.93	2.75	3.09	3.24	3.46	3.35	3.26	3.15	2.51	3.20	3.12	3.12	3.13	3.01	2.84	2.83
4	2.58	2.55	2.75	2.76	3.07	3.29	3.24	3.18	2.35	3.00	2.97	3.04	3.02	3.01	2.88	3.03
5	2.24	2.23	2.43	2.57	2.61	3.02	3.03	2.90	2.15	2.67	2.82	3.02	2.98	3.06	2.96	3.02
6	1.98	2.07	2.14	2.18	2.34	2.55	2.74	2.70	2.01	2.46	2.75	2.62	2.82	2.87	2.63	2.88
7	1.81	1.83	1.96	2.02	2.09	2.37	2.41	2.47	1.74	2.30	2.51	2.48	2.63	2.60	2.50	2.61
8	1.68	1.57	1.75	1.79	1.86	2.10	2.20	2.19	1.69	2.14	2.39	2.28	2.25	2.50	2.29	2.31
9	1.45	1.47	1.67	1.67	1.69	1.91	1.91	1.91	1.43	2.00	2.07	2.17	2.11	2.30	2.08	2.32
0–4	2.33	2.20	2.30	2.32	2.35	2.42	2.38	2.43	1.93	2.28	2.27	2.25	2.30	2.27	2.13	2.23
5–9	1.83	1.83	1.99	2.05	2.12	2.39	2.46	2.44	1.81	2.31	2.51	2.52	2.56	2.67	2.49	2.63
10–14	1.11	1.10	1.20	1.24	1.30	1.42	1.45	1.51	1.08	1.49	1.68	1.74	1.84	1.90	1.80	1.81
15–19	0.79	0.77	0.83	0.87	0.88	0.96	0.97	1.00	0.70	0.96	1.10	1.18	1.27	1.33	1.33	1.32
20–24	0.50	0.50	0.53	0.58	0.60	0.66	0.64	0.68	0.51	0.65	0.74	0.78	0.87	0.91	0.89	0.92
25 and more	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.26	0.27	0.28	0.24	0.29	0.32	0.34	0.38	0.39	0.41	0.41
Total divorce rate	34.8	33.9	36.2	37.5	38.4	41.8	42.1	43.1	32.5	41.4	44.7	45.7	48.0	49.3	47.3	48.7
Mean marriage duration at divorce	10.1	10.2	10.3	10.5	10.5	10.6	10.7	10.8	10.8	11.0	11.3	11.5	11.8	11.9	12.2	12.0

Table 7 Divorce rate by order

Indicators	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006	1991	1994	1997	2000	2003	2006
	Total divorce rate						Mean marriage duration at divorce					
1st marriages	36.0	39.3	43.6	42.7	50.2	50.8	10.3	10.7	11.0	11.3	12.0	12.5
Remarriages	29.5	30.3	36.2	36.3	40.1	42.0	8.5	9.0	9.2	9.7	10.3	10.4
Total	34.8	37.5	42.1	41.4	48.0	48.7	10.1	10.5	10.7	11.0	11.8	12.0

in the third and fourth years of marriage. The biggest increase in divorce intensity was among marriages of longer duration, and the divorce intensity among marriages more than 25 years in duration almost doubled between 1991 and 2006. In conformity with this development the mean marriage duration at divorce (calculated from the distribution of intensities by marriage duration) in the indicated period increased by almost two years, from 10.1 to 12.0 years.

The total divorce rate, which determines what percentage of marriages would end in divorce if the current rate of divorce by duration of marriage were preserved, has in recent years remained at a level just below fifty percent. It came closest to the fifty-percent mark in 2004 when it reached 49.3%. At the start of the 1990s, though, it was less than 40%. The Czech Republic thus traditionally figures in the top rankings in international comparisons of divorce rates.

Individual intensities, including total divorce rate, can be calculated separately for first marriages and remarriages. Table 7 shows that first marriages have a higher total divorce rate than remarriages; on the other hand, when higher-order marriages end in divorce it is on average approximately two years earlier than in the case of first marriages.

A time series of divorce rates by duration of marriage for a single marriage cohort can be source data for the cumulated divorce rate of the given marriage cohort. Because data on divorces by year of the marriage are only available since 1991, by 2007 it is possible to obtain a divorce rate at most for marriages sixteen years in duration. During this period, 34% of the marriages that took place in 1991 have ended in divorce. Data on the divorce rates of ten-year marriages is available for seven marriage cohorts (1991–1997): 23–24% of these marriages ended in divorce.

The highest divorce rate so far is observed in the cohort of marriages from 1998, of which 12.0% of couples divorced after five years and 20.3% after eight years (Table 8). Conversely, in the next marriage cohorts, of marriages that took place in the year 1999 and 2000, a lower intensity of divorce in the first

Table 8 Cumulated divorce intensity of marriage cohort by the duration of marriage (age-cohort specific events)

Duration of marriage	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
1	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4
2	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.6	
3	5.9	5.6	5.4	5.2	5.5	5.2	5.4	5.8	4.9	5.0	5.3	5.2	5.1	5.6		
4	9.3	9.1	8.5	8.6	8.1	8.2	8.5	8.9	8.1	8.2	8.1	8.1	8.1			
5	12.5	12.3	11.9	11.0	10.9	11.3	11.4	12.0	11.3	11.0	11.1	11.3				
6	15.6	15.4	14.2	13.5	13.8	14.3	14.3	15.1	14.3	14.0	14.2					
7	18.4	17.4	16.5	16.2	16.5	17.0	17.2	17.7	17.2	17.1						
8	20.4	19.5	18.9	18.8	19.0	19.7	19.7	20.3	20.0							
9	22.4	21.8	21.2	21.1	21.4	22.0	22.0	22.9								
10	24.5	23.8	23.3	23.3	23.5	24.3	24.5									
11	26.6	25.8	25.5	25.3	25.6	26.5										
12	28.5	27.8	27.4	27.2	27.8											
13	30.5	29.6	29.2	29.1												
14	32.3	31.4	31.0													
15	33.9	33.2														

Note: The data also reflect divorces in made in 2007.

Table 9 Average marriage duration at divorce by citizenship

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Divorces of males-foreigners	9.3	8.3	8.4	7.3	6.7	7.8	7.2	8.0	7.4	7.8	7.6	7.5
Divorces of females-foreigners	10.5	11.2	10.3	8.9	9.1	8.3	8.7	8.7	8.2	8.3	8.3	7.9
Divorces of two foreigners	11.8	12.4	12.7	9.4	10.6	10.2	9.4	10.8	11.3	12.5	13.3	12.2
Divorces of two citizens of the CR	11.0	11.4	11.7	12.0	12.2	12.5	12.8	13.1	13.5	13.7	14.1	14.1
Total divorces	11.0	11.3	11.6	11.8	12.0	12.3	12.6	12.9	13.3	13.4	13.8	13.7

Note: Calculated from absolute data on duration of marriage.

years of marriage was observed, but its cumulative divorce intensity after six years of marriage drew even and then even surpassed the divorce rate of other cohorts, e.g. the 1994 and 1995 cohorts.

While the mean marriage duration at divorce has generally increased since the mid-1990s, this indicator has exhibited the opposite trend among marriages in which one of the spouses had foreign citizenship. In the late 20th century this trend was decreasing and is now below eight years, thus an average of six years fewer than the average of divorced marriages in which both partners are Czech citizens. The trend in the average duration of marriages in which both partners are foreigners is very uneven, as in absolute figures the numbers are very small. However, it can be said that marriages between two foreigners on average divorce later than those in which only one spouse is a foreigner.

Another piece of data characterising dissolved marriages is the **number of (living) children** born of marriage. Until 1994 both the total number of children and the number of minor children were indicated in the Divorce Reports, but since 1995 only data on the number of (living) minor children from the marriage are available. (The Civic Code defines the age of majority as the age of 18.)

As the share of older marriages among divorces has increased over the observed period, the share of divorces with minor children has decreased: while in 1991, 71.7% of divorced marriages had minor children, in 2006 it was only 60.5%. Data on the structure of divorces by the number of minor children (Table 10) confirm that the 1998 amendment to the Family Act above all impacted families with young children – the temporary decrease in the number of divorces in 1999 was caused by a decrease in the number of divorces of marriages with minor children.

What has not changed over the course of the years is the structure of divorced marriages with minor children by their number: over the observed period, 55–59% of these divorced marriages were families with one minor child, 36–38% had two minor children, and just 5–6% had three children. The average number of children in divorced families has long remained constant at 1.5.

The number of minor children in a family understandably has much to do with the duration of a mar-


Table 10 Divorces by number of minor children

Number of minor children	1991	1994	1997	1998	1999	2000	2003	2006
0	8 313	8 650	9 862	10 727	9 480	10 637	12 119	12 412
1	11 638	12 902	13 274	12 607	8 199	11 084	11 748	11 004
2	8 076	8 124	8 144	7 802	5 248	7 015	7 929	7 085
3	1 176	1 091	1 006	994	632	813	853	774
4	134	146	144	183	80	127	132	98
5 or more	29	26	35	50	18	28	43	42
Total divorces	29 366	30 939	32 465	32 363	23 657	29 704	32 824	31 415
Divorces with minors	21 053	22 289	22 603	21 636	14 177	19 067	20 705	19 003
incl: with one child (%)	55.3	57.9	58.7	58.3	57.8	58.1	56.7	57.9
with two children (%)	38.4	36.4	36.0	36.1	37.0	36.8	38.3	37.3
with 3 or more children (%)	6.4	5.7	5.2	5.7	5.1	5.1	5.0	4.8
Proportion of divorces with minors (%)	71.7	72.0	69.6	66.9	59.9	64.2	63.1	60.5
Average number of minor children in family with minors	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Number of minor children	32 014	33 143	33 332	32 192	21 005	28 215	30 927	28 117

riage. Figure 5 shows the curves capturing the number of divorces by the number of minor children and by the duration of a marriage in 2006. The distribution of divorces without minor children shows two peaks: one shortly after the start of a marriage, when the couples is still childless, and the second after about 22 years of marriage, when the couple’s children have already reached the age of majority. The same is true of divorces with one minor child, the only difference being that the first peak comes approximately three years later, and the second peak comes earlier, around 20 years of marriage. The divorce curve for families with two minor children has one peak, which in the early 1990s stretched over the broad interval of 8–18 years after the wedding, with the number of divorces in families of this size surpassing the number of divorces in other groups defined by the number of minor children. Today the interval in which families with two minor children form the largest divorce group is narrower, with the 15-year duration mark forming the top end of the interval. The absolute number of divorces in families with three or more minor children is substantially lower compared to the other groups and the number rises with the duration of the marriage, peaking after 15–18 years of marriage, and then dropping sharply.

Another piece of data that is common to both divorcing spouses is their last shared **place of residence**, which provides information on the regional distribution of divorce. There are regional variations

Figure 5 Divorces by duration of marriage and the number of minor children, 2006



not just in the overall divorce rate (measured as total divorce rates), but also, for example, in the share of higher-order divorces or in the mean marriage duration at divorce. However, here we shall refrain from describing these regional differences and shall just note that generally there is a higher divorce rate in the regions of Northwest Bohemia and in recent years also in the Středočeský region (a total divorce rate of over 50%), while the lowest divorce rate is traditionally recorded in the Vysočina region (39% in 2006), and the Pardubický, Jihomoravský, and Zlínský regions.

Conclusion

The data provided in the Divorce Reports are generally sufficient to meet the needs of demographic statistics, that is, for calculating intensity indicators, while the most interesting data relate to information that tells us more about the divorced marriages. However, the informative capacity of some items in the Divorce Report (the cause of the breakdown of marriage, education) is reduced by the fact that the provision of some information is optional or need not be determined. Moreover, Divorce Reports do not meet the requirements (and thus are not intended) for conducting a deeper analysis of divorce, and for that we have to turn to other studies, such as sociological studies, which focus on the factors that influence divorce and the timing of divorce, the accessibility of divorce, family arrangements after divorce, and society's view of divorce. It is also important to interpret divorce rates in relation to nuptiality intensity.

The Czech Republic has long had a consistently high divorce rate: almost every second marriage ends in divorce. Even at the international level the Czech total divorce rate is one of the highest, alongside Scandinavian and Russian divorce rates, though international comparisons are not simple given the differences in divorce legislation in various countries. In recent years the structure of divorces in the Czech Republic has changed in the direction of more divorces among marriages of long duration.

Michaela Němečková

Population and vital statistics of the Czech Republic: 2008, regions and districts

Area	Population 1 July	Population 31 December	Mar- riages	Divorces	Live births	Abor- tions	Deaths		Increase (decrease)			Mar- riages per 1000 inhabitants	Live births per 1000 inhabitants	Deaths per 1000 inhabitants	Total increase
							Total	Within 1 year	Within 28 days	Natural	Net migration				
Czech Republic	10 429 692	10 467 542	52 457	31 300	119 570	41 446	104 948	338	14 622	71 790	86 412	5.0	11.5	10.1	8.3
Capital City of Prague Region	1 225 281	1 233 211	6 580	3 666	14 339	4 694	12 269	21	2 070	19 044	21 114	5.4	11.7	10.0	17.2
Středočeský Region	1 216 772	1 230 691	6 320	3 695	15 246	4 992	12 255	41	2 991	25 873	28 864	5.2	12.5	10.1	23.7
Benešov	92 989	93 446	500	233	1 065	388	1 042	4	23	792	815	5.4	2.5	11.5	8.8
Beroun	82 088	82 941	419	154	983	377	791	5	192	1 442	1 634	5.1	1.9	12.0	9.6
Kladno	156 479	157 375	815	538	1 918	744	1 689	5	229	1 882	2 061	5.2	3.4	12.3	13.2
Kolín	93 711	94 370	476	276	1 070	385	960	2	110	1 218	1 328	5.1	2.9	11.4	14.2
Kutná Hora	74 661	74 850	344	197	768	270	815	1	-47	312	265	4.6	2.6	10.3	3.5
Mělník	99 003	100 049	535	351	1 215	448	1 004	4	211	2 142	2 353	5.4	3.5	12.3	10.1
Mladá Boleslav	122 034	123 363	617	426	1 500	463	1 132	2	368	2 216	2 584	5.1	3.5	12.3	9.3
Nymburk	89 487	90 195	504	324	1 178	355	951	4	227	1 112	1 339	5.6	3.6	13.2	10.6
Praha-východ	131 370	135 484	685	400	1 973	493	1 206	2	767	7 676	8 443	5.2	3.0	15.0	64.3
Praha-západ	109 343	112 211	589	302	1 723	407	867	4	856	5 307	6 163	5.4	2.8	15.8	7.9
Příbram	111 327	111 714	530	328	1 224	431	1 198	6	26	795	821	4.8	2.9	11.0	10.8
Rakovník	54 280	54 693	306	166	629	231	600	2	29	1 029	1 058	5.6	3.1	11.6	11.1
Jihočeský Region	634 614	636 328	3 112	1 966	7 155	2 296	6 347	19	808	2 256	3 064	4.9	11.3	10.0	4.8
České Budějovice	184 845	185 584	939	604	2 123	779	1 756	9	367	961	1 328	5.1	3.3	11.5	9.5
Český Krumlov	61 364	61 516	310	231	765	334	533	4	232	23	255	5.1	3.8	12.5	7.2
Jindřichův Hradec	92 838	93 298	414	259	998	306	908	2	90	515	605	4.5	2.8	10.7	9.8
Písek	70 460	70 550	331	204	770	178	777	1	-7	247	240	4.7	2.9	10.9	3.4
Prachatice	51 476	51 548	236	156	588	183	539	-	49	29	78	4.6	3.0	11.4	1.5
Strakonice	71 020	71 054	338	218	812	172	786	2	26	341	367	4.8	3.1	11.4	11.1
Tábor	102 611	102 778	544	294	1 099	344	1 048	1	51	140	191	5.3	2.9	10.7	10.2
Plzeňský Region	566 080	569 627	2 763	1 604	6 385	2 617	5 785	17	600	7 953	8 553	4.9	2.8	11.3	15.1
Domazlice	60 017	60 239	300	165	739	259	568	1	171	337	508	5.0	2.7	12.3	8.5
Klatovy	88 566	88 669	417	271	892	349	948	1	-56	380	324	4.7	3.1	10.1	10.7
Plzeň-město	183 568	185 125	923	514	2 104	1 004	1 841	7	263	4 063	4 326	5.0	2.8	11.5	10.0
Plzeň-jih	60 300	60 856	301	154	677	213	620	-	57	1 148	1 205	5.0	2.6	11.2	10.3
Plzeň-sever	73 535	74 003	358	209	872	309	770	5	102	840	942	4.9	2.8	11.9	10.5
Rokycany	46 998	47 341	221	121	497	199	561	3	-64	643	579	4.7	2.6	10.6	11.9
Tachov	53 096	53 394	243	170	604	284	477	-	127	542	669	4.6	3.2	11.4	9.0

(Continued)

Area	Population 1 July	Population 31 December	Mar- riages	Divorces	Live births	Abor- tions	Deaths			Increase (decrease)			Mar- riages per 1000 inhabitants	Live births per 1000 inhabitants	Deaths per 1000 inhabitants	Total increase
							Total	Within 1 year	Within 28 days	Natural	Net migration	Total				
Karlovarský Region	308 577	308 403	1 514	1 155	3 562	1 615	3 023	11	7	539	415	954	4.9	11.5	9.8	3.1
Cheb	95 463	95 452	428	309	1 116	568	919	5	2	197	52	249	4.5	11.7	9.6	2.6
Sokolov	93 022	93 028	484	322	1 100	476	890	4	3	210	-263	-53	5.2	11.8	9.6	-0.6
Ústecký Region	834 283	835 891	4 477	2 889	10 031	4 631	8 809	42	30	1 222	3 489	4 711	5.4	12.0	10.6	5.6
Děčín	135 690	135 710	716	480	1 595	777	1 404	4	4	191	269	269	3.5	11.8	10.3	2.0
Chomutov	126 121	126 353	717	510	1 563	738	1 209	4	4	354	256	610	5.7	12.4	9.6	4.8
Litoměřice	117 816	118 243	604	359	1 425	474	1 305	13	11	120	964	1 084	5.1	12.1	11.1	9.2
Louny	86 949	87 197	479	241	994	457	905	4	1	89	398	487	5.5	11.4	10.4	5.6
Most	117 094	117 294	640	399	1 395	632	1 212	4	3	183	383	334	5.5	11.9	10.4	4.8
Teplice	129 796	130 070	674	426	1 542	834	1 538	6	3	4	864	868	5.2	11.9	11.8	6.7
Ústí nad Labem	120 817	121 024	647	474	1 517	719	1 236	7	6	281	546	827	5.4	12.6	10.2	6.8
Liberecký Region	435 790	437 325	2 343	1 400	5 220	2 092	4 295	19	14	925	2 452	3 377	5.4	12.0	9.9	7.7
Česká Lípa	103 647	103 990	589	362	1 331	597	962	5	4	369	367	736	5.7	12.8	9.3	7.1
Jabonec nad Nisou	89 812	90 076	445	294	1 042	464	891	4	3	151	475	626	5.0	11.6	9.9	7.0
Liberec	167 674	168 561	973	556	2 044	780	1 640	10	7	404	1 610	2 014	5.8	12.2	9.8	12.0
Semily	74 657	74 698	336	188	803	251	802	-	-	1	-	1	4.5	10.8	10.7	0.0
Královéhradecký Region	553 513	554 520	2 738	1 515	6 254	2 228	5 526	12	9	728	1 580	2 308	4.9	11.3	10.0	4.2
Hradec Králové	161 966	162 377	829	420	1 857	707	1 619	3	3	238	790	1 028	5.1	11.5	10.0	6.3
Jičín	79 112	79 585	375	175	865	320	839	2	1	26	707	733	4.7	10.9	10.6	9.3
Náchod	112 574	112 582	560	342	1 281	398	1 128	3	2	153	-78	75	5.0	11.4	10.0	0.7
Rychnov nad Kněžnou	79 173	79 198	385	208	877	290	779	1	1	98	58	156	4.9	11.1	9.8	2.0
Trutnov	120 688	120 778	589	370	1 374	513	1 161	3	2	213	103	316	4.9	11.4	9.6	2.6
Parubický Region	513 703	515 185	2 470	1 292	5 752	1 753	5 087	23	15	665	3 120	3 785	4.8	11.2	9.9	7.4
Chrudim	104 109	104 351	463	266	1 140	354	1 049	6	5	91	400	491	4.4	11.0	10.1	4.7
Parubice	165 654	166 519	847	490	1 872	501	1 667	4	2	205	2 388	2 593	5.1	11.3	10.1	15.7
Švitavy	104 818	104 934	502	259	1 152	393	1 065	6	3	87	91	178	4.8	11.0	10.2	1.7
Ústí nad Orlicí	139 122	139 381	658	277	1 588	505	1 306	7	5	282	241	523	4.7	11.4	9.4	3.8
Vysočina Region	514 387	515 411	2 332	1 343	5 649	1 746	4 881	12	7	768	966	1 734	4.5	11.0	9.5	3.4
Havlíčkův Brod	95 805	96 079	405	236	1 037	354	966	1	-	51	410	461	4.2	11.0	10.3	4.8
Jihlava	111 629	112 031	552	301	1 351	408	987	3	3	364	410	774	4.9	12.7	12.1	8.8
Pelhřimov	73 092	73 227	301	189	728	235	717	2	1	11	258	269	4.1	10.0	9.8	3.7
Třebíč	114 051	114 028	486	340	1 200	357	1 108	4	2	92	-217	-125	4.3	10.5	9.7	-1.1
Žďár nad Sázavou	119 810	120 046	588	277	1 333	392	1 063	2	1	250	105	355	4.9	11.1	9.0	3.0

(End of table)

Area	Population 1 July	Population 31 December	Mar- riages	Divorces	Live births	Abor- tions	Deaths		Increase (decrease)		Mar- riages	Di- vorces	Live births	Deaths	Total increase		
							Total	Within 1 year	Within 28 days	Natural						Net migration	Total
Jihomoravský Region	1 143 615	1 147 146	5 802	3 334	13 196	3 796	11 262	37	21	1 934	4 678	6 612	5.1	2.9	11.5	9.8	5.8
Blansko	106 008	106 248	547	258	1 259	331	1 064	6	4	195	390	585	5.2	2.4	11.9	10.0	5.5
Brno-venkov	196 800	198 379	952	610	2 470	556	1 807	7	3	663	2 072	2 735	4.8	3.1	12.6	9.2	13.9
Břeclav	113 229	113 479	545	260	1 181	400	1 049	5	2	132	176	308	4.8	2.3	10.4	9.3	2.7
Hodonín	157 116	157 084	697	390	1 559	455	1 558	5	2	1	-93	-92	4.4	2.5	9.9	9.9	-0.6
Vyškov	87 792	88 057	439	267	996	288	865	3	2	131	407	538	5.0	3.0	11.3	9.9	6.1
Znojmo	113 011	113 307	524	318	1 241	466	1 103	1	1	138	341	479	4.6	2.8	11.0	9.8	4.2
Olomoucký Region	641 822	642 137	3 098	1 884	7 118	2 145	6 433	18	9	685	-339	346	4.8	2.9	11.1	10.0	0.5
Jeseník	41 487	41 404	180	112	412	143	435	1	-	-23	-138	-161	4.3	2.7	9.9	10.5	-3.9
Olomouc	230 847	231 339	1 165	755	2 664	732	2 208	7	5	456	276	732	5.0	3.3	11.5	9.6	3.2
Prostějov	109 976	110 159	532	310	1 257	369	1 220	2	2	37	143	180	4.8	2.8	11.4	11.1	1.6
Přerov	135 044	134 722	615	398	1 422	459	1 402	-	-	20	-463	-443	4.6	2.9	10.5	10.4	-3.3
Šumperk	124 468	124 513	606	309	1 363	442	1 168	8	2	195	-157	38	4.9	2.5	11.0	9.4	0.3
Zlínský Region	591 087	591 412	2 710	1 593	6 261	1 877	6 002	13	9	259	373	632	4.6	2.7	10.6	10.2	1.1
Kroměříž	107 839	107 875	475	327	1 124	358	1 147	5	4	-23	109	86	4.4	3.0	10.4	10.6	0.8
Uherské Hradiště	144 377	144 533	660	338	1 467	444	1 464	2	1	3	288	291	4.6	2.3	10.2	10.1	2.0
Vsetín	145 788	145 850	633	347	1 568	438	1 413	1	-	155	-86	89	4.3	2.4	10.8	9.7	0.6
Zlín	193 083	193 154	942	581	2 102	637	1 978	5	4	124	42	166	4.9	3.0	10.9	10.2	0.9
Moravskoslezský Region	1 250 168	1 250 255	6 198	3 964	13 402	4 964	12 974	53	36	428	-70	358	5.0	3.2	10.7	10.4	0.3
Brno	97 974	97 868	473	360	1 014	428	1 016	5	3	-2	-278	-280	4.8	3.7	10.3	10.4	-2.9
Frydek-Místek	210 691	211 070	1 030	631	2 207	844	2 175	9	6	32	669	701	4.9	3.0	10.5	10.3	3.3
Karviná	275 174	274 863	1 365	960	2 805	1 158	1 817	16	11	-12	-522	-534	5.0	3.5	10.2	10.2	-1.9
Nový Jičín	152 464	152 506	713	423	1 647	510	1 499	3	3	148	6	154	4.7	2.8	10.8	9.8	1.0
Opava	176 980	177 213	862	460	1 966	666	1 875	7	6	91	302	393	4.9	2.6	11.1	10.6	2.2
Ostrava-město	336 885	336 735	1 755	1 130	3 763	1 358	3 592	13	7	171	-247	-76	5.2	3.4	11.2	10.7	-0.2

Radek Havel

Population and vital statistics of the Czech Republic in towns with a population above 20 thous.: 2008

Town	Population	Population	Population		Marriages	Divorces	Live births	Abortions	Deaths	Increase (decrease)		Marriages	Divorces	Live births	Deaths	Total increase
	1 July	31 December	Natural	Net migration						Total	per 1000 inhabitants					
Praha	1 225 281	1 233 211	6 580	3 666	14 339	4 694	12 269	2 070	19 044	21 114	5.4	3.0	11.7	10.0	17.2	
Brno	369 659	370 592	2 098	1 231	4 490	1 300	3 816	674	1 385	2 059	5.7	3.3	12.1	10.3	5.6	
Ostrava	308 211	307 767	1 623	1 054	3 481	1 308	3 299	182	-789	-607	5.3	3.4	11.3	10.7	-2.0	
Pízeň	167 864	169 273	851	477	1 918	930	1 700	218	3 817	4 035	5.1	2.8	11.4	10.1	24.0	
Liberec	100 286	100 914	589	346	1 253	464	975	278	915	1 193	5.9	3.5	12.5	9.7	11.9	
Olomouc	100 313	100 373	543	344	1 186	320	965	221	-221	-	5.4	3.4	11.8	9.6	-	
Ústí nad Labem	95 235	95 289	528	382	1 139	417	933	284	45	329	5.5	4.0	12.8	9.8	3.5	
České Budějovice	95 034	94 996	526	340	1 139	490	903	236	-371	-135	5.5	3.6	12.0	9.5	-1.4	
Hradec Králové	94 417	94 497	533	273	1 082	447	939	143	102	245	5.6	2.9	11.5	9.9	2.6	
Pardubice	89 900	89 892	507	265	1 024	293	910	114	533	647	5.6	2.9	11.4	10.1	7.2	
Havířov	83 873	83 558	439	348	826	355	840	-14	-461	-475	5.2	4.1	9.8	10.0	-5.7	
Zlín	77 949	77 803	423	231	882	323	852	30	-293	-263	5.4	3.0	11.3	10.9	-3.4	
Kladno	69 928	69 906	383	258	838	368	750	88	143	231	5.5	3.7	12.0	10.7	3.3	
Most	67 533	67 438	392	242	770	386	648	122	-227	-105	5.8	3.6	11.4	9.6	-1.6	
Karviná	62 791	62 661	295	201	626	279	653	-27	-193	-220	4.7	3.2	10.0	10.4	-3.5	
Frydek-Místek	59 152	59 007	313	224	653	310	555	98	-324	-226	5.3	3.8	11.0	9.4	-3.8	
Opava	58 924	58 807	297	189	637	288	660	-23	-93	-116	5.0	3.2	10.8	11.2	-2.0	
Děčín	52 510	52 282	286	187	610	307	559	51	-278	-227	5.4	3.6	11.6	10.6	-4.3	
Teplice	51 527	51 461	283	185	594	361	579	15	-15	-	5.5	3.6	11.5	11.2	-	
Karlovy Vary	51 553	51 459	266	255	526	218	548	-22	279	257	5.2	4.9	10.2	10.6	5.0	
Jihlava	50 934	51 143	295	145	660	202	438	222	126	348	5.8	2.8	13.0	8.6	6.8	
Chomutov	49 909	49 926	302	189	595	334	465	130	-86	44	6.1	3.8	11.9	9.3	0.9	
Prerov	46 844	46 503	210	163	487	160	425	62	-596	-534	4.5	3.5	10.4	9.1	-11.4	
Mladá Boleslav	45 144	45 507	224	151	554	176	396	158	747	905	5.0	3.3	12.3	8.8	20.0	
Prostějov	45 507	45 378	213	141	511	177	516	-5	-292	-297	4.7	3.1	11.2	11.3	-6.5	
Jablonec nad Nisou	45 248	45 254	239	160	506	273	401	105	98	203	5.3	3.5	11.2	8.9	4.5	
Třebíč	38 438	38 362	187	154	462	164	295	167	-298	-131	4.9	4.0	12.0	7.7	-3.4	
Česká Lípa	38 386	38 318	230	140	506	247	306	200	-197	3	6.0	3.6	13.2	8.0	0.1	
Třinec	37 593	37 569	214	119	404	157	400	4	-92	-88	5.7	3.2	10.7	10.6	-2.3	
Tábor	35 625	35 593	176	131	363	162	351	12	-188	-176	4.9	3.7	10.2	9.9	-4.9	
Cháb	34 945	34 873	171	131	411	288	319	92	-37	55	4.9	3.7	11.8	9.1	1.6	
Znojmo	34 732	34 759	184	115	390	191	328	62	-38	24	5.3	3.3	11.2	9.4	0.7	
Příbram	34 546	34 496	187	119	383	146	342	41	-136	-95	5.4	3.4	11.1	9.9	-2.7	
Orlová	32 789	32 738	171	123	367	145	286	81	-261	-180	5.2	3.8	11.2	8.7	-5.5	
Trutnov	31 056	31 039	164	103	360	163	250	110	-64	46	5.3	3.3	11.6	8.0	1.5	
Kolín	30 939	31 014	171	103	340	156	299	41	237	278	5.5	3.3	11.0	9.7	9.0	

(End of table)

Town	Population 1 July	Population 31 December	Marriages	Divorces	Live births	Abortions	Deaths	Increase (decrease)			Mar- riages	Divorces per 1000 inhabitants	Live births	Deaths	Total increase
								Natural	Net migration	Total					
Písek	29 955	29 972	134	98	351	46	304	47	27	74	4.5	3.3	11.7	10.1	2.5
Kroměříž	29 048	29 046	125	80	273	106	336	-63	73	10	4.3	2.8	9.4	11.6	0.3
Veselín	27 865	27 759	125	75	323	94	267	56	-260	-204	4.5	2.7	11.6	9.6	-7.3
Šumperk	27 860	27 754	133	79	281	97	268	13	-205	-192	4.8	2.8	10.1	9.6	-6.9
Litvínov	27 348	27 502	137	89	356	119	316	40	344	384	5.0	3.3	13.0	11.6	14.0
Valašské Meziříčí	27 313	27 290	104	88	290	78	263	27	-73	-46	3.8	3.2	10.6	9.6	-1.7
Nový Jičín	25 993	25 939	134	86	302	100	277	25	-157	-132	5.2	3.3	11.6	10.7	-5.1
Hodonín	25 799	25 687	122	86	256	118	237	19	-229	-210	4.7	3.3	9.9	9.2	-8.1
Uherské Hradiště	25 751	25 677	124	80	278	97	238	40	-228	-188	4.8	3.1	10.8	9.2	-7.3
Český Těšín	25 573	25 579	128	77	297	121	255	42	-96	-54	5.0	3.0	11.6	10.0	-2.1
Krnov	25 157	25 090	137	90	219	109	253	-34	-87	-121	5.4	3.6	8.7	10.1	-4.8
Havičkův Brod	24 601	24 668	95	67	293	145	258	35	127	162	3.9	2.7	11.9	10.5	6.6
Sokolov	24 500	24 467	143	95	274	132	249	25	-46	-21	5.8	3.9	11.2	10.2	-0.9
Břeclav	24 248	24 242	120	70	261	117	229	32	-109	-77	4.9	2.9	10.8	9.4	-3.2
Litoměřice	23 793	23 823	131	82	295	127	248	47	8	55	5.5	3.4	12.4	10.4	2.3
Žďár nad Sázavou	23 634	23 478	111	71	239	118	189	50	-289	-239	4.7	3.0	10.1	8.0	-10.1
Chrudim	23 380	23 374	113	71	266	109	222	44	-49	-5	4.8	3.0	11.4	9.5	-0.2
Strakonice	23 334	23 278	117	86	274	63	235	39	-41	-2	5.0	3.7	11.7	10.1	-0.1
Kopřivnice	23 200	23 172	123	78	240	90	170	70	-146	-76	5.3	3.4	10.3	7.3	-3.3
Bohumín	22 987	22 976	119	71	249	119	252	-3	65	62	5.2	3.1	10.8	11.0	2.7
Klatovy	22 852	22 817	126	96	223	121	230	-7	-66	-73	5.5	4.2	9.8	10.1	-3.2
Jindřichův Hradec	22 350	22 457	102	81	250	95	194	56	101	157	4.6	3.6	11.2	8.7	7.0
Vyškov	21 878	21 875	112	82	228	68	199	29	-55	-26	5.1	3.7	10.4	9.1	-1.2
Kutná Hora	21 507	21 646	99	75	248	96	194	54	148	202	4.6	3.5	11.5	9.0	9.4
Blansko	21 038	21 106	116	54	254	75	173	81	105	186	5.5	2.6	12.1	8.2	8.8
Jirkov	20 945	20 894	131	95	276	141	197	79	-109	-30	6.3	4.5	13.2	9.4	-1.4
Náchod	20 851	20 842	103	71	243	87	220	23	-79	-56	4.9	3.4	11.7	10.6	-2.7

Radek Havel

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